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Essays on Matching Markets:
Course Allocation, Team Formation, and P2P Lending Markets
Hoda Atef Yekta
University of Connecticut
Abstract
In this dissertation we analyze matching markets using two broad methodologies. In the first two
of three essays, we use integer programming to design new practical markets, solving difficult
organizational problems in which items like a seat in a classroom course or membership on a
project team are allocated to agents who express their preferences to a centralized planner. In the
third essay, we employ empirical modeling to study the signals sent among three types of agents
in a peer-to-peer (P2P) lending market: borrowers, lenders, and a (rating-service) platform. The
first two essays use extensive simulations, while the third uses statistical analysis on a large
empirical dataset: four years of loan application and payment history from a prominent online
P2P lending platform.
Our findings in the first essay show that large but manageable course allocation problems can be
solved with various multi-stage optimization algorithms, providing much better outcomes than
existing benchmarks from the literature on metrics of efficiency, fairness, and incentivecompatibility. We demonstrate robustness of our techniques by simulating over a variety of
market parameters, including varying degrees of manipulation over a range of common to private
value utility functions. These results show promising new practical designs that can satisfy more
organizational objectives than previous methods.
In the second essay, we find that the much harder (interpersonal) quadratic-interaction
optimization in an agent-based team formation game requires advanced computational technique.
In the pursuit of a balance between the competing objectives efficiency and group stability, we
explore the cutting-edge of computational operations research. In contrast to existing draft-based
systems that favor distributed, intuitive heuristics, we solve the extremely difficult centralized
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optimization problems directly, with positive results using a new technique for bi-level
optimization in this context, based on a customized column generation framework. Again, the
results produce a promising new optimization framework for a practical problem, and our results
compare favorably with existing methods.
Finally, the results of the third essay show just how complex behavior in real-world matching
markets can be through the empirical analysis of a real market. We verify a few intuitive results,
but also find some counterintuitive interactions, in which a monotonically increasing signal from
the market platform results in a non-monotonic return on investment (ROI), for example.
Overall, we find risk-seeking behavior among peer investors that does not tend to pay off, and
some strange disconnects in which, for example, investors favor “Debt Consolidation” loans
despite inferior ROI, and have a prejudice against “Business” loans despite no significant
evidence of poor performance.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Matching theory has a long history as a branch of game theory, and was recognized with the
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2012. In recent decades, applications of matching theory
and the framework of “marriage” and “roommate” markets have included successful programs
for matching students to schools, applicants to public housing, workers to jobs, and courses to
students, to name a few. In first two essays of this dissertation, we analyze new extensions of
matching theory and simulate new applications. In a third essay, we turn our attention from nonmonetary markets to an empirical study of peer-to-peer (P2P) lending markets, which often take
the form of matching markets with a prescribed monetary contract (i.e., an exogenous platformdetermined interest rate).
In the first essay of this dissertation, Chapter 2, we focus on a many-to-many matching
problem in which a set of objects are distributed among a set of agents based on agent
preference. A familiar example of this problem is the “course allocation problem” in which
scarce classroom capacity is assigned to students when several particular courses experience
significant excess demand. In recent years, several universities have adopted an algorithmic
approach to the allocation of seats in courses, in which students place bids, and then seats are
awarded according to a predetermined procedure or mechanism. Although designing the
appropriate mechanism for translating bids into student schedules has received attention in the
literature, there is currently no consensus on the best mechanism in practice. Thus, we introduce
five new algorithms for this problem, using various combinations of matching algorithms,
second-price concepts, and optimization, and compare our new methods to the natural
benchmarks from the literature.
1

In a second essay, Chapter 3, we worked on an extension of the roommate problem, called
the team formation problem (TFP), in which a group of N agents are to be partitioned into M
groups of size N/M (or floor(N/M) and ceiling(N/M) when N/M is non-integer). Such problems
arise in project management, military platooning, sports-league management, and in assigning
MBA group-projects, for example. This problem can be modeled similar to the marriage or
roommate problems in which we prefer “stable solutions,” i.e., solutions in which no group of
people would be mutually better off leaving their team assignment to form their own team.
Unlike the marriage problem, however, there may be no stable solution, and a tractable algorithm
for finding stable solutions when they exist is currently unknown. Further, partitioning the
market in order to maximize total utility is an NP-hard problem. In this essay, we present a
column generation scheme which provides orders of magnitude speedups over existing
algorithms for partitioning the market with respect to a quadratic objective function. We also
define new metrics for measuring stability and compare our solutions with those obtained by
existing algorithms on measures of efficiency, fairness, stability, and the effect of strategic
behavior.
In a third essay, Chapter 4, we turn our attention to peer-to-peer lending markets that matches
many lenders to many borrowers. In these markets, lenders select a portfolio of unsecured
personal loans to fund, in full or partially. Having collected a large dataset of publicly available
loan information for over four years of loan origination requests (with all follow-up data through
the completion of 36-month loan terms) from an anonymous lending platform, this study seeks to
shed light on the interplay between the players in these markets, showing how signals from one
class of participant effects the behavior of others using data analytics. In particular, we first
explore the borrowers’ disclosed personal information and analyze the response of the platform
2

as well as the investors to these signals. Then, we analyze the response of investors to the
platform signals and examine how closely investors follow the signals provided by the platform.
Finally, we study the efficiency of both the borrower self-reported information as well as the P2P
lending platform signals in predicting the success of each loan.

3

Chapter 2. Optimization-based Mechanisms for the Course Allocation
Problem
Abstract:
In recent years, several universities have adopted an algorithmic approach to the allocation of seats in
courses, in which students place bids (typically by ordering or scoring desirable courses), and then seats
are awarded according to a predetermined procedure or mechanism. Designing the appropriate
mechanism for translating bids into student schedules has received attention in the literature, but there is
currently no consensus on the best mechanism in practice. In this paper, we introduce five new algorithms
for this course allocation problem, using various combinations of matching algorithms, second-price
concepts, and optimization, and compare our new methods to the natural benchmarks from the literature:
the (proxy) draft mechanism and the (greedy) bidding-point mechanism. Using simulation, we compare
the algorithms on metrics of fairness, efficiency, and incentive compatibility, measuring their ability to
encourage truth-telling among boundedly-rational agents. We find good results for all of our methods, and
that a two-stage full-market optimization performs best in measures of fairness and efficiency, but with
slightly worse incentives to act strategically compared to the best of the mechanisms. We also find
generally negative results for the bidding-point mechanism, which performs poorly in all categories.
These results can help guide the decision of selecting a mechanism for course allocation or for similar
assignment problems, such as project team assignments, or sports drafts, for example, where efficiency
and fairness are of utmost importance, but incentives must also be considered. Additional robustness
checks and comparisons are provided in a series of online appendices.
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1. Introduction
The allocation of scarce classroom capacity to students is a challenging process for many universities
when several particular courses experience significant excess demand. Similarities in students’
preferences, limits on the number of semesters to complete a program, and a limited number of seats
(especially in MBA programs) intensify the importance of what has become known as the course
allocation problem (CAP). In the last three decades, several universities, especially highly-ranked (and
thus heavily demanded) business schools like Stanford Business School, Harvard Business School, Ross
School of Business at University of Michigan, and Columbia Business School have tried to improve their
mechanisms for allocating courses among students and have tested different methods to manage and solve
this problem (Krishna & Ünver, 2008).
In this paper, we consider several metrics relevant to a university in making these decisions, in order
to compare the practicality of newly introduced optimization-based approaches and two standard
benchmarks on simulated data. These metrics can be categorized into three groups and described as
follows:
Measures of Efficiency
An allocation is Pareto efficient if no student can be made better off without making another student
worse off. Some mechanisms are not even Pareto efficient with respect to the submitted preferences (i.e.,
may not be Pareto efficient even when all players reveal their preferences truthfully.)
The allocative efficiency of a market outcome measures the total market utility (satisfaction) over all
players, reflecting that the goal of a university is to satisfy students as much as possible with their most
preferred courses. Total market utility can be measured with a (traditional) cardinal utility objective
function, or an ordinal utility objective (comparing only the relative rankings of courses), or a binary
utility objective (simply measuring the total number of seats assigned by the market.)
Measures of Fairness
5

The range and standard deviation of individual student utility provide measures of dispersion among the
students, with high values indicating outcomes that would be viewed as highly unequal among students
and thus unfair. As with allocative efficiency, fairness can be measured using cardinal, ordinal, or binary
utility measures. For example, under binary utility, the range and standard deviation measure differences
in the total number of courses awarded to a student. Significant dispersion in the number of courses
assigned to a student is problematic, given the basic expectation of getting a full or nearly full schedule of
courses. Dispersion when using the other utility measures is similarly problematic.
Measures of Incentive Compatibility
To test the relative truth-inducing properties of the various course allocation mechanisms, we adapt a
common-value utility approach from Kominers et al. (2010), in which a student’s true utility for each
course is simulated as the mean of a private-value component and a common-value component. This
setup creates a high degree of value correlation and a natural method to behave strategically under highly
uncertain conditions: moving the weighting factor from the private signal toward the common-value
signal tends to increase one’s chances of getting highly popular courses. We implement these boundedlyrational strategies using a range of weights (more and less extreme strategies) and among a higher and
lower percentage of such “strategic” students. We can then measure the benefit or lack of benefit to
honest and strategic students under a variety of scenarios, measuring where strategic play is most
beneficial to those who employ such tactics, and most hurtful to those who remain honest.

Focusing on these metrics, our results show a great deal of promise for mechanisms that use an
integer-programming approach. Our five new algorithms represent new combinations of existing ideas
from the literature, including round-by-round allocation as in draft mechanisms, top-trading cycles from
matching theory, second-price concepts from auction theory, and the use of optimization, both within
rounds and globally across an entire market.
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Round-by round allocation has the potential to increase fairness by ensuring that no student gets
allocated her 𝑡 + 1st course before all students have been allocated 𝑡 courses (except when a student has
exhausted her list of acceptable courses and thus can be allocated no more.) Therefore four of our five
new algorithm variations investigate the use of round-by-round allocation for its potential to have good
fairness properties.
Within the round-by-round framework, we pursue two different general approaches. The first
emulates the top-trading-cycle (TTC) algorithm commonly discussed alongside the deferred-acceptance
algorithm in matching theory, adapted here to be iterated for the multi-round allocation of several courses,
as opposed to matching theory’s typical unit-demand setting. This algorithm will be referred to as TTC
for its connection to that classical approach.
Our second approach emulates auction theory in its use of second prices to squelch strategic
manipulability. Though a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism can be used to provide incentive
compatibility in weakly-dominant strategies even for the general combinatorial auction setting, it uses
actual currency and a payment scheme to control incentives. For universities, however, course allocation
cannot be settled through monetary bidding and payments (a situation known in the literature as nontransferable utility, NTU) making the control of incentives more difficult. Still, although a bidding student
has no value for unused points after participation in the market, a multi-round setting can potentially set
up a situation in which unused bidding points in one round can be useful as points to be used in
subsequent rounds, potentially returning some currency value and auction-like properties. We therefore
investigate course allocation as a sequence of second-price auctions using bidding points in each round.
This algorithm will be referred to as SP for second-price.
Each of these multi-round algorithms is also implemented using within-round optimization, creating
optimization versions of each, our third and fourth algorithm variations, TTC-O and SP-O, respectively.
These within-round optimizations tend to improve efficiency in harmony with the multi-round formats’
focus on fairness, but the effect of this combined approach on incentives is not known, leading us to
investigate the impact via simulation.
7

Our fifth algorithm attempts optimization over the entire market, first maximizing ordinal utility,
followed by a second optimization to maximize cardinal utility subject to ordinal-utility optimality. This
two-stage approach reflects a desire to avoid interpersonal cardinal utility comparisons as much as
possible, instead reflecting a university’s desire to have a large number of highly ranked course
assignments. The magnitudes of bid-point revelations are instead used only for tie breaking, guaranteeing
that any cardinal-utility comparison is based on intrapersonal effects, not just direct interpersonal
comparisons, which are harder to justify. Our findings show that this approach of ordinal-then-cardinal
optimization (which we abbreviated OC) performs quite well in the areas of efficiency and fairness.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. First, a comprehensive review of the current body
of knowledge is discussed in §2. Next, we introduce our five new algorithm variations for solving the
course allocation problem in §3. Then in §4 and §5, we discuss the results of two extensive simulations
comparing these new algorithms to the most commonly discussed methods in the literature (the draft
mechanism and BPM) using the measures of efficiency, fairness, and incentive compatibility discussed
above. Concluding remarks are provided in §6.
Supporting material is provided in a set of appendices. Appendix A describes the simulation details
for the efficiency/fairness experiments in greater depth. Additional results on incentive compatibility are
described in Appendix B, and a brief additional discussion of a more recent alternative mechanism (ACEEI) due to Budish (2011) is given in Appendix C. In Appendix D, we explore robustness under a more
random setup while varying the amount of correlation among student preferences, finding that the fairness
of our round-by-round optimization-based methods are more robust to extreme preference correlation, as
might be expected.

2. Background and Literature Review
A review of the literature reveals five prominent alternative algorithm variations for CAP: the
bidding-point mechanism, the draft mechanism (including a “proxy bidding” version), random serial
dictatorship, the “Gale-Shapley Pareto-dominant market” mechanism, and the “Approximate Competitive
8

Equilibrium for Equal Income (A-CEEI)” mechanism. Each of these algorithms has its own strengths and
weaknesses, and in the rest of this section, we mainly discuss the details of each. Moreover, at the end of
this section, we also briefly review the other more recent papers for solving CAP.
Two main mechanisms have been most widely used by different universities, the bidding-point
mechanism (BPM) and the draft mechanism. In BPM, a fixed bidding budget of points is assigned to each
student, and a bid is submitted that allocates these points among her various courses of interest. Following
a complete submission from all students, all bids for all courses are sorted into a single list, from highest
to lowest, and accepted in turn, if eligible, one at a time. Each bid is considered if and only if the bidding
student has not filled her schedule, this course does not conflict with her current assigned courses, and the
course has not filled all its seats (Sӧnmez and Ünver, 2010). This algorithm (with small variations) has
been used by several schools, including University of Michigan’s Ross School, Kellogg Graduate School
of Management at Northwestern, Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell, Columbia
Business School, Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley, and Yale School of Management (Krishna &
Ünver, 2008).
Budish (2011) describes the main issue of BPM, its unfair results, in which one student may receive
no course for one semester and her unspent points are wasted, while another student may receive all of
her desired courses, a result which unexpectedly happened frequently at University of Chicago’s Booth
School of Business. Indeed, BPM focuses only on maximizing allocative efficiency and does not consider
equity among students. In fact, it compromises both equity in number of courses and fairness in value of
courses among students in order to achieve a solution which greedily maximizes the total bid of assigned
courses. Moreover, moving beyond a static, one-shot investigation for some highly popular courses,
course prices may become distorted and chaotic if taken as signals for bidding from semester to semester.
That is, the course price may become as high as the whole budget of a student in one semester,
discouraging students in the next semester from bidding on it, only to see its price drop, leading demand
to rise and fall sporadically over time.
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In the draft mechanism, used by Harvard Business School beginning in the mid-1990s, a computer
takes students’ preferences over individual courses. Then, student proxies take turns in a “draft order,”
with one available course seat assigned to each student in each round. In the draft order procedure,
students are first randomly ordered, and in even-numbered rounds their order is reversed (Budish &
Cantillon, 2011).
The draft mechanism is fairer than BPM because the round-by-round allocation naturally decreases
the range of the number of assigned courses per student. However, the initial random favoritism among
students may result in successive bad luck for a student and causes dissatisfaction based on inequality of
ordinal or cardinal utility. In fact, the draft mechanism only collects the student ordinal preferences and
therefore cannot distinguish between a slight difference and a significant difference among preferences.
Hence, a student who is almost indifferent between two courses C1 and C2 and has put C1 first may get
this course while another student who wants C1 much more than C2 may lose it. Though a small decrease
in utility of the first student could allow a large increase for the second, this opportunity to improve
overall cardinal utility is lost by the draft mechanism.
Furthermore, in both BPM and the draft mechanism each student’s belief about others’ favorite
courses affects her declared preferences, encouraging her to behave strategically and misreport her
preferences (Budish & Cantillon, 2011). In fact, our simulations show that BPM is seriously vulnerable to
student strategic behavior, with an intentional misreporting of preferences easily leading to a more
favorable outcome.
Kominers et al. (2010) introduced a variation of the draft mechanism based on proxy-bidding, which
showed improved performance with respect to incentives in their simulations, i.e., showing less benefit to
those who choose to bid strategically. The approach is to generate true-bid values for simulated students
based on an equally weighted average of a common-value and a personal value for each course, and
moving the weight towards the common (popularity-based) value to simulate strategic behavior. We adapt
this approach to the current setting in the experiments described in §4.3, as a first approximation of
strategic behavior in a setting of bounded rationality (incomplete and uncertain information with no
10

ability to devise a stochastically optimal strategy) as in their paper. Though their results show some
improvement of incentives over the draft mechanism, it suffers some of the same problems, in which a
commitment to a random prioritization of students results in lost opportunities for efficiency
improvements as mentioned above. Also, some of their results are based on the assumption of nonoverlapping courses, though our current study takes the more realistic assumption that some course
sections overlap in time, and that different sections of the same course may be available, though only one
can be taken.
A third algorithm discussed in the literature is the random serial dictatorship, in which students are
sorted randomly and in each turn one student picks her entire bundle of courses from any seats still
available. This mechanism is the only incentive-compatible mechanism for CAP in the literature (see
Papai, 2001, Ehlers and Klause, 2003, and Hatfield, 2009) because student strategic behavior cannot
change their assigned courses. However, fairness and equity are totally neglected in this method (Budish
& Cantillon, 2011). Indeed, randomness of this sort is in favor of incentive compatibility in general:
basing “prioritization” on declared preferences (rather than randomness) in general introduces
opportunities for manipulation of the declared preferences. But given the quite bad fairness and efficiency
for these a totally random prioritization, the perspective of the current paper is to find mechanisms which
do not perform very badly on incentives, while offering drastic improvements on fairness and efficiency.
A fourth algorithm is the Gale-Shapley Pareto-dominant market mechanism (GS mechanism) which
is developed by Sӧnmez and Ünver (2010) as a hybrid between BPM and the familiar GS deferredacceptance algorithm for matching. This algorithm gives a fixed bidding budget to each student. Then,
each student submits both a rank ordered list and a bid list for her desired courses, where these two lists
need not agree with each other. (If the rank ordered lists and the bid lists agree with each other, GS and
BPM result in the same solution.) In this version of the GS algorithm, first each student (proxy) points to
her most preferred course based on rank and then proposes a match. Then, each course sorts all the offers
and keeps the highest bids, up to capacity, and rejects the remaining ones. Students with rejected offers
point to their next most preferred course, proceeding as in a deferred-acceptance algorithm, with courses
11

keeping the current set of highest bids and rejecting those that don’t fit. This algorithm stops when no
student is rejected, at which point each student can take the courses which hold her name.
Krishna & Ünver (2008) showed that based on the theory and the results of their field experiments,
asking for a rank ordered list as well as a bid list increases the efficiency of results of the GS algorithm in
comparison with BPM. However, getting two sets of information which may not agree each other may in
reality increase the risk of misreporting preferences and encourages students to behave strategically.
Furthermore, the GS method like other bidding mechanisms at times results in solutions assigning no
course to some students.
A fifth algorithm for CAP was introduced by Budish (2011), the Approximate Competitive
Equilibrium for Equal Income (A-CEEI) Mechanism. In A-CEEI, students report their ordinal preferences
over all possible schedules of courses and they have the option to report either their additive or nonadditive complementary/substitutability preferences, depending on the specific implementation. Then, it
assigns a random approximately-equal budget to students and allocates courses through a series of
optimizations based on student preferences, student budgets, and course prices, emulating a Walrasianstyle price equilibrium. Though several algorithmic variations are possible, one concrete implementation
uses a metaheuristic Tabu search method to find a nearly-optimal price set, which approximately equates
the number of available seats of each course (supply) with its demand. The course demand for each price
set is calculated by allocating each course seat to a student who wants it and can afford it. The final
allocation of courses is achieved when the error, the difference between allocated and available seats, is
less than a predetermined tolerance. Accordingly, A-CEEI allows infeasible solutions in which the
number of assigned students may exceed the course capacity, a problem to be sorted out after the
mechanism. Also, similar to the draft mechanism, this method randomly prioritizes students, with
randomly generated budget inequality directly affecting the results, which should in principle be avoided
where possible.
Furthermore, finding an A-CEEI price-set that approximately balances the demand and supply of the
market for real-size problems can be a very time consuming computational process. Indeed, because we
12

were unable to create a fast implementation of A-CEEI approach subject to non-overlap constraints, we
were unable to conduct a direct comparison of A-CEEI to our own mechanisms, which in contrast were
easily implemented hundreds of times in our simulations. Further discussion of A-CEEI relative to the
current context is provided in appendix C.
Along with these main algorithms, recently two other streams of research have been presented to
solve CAP. In the first stream, another definition of CAP has been studied. Diebold et al. (2014) defined
CAP differently and assumed that each course or organizer also has preferences over students. Based on
their definition, CAP is a two-sided matching problem (Roth & Sotomayor, 1990). Therefore, they
defined a stable matching of courses and students and compared the first come first served procedure and
the GS mechanism with their mechanism. However, they did not consider overlapping constraints in their
model and solutions. Nogareda & Camacho (2016) also had the same approach and defined CAP as a
two-sided matching problem and they did not consider overlapping courses either.
In the second stream, first Budish et al. (2013) proposed a random allocation mechanism to solve the
general matching problems including CAP. However, their mechanism cannot consider the section and
time-slot overlapping constraints simultaneously. Also, design of their mechanism for multi-unit market
is similar to Budish (2011) and both need to find a set of prices balancing supply and demand and clear
the market. Finding this set of prices as we discussed for Budish (2011) is computationally very difficult.
Recently, Akbarpour & Nikzad (2015) and Nguyen et al. (2015) proposed other random allocation
mechanisms which similar to Budish (2011) and Budish et al. (2013) terminate with infeasible solutions.
Here, our new methods all compute feasible solutions.

3. New algorithms and metrics for CAP
The course allocation problem (CAP) consists of a set of courses, some of which may have more than
one section/time offered. Define the set 𝐶 = {1, . . , 𝑚} as set of all course-sections offered in the market in
which each course-section 𝑗 has 𝑞𝑗 seats. The course-section seats are allocated to a set of students 𝐼 =
{1, . . , 𝑛}, each of whom can take at most 𝑘 courses in each semester.
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By standard assumptions of rationality, each student 𝑖 has real cardinal preferences (utility) over
course-sections 𝑢𝑖𝑗 . In any of our cardinal-eliciting mechanisms, she submits her cardinal preferences
(i.e., bids) 𝑏𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 for each course-section with ∑𝑗 𝑏𝑖𝑗 ≤ 1000. (As is standard in utility theory, affine
transformations do not affect preferences, so it is always possible to normalize an approximately truthful
revelation to this 1000 point bidding scale. Higher budgets would allow higher precision.)
In some mechanisms ordinal preferences are submitted; each student 𝑖 submits her integer ordinal
preferences over course-sections 𝑟𝑖𝑗 , where higher 𝑟𝑖𝑗 shows a more preferred course-section. (Though
lower-is-better seems more common in plain language, with 𝑟𝑖𝑗 = 1 indicating the first-best course, etc.,
this approach is not practical for optimization, since non-allocation would seem lower, and therefore
better.) For our computations, we let 0 ≤ 𝑟𝑖𝑗 ≤ 100, though other upper bounds provide similar results.
Unlike the GS algorithm for CAP in Sӧnmez and Ünver (2010) we require consistency among any
student’s course ranks and bids, i.e., ∀𝑗, 𝑗 ′ , 𝑟𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑟𝑖𝑗′ ⇔ 𝑏𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑏𝑖𝑗′ . In practice, for the new algorithms
which use both cardinal and ordinal measures, a student need only submit her cardinal preferences, and
then her ordinal preferences may be inferred due to this consistency requirement.
Each student will get a feasible bundle of course-sections 𝑆𝑖 in which no two course-sections overlap,
none are different sections of the same course, and the number of course-sections in the bundle is less
than or equal to 𝑘. We define the binary decision variable 𝑥𝑖𝑗 to 1 if and only if a seat in coursesection 𝑗 is assigned to student 𝑖.
To define forbidden course overlap, let binary parameter 𝑂𝑗𝑗′ equal 1 if and only if the course-section
𝑗 and 𝑗’ are overlapping course-sections in time or they are different sections of a same course. Therefore,
a feasible bundle of course-sections, 𝑆𝑖 , is defined by the corresponding 𝑥𝑖𝑗 , which must satisfy
′
∑𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑘 and 𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗′ ≤ 1 for all (𝑗, 𝑗 ) with 𝑂𝑗𝑗 ′ = 1. Although it is possible to require transitivity,

in which (𝑂𝑗𝑗′ = 1) and (𝑂𝑗′ 𝑗 ′′ = 1) would imply (𝑂𝑗𝑗′′ = 1), we do not make such an assumption.
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(Computational experiments that included a transitivity assumption were easier to solve, but we
abandoned this line of enquiry, given that overlap based on the preponderance of non-transitivity in
practice; one course might overlap with another in time, but not an alternative section of the same course,
for example.)
The utility of the set 𝑆𝑖 is defined as the sum of the utility of its members, i.e., we assume additive
utility over course sections. Accordingly, the “best bundle of courses” for student 𝑖 or 𝑆𝑖∗ is also defined
as a feasible bundle of course-sections for student 𝑖 which maximizes her total utility.
For round-by-round algorithms, the letter 𝑡 will be added as a round index subscript, giving us 𝑞𝑗𝑡 for
the available seats in course 𝑗 in round 𝑡 and 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 for an allocation of a seat in course 𝑗 to student 𝑖 in
round 𝑡. The set of eligible course-sections for student 𝑖 in round 𝑡 is denoted 𝐸𝑖𝑡 . For round 1, we
initialize 𝐸𝑖1 = {𝑗: 𝑏𝑖𝑗 > 0}, with 𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 formed by successively removing courses no longer in play at the
end of each round. Also, 𝑝𝑗𝑡 is defined as the price of course 𝑗 in round 𝑡, which is needed for one of the
proposed algorithms. For simplicity, in the rest of this paper the term “course” refers to the “coursesection” unless it is explicitly mentioned.
Turning our attention from notation to the specific metrics of interest, market efficiency is measured
by the following integer programming formulation:
𝑀𝑎𝑥 ∑𝑖,𝑗 𝑢𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗

(1)

∑𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑞𝑗

∀𝑗

(2)

∑𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑘

∀𝑖

(3)

𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗′ ≤ 1 ∀𝑗, 𝑗′ with 𝑂𝑗𝑗′ = 1

(4)

𝑥𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1}

(5)

∀𝑖, 𝑗

The objective is to maximize total (cardinal) utility for the market, with no more seats awarded than
are available in any course (2), no more than 𝑘 courses per student (3), and no student taking conflicting
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courses (4). Any allocation mechanism satisfying (2) -(5) can be compared using the following natural
efficiency and fairness metrics as discussed in §1 and summarized in Table 1. Typically, in practice,
market efficiency based on true utility uij is not possible, since only bid values bij are given. So for any of
these metrics, both revealed and actual metrics are possible based on the situation, the latter typically only
possible via simulation or controlled experiment.

Category
Cardinal
Ordinal
Binary

Efficiency
Fairness
Larger ⇒ better
Smaller ⇒ better
∑𝑖,𝑗 𝑢𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗
Range𝑖 (∑𝑗 𝑢𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ) StDev𝑖 (∑𝑗 𝑢𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗 )
∑𝑖,𝑗 𝑟𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗
Range𝑖 (∑𝑗 𝑟𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ) StDev𝑖 (∑𝑗 𝑟𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗 )
∑𝑖,𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗
Range𝑖 (∑𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗 )
StDev𝑖 (∑𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗 )
Table 1 – Efficiency and Fairness Metrics

3.1. Multi-Round Top-Trading-Cycle Algorithm (TTC) for CAP
The top-trading-cycle algorithm was developed to solve the house-allocation problem, which finds a
new assignment of houses among a set of house-owners who are selling their houses and each owner has
preferences over other houses in the market. In this algorithm, each owner points to her most preferred
house, and each house points to the highest offer. If there is a cycle (i.e., a house points to an owner and
the owner also points back to the same house) the owner is assigned to the house, and both are removed
from the market. The process then reiterates with the remaining participants. Another version of this
algorithm assigns students to schools and has been used in practice. In the current paper, we modify this
algorithm to solve the course allocation problem.
Our new top-trading-cycle algorithm (TTC) for CAP attempts to overcome the weaknesses of BPM
and the draft mechanism while keeping their strengths. BPM considers the cardinal bids of students and
avoids random favoritism of students when it is not needed; however, it may assign all top preferred
courses to some students and assign no course to others. On the other hand, the draft mechanism
randomly prioritizes students and assigns courses to students based on the random order. Nevertheless, it
considers fairness as no student can get her 𝑡 + 1𝑠𝑡 course before all other students get their 𝑡𝑡ℎ course.
TTC is developed to combine these strong points. Accordingly, it assigns one course in each round to
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each student, but the winning students are defined based on the students’ bid values and not based on
random numbers.
The details of this algorithm are as follows:
1- Each student is given a fixed budget (e.g., 1000 points) and submits bid points 𝑏𝑖𝑗 for each
course with the sum not exceeding the budget.
2- Round 𝑡, the algorithm acts on behalf of each student as follows:
I. Each student points to 𝑗𝑖∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗∊𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑗 and offers the bid amount (𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑖∗ ) for it.
II. Each course accepts up to 𝑞𝑗𝑡 of the highest offers and rejects any remaining offers. Then
capacities are updated: 𝑞𝑗𝑡+1 = 𝑞𝑗𝑡 − ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 .
III. 𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 is calculated based on the following recursive equation:
𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑖𝑡 − {𝑗𝑖∗ } − {𝑗: 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑖∗ 𝑡 = 1 , 𝑂𝑗𝑗𝑖∗ = 1} − {𝑗: 𝑞𝑗𝑡+1 = 0}
IV. If there are rejected students, they will repeat steps I to III until no more student is
rejected. Accordingly, all students take one more course in round 𝑡 or leave the market
because there are no courses in their 𝐸𝑖𝑡 .
3- Step 2 repeats until all students take 𝑘 courses or leave the market.

Example 1. Consider a set of students 𝐼 = {𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝑆3, 𝑆4}, and courses 𝐶 = {𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3, 𝐶4, 𝐶5} with
{2,3,3,2,2} seats, respectively, where C1 and C4 are overlapping courses and each student can take at
most three courses. Table 2 shows the submitted student bid lists (cardinal preferences) and rankedordered lists (ordinal preferences) for the offered courses. In Example 1, we assume that 1 ≤ rij ≤ 5 and
higher rij represents more preferred courses.
Under TTC, students first point to their top ranked course. Therefore, C1 receives two offers from S1
and S4 and based on its capacity accepts theses offers. At the same time, C3 and C4 receive one offer
from S2 and S3, respectively, and they accept these offers. Thus round 1 ends, with one course assigned
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to each student and C1 with no more seats leaving the market. The updated course capacity list
is {0,3,2,1,2}.
Student 1
Student 2
Student 3
Student 4
Bid
Bid
Bid
Bid
Rank
List
Rank
List
Rank
List
Rank
List
C1
400 C3
256 C4
245 C1
251
C3
230 C2
252 C1
243 C3
242
C4
200 C4
246 C3
240 C2
235
C2
150 C1
245 C2
230 C4
201
C5
20 C5
1 C5
42 C5
71
Table 2 - Student rankings and bid lists for Example 1
In round 2, C2 accepts one offer from S2, but C3 receives three offers from S1, S3, and S4 which is
more than its capacity. Then C3 fills its two available seats from the two highest offers (242 and 240) and
rejects the lowest one (200). Therefore, S1’s offer for C3 is rejected, but she gets another chance and her
next course in her rank ordered list. She points to the fourth course in her rank ordered list, skipping C4
due to overlap with C1 already in her schedule, and her offer for C2 is accepted. Each student has two
courses so round 2 ends, with the updated course capacity list {0,1,0,1,2}.
In round 3, S1 and S2 point to their next highest ranked course among available course, C5 and C4,
respectively, and since there are enough seats, their offers are accepted. At the same time, C2 receives
two offers from S3 and S4, but with only one available seat, it only accepts the higher bid offer (235) and
rejects the lower one (230). Accordingly, S3 who is rejected by C2 gets another chance and points to his
next highest ranked course with available seats, C5, and since it has an available seat, he takes the course.
With no course seats available, the final course assignment for Example 1 and the total rank of assigned
courses to each student is shown in Table 3. Also, Table 4 shows the efficiency and fairness metrics for
Example 1 solved by TTC.
Assigned Courses
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Total Cardinal Utility

Student 1
C1
C2
C5
570
18

Student 2
C3
C2
C4
754

Student 3
C4
C3
C5
527

Student 4
C1
C3
C2
728

Total Ordinal Utility
8
12
9
Total Binary Utility
3
3
3
Table 3 – Final solution to Example 1 solved by TTC

12
3

Efficiency

Fairness
Range
St. Dev.
Cardinal
2579
227
97.88
Ordinal
41
4
1.79
Binary
12
0
0
Table 4 – Efficiency and Fairness Metrics of Final solution to Example 1 solved by TTC

3.2. Second-Price Algorithm (SP) for CAP
As mentioned above, the VCG mechanism can elicit truthful bids from bidders in an auction, where
monetary bids are used to compute winners and payments for goods received. However, in CAP,
monetary transfers cannot be used, making it more difficult to control incentives; in bidding with points (a
fictional currency used only for the CAP process) receiving low prices or keeping unused points has no
value to a bidding student, and therefore incentives are drastically different.
But in a multi-round setup, we explore the possibility that returned points may retain some currency
value from round to round, encouraging truthful bidding. For example, suppose a bidder would like to bid
aggressively for her top course, say 350 points, only to find later that she could have bid 250 and still
would have been awarded the course. Retrospectively, she would have wished to have bid lower for this
course so that more of the bid points could have been used on subsequent course bids. This suggests an
incentive for her to strategically lower her truly high value for the course. But if a round-by-round
mechanism returned points that exceeded the threshold necessary to “buy” the course with points (i.e.
gave her back the 100 points excess), she would not have such an incentive.
Here, we explore this notion of returning points, similar to discounts in a second-price auction, to be
used across rounds. In a setting with unit-demand bidders, the VCG mechanism becomes a uniform-price
auction in which the top 𝑞 bidders win the 𝑞 available items and pay the amount of the 𝑞 + 1st bid, which
we emulate in each round of our multi-round set-up. The resulting algorithm is called the second-price
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algorithm for CAP, or SP for short. The algorithm is very similar to TTC, but with step 2 part II replaced
as follows with IISP:
IISP.Each course accepts up to 𝑞𝑗𝑡 of the highest offers and rejects any remaining offers. Then capacities
are updated: 𝑞𝑗𝑡+1 = 𝑞𝑗𝑡 − ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 .
If 𝑞𝑗𝑡+1 = 0, then let price 𝑝𝑗𝑡 equal the highest rejected offer for 𝑗, else let 𝑝𝑗𝑡 = 0. Return unspent
points to use on the next most preferred course, i.e., let 𝑗𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗∊𝐸𝑖𝑡 −{𝑗𝑖∗ } 𝑏𝑖𝑗 and let
𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑖∗ − 𝑝𝑗𝑡 .
𝑖

𝑖

We next consider the same market as discussed in Example 1, but now under SP. As before, C1
receives two offers, C3 receives one offer, and C4 receives one offer in the first round. Since there are no
rejected offers, the prices of all courses in this round are set to zero and the points of all offers are added
to the next course in their rank ordered list. In round 2, courses begin to reach capacities and thus charge
prices for courses, only returning the unused portion of each bid, which is then used for the next set of
offers. These next offers will occur before round 2 ends, because some students were rejected from their
second favorite course and must be awarded a course before the next round begins.
We omit the full details, but the results of SP on Example 1 with efficiency and fairness metrics are
given in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. Note that relative to the TTC results in Table 3, this final allocation
awards the same number of courses and has the same ordinal efficiency (same total rank). However, other
measures tell different stories: the ordinal fairness metrics (both range and standard deviation of rank) are
lower (better) for SP, while the cardinal fairness metrics (range and standard deviation of cardinal utility)
are both lower (better) for TTC. Also, total cardinal utility is larger for SP, indicating overall that it is
difficult to rank allocations/algorithms based on the many design metrics, even for a very small
(oversimplified) problem.
Assigned Courses

Student 1
20

Student 2

Student 3

Student 4

Round 1
C1
C3
C4
Round 2
C3
C2
C3
Round 3
C2
C4
C5
Total Cardinal Utility
780
754
527
Total Ordinal Utility
11
12
9
Total Binary Utility
3
3
3
Table 5 – Final solution to Example 1 solved by SP

C1
C2
C5
557
9
3

Efficiency

Fairness
Range
St. Dev.
Cardinal
2618
253
113.37
Ordinal
41
3
1.30
Binary
12
0
0
Table 6 – Efficiency and Fairness Metrics of Final solution to Example 1 solved by SP

3.3. The optimized multi-round algorithms: TTC-O and SP-O
The TTC and SP algorithms locally maximize the benefit of each student in each round in a greedy
fashion, not considering that a better outcome may be available for the whole market, even within the
same round. Instead, at times exchanging a student’s 𝑟 𝑡ℎ ranked course with her (𝑟 + 1)𝑠𝑡 course may
benefit two or more students. In this case, the total rank for the whole market can be improved, with two
or more made better off and one student worse off. Considering the benefit to the entire market in each
round is made possible in the following optimization versions of the TTC and the SP mechanisms, which
we call TTC-O and SP-O.
In both methods (and as in our fifth and final method, OC) we make use of a two-stage optimization,
first finding the maximum possible total rank, and then, maximizing total bid points among all rankoptimal solutions, since there are typically many. The optimizations for TTC-O and SP-O occur in each
round, in contrast to OC described below.
Multi-Round Top Trading Cycle Algorithm, Optimization Version (TTC-O)
In round 𝑡 we solve optimization model (6) -(9) followed by (10)-(11):
𝑍𝑡1 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 ∑𝑗,𝑖∈𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡

(6)

∑𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝑞𝑗𝑡 ∀𝑗

(7)
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∑𝑗∈𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≤ 1 ∀𝑖

(8)

𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∈ {0,1} , 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∈ 𝐸𝑖𝑡

(9)

𝑍𝑡2 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥

∑𝑗,𝑖∈𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡

(10)

(7)- (9)

∑𝑗,𝑖∈𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑍𝑡1

(11)

Notice that (6) -(9) represent an instance of the transportation problem, known to have a totallyunimodular constraint matrix, thus making it easy to solve as a relaxed integer program. The addition of
constraint (11) to lock in the total rank at its maximum value and the changing the objective to (10) in the
secondary optimization do not make the problem harder in practice.
Consider again the market discussed in Example 1. In the first round of TTC-O, just as in TTC,
courses C1, C3, C4, C1 are assigned to S1, S2, S3, S4, respectively. (Since all can get their top-ranked
course, it is optimal to do so in the first round.) But, in round 2, the TTC-O method differs, with C3, C2,
C3, C2 assigned to S1, S2, S3, S4, respectively. In TTC, S4’s bid for C3 beats out S1’s offer for this
course, but TTC-O recognizes that denying the seat to S4 results in her getting a course of only one lower
rank, whereas denying the seat to S1 would push her two steps down her rank list, a worse move overall
for total rank in this round. (The third round also proceeds differently, though details are omitted.) The
final assignment of courses to students with the TTC-O algorithm and efficiency and fairness metrics are
presented in Table 7 and 8, respectively.
Comparing Table 7 to the results of TTC and SP (Tables 3 and 5), we see a third distinct allocation of
courses to students delivering the same ordinal efficiency of 41. The results in Table 7 have a higher
(better) cardinal utility, also we see that its allocation performs at least as well if not better in every other
fairness and efficiency metric.

Assigned Courses
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3

Student 1
C1
C3
C5
22

Student 2
C3
C2
C4

Student 3
C4
C3
C2

Student 4
C1
C2
C5

Total Cardinal Utility
650
754
715
557
Total Ordinal Utility
10
12
10
9
Total Binary Utility
3
3
3
3
Table 7 – Final solution to Example 1 solved by TTC-O or SP-O

Efficiency

Fairness
Range
St. Dev.
Cardinal
2676
197
74.58
Ordinal
41
3
1.09
Binary
12
0
0
Table 8 – Efficiency and Fairness Metrics of Final solution to Example 1 solved by TTC-O or SP-O
A Second-Price Algorithm for CAP, Optimization Version (SP-O)
In the SP-O algorithm, at the end of each round the excess points are returned to students and applied
to their next round offers. To calculate the extra points, we need to determine the price of each course in
each round. The dual optimization problem (12)-(14) followed by (15)-(16) at the end of round 𝑡 helps us
to find the course prices in this round.
𝑊𝑡1 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 (𝑍𝑡1 𝐷 + ∑𝑗 𝑞𝑗𝑡 𝑝

𝑗𝑡

+ ∑𝑖 𝑣𝑖𝑡 )

𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗 𝐷 ≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑗

(13)

𝑝𝑗𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0 , 𝐷 𝑖𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑊𝑡2 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛

(12)

∑𝑗 𝑞𝑗𝑡 𝑝

(14)
(15)

𝑗𝑡

(13)- (14)
𝑍𝑡1 𝐷 + ∑𝑗 𝑞𝑗𝑡 𝑝 + ∑𝑖 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡1
𝑗𝑡

(16)

In these models, 𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the price of course 𝑗 in round 𝑡 and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 can be described as the value of student
𝑖 in round 𝑡 in the market. Also, in (15) we find a set of prices which minimize the weighted summation
of course prices. It means that we are interested to decrease the price of courses with fewer seats less than
courses with more seats. This objective function along with (16) which locks (12) at its optimum value
result in finding unique optimum values for the course prices in each round.
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Consider again the market discussed in Example 1. Since this is a very small example, returning
points to students does not change the final solutions and the assigned courses in each round of TTC-O
and SP-O and their final solutions are the same. Therefore, the final assignment of courses to students
with SP-O algorithm and efficiency and fairness metrics are presented in Table 7 and 8, respectively.

3.4. Ordinal-then-Cardinal (OC) Algorithm for CAP
In the Ordinal-then-Cardinal (OC) algorithm for CAP, we maximize ordinal utility followed by
maximizing cardinal utility among rank-maximal solutions as in TTC-O and SP-O, but here performing
this two-part optimization once for the whole market instead of in each round. To define these models
formally, we use the general market feasibility constraints (2)-(5).
𝑍1 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 ∑𝑖,𝑗 𝑟𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗
(2)-(5)

(17)

𝑍2 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 ∑𝑖,𝑗 𝑏𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗
∑𝑖,𝑗 𝑟𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝑍1
(2)- (5)

(18)
(19)

Tables 9 and 10 display the final assignment of courses to students as well as efficiency and fairness
metrics under OC using a maximum schedule size of k = 3, respectively. However, if k changes and
increases to 4 the solution of OC will change while the solution of other presented algorithms stay the
same. Tables 11 and 12 show the final assignment as well as the efficiency and fairness metrics of courses
when k = 4, respectively. Both solutions achieve a total rank of 42, one unit higher than any previously
discussed allocation, with the former showing that it is possible to achieve this better solution while
maintaining equal schedule sizes (binary fairness metrics equal to zero). While this small change shows a
potential issue of fairness in OC results, our simulation results show that OC algorithm is able to achieve
the lowest binary fairness metric among all algorithms.

Assigned Courses

Student 1
C1, C3, C5
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Student 2
C3, C2, C4

Student 3
C4, C2, C5

Student 4
C1, C3, C2

Total Cardinal Utility
650
754
517
728
Total Ordinal Utility
10
12
8
12
Total Binary Utility
3
3
3
3
Table 9 – Final solution to Example 1 solved by OC using 𝑘 = 3.
Efficiency

Fairness
Range
St. Dev.
Cardinal
2649
237
92.18
Ordinal
42
4
1.66
Binary
12
0
0
Table 10 – Efficiency and Fairness Metrics of Final solution to Example 1 solved by OC using 𝑘 = 3
Student 1 Student 2 Student 3
Student 4
Assigned Courses
C1, C3
C3,C2,C4 C4,C2,C5 C1, C3, C2,C5
Total Cardinal Utility
630
754
517
799
Total Ordinal Utility
9
12
8
13
Total Binary Utility
2
3
3
4
Table 11 – Final solution to Example 1 solved by OC using 𝑘 = 4.
Efficiency

Fairness
Range
St. Dev.
Cardinal
2700
282
110.23
Ordinal
42
5
2.06
Binary
12
2
0.71
Table 12 – Efficiency and Fairness Metrics of Final solution to Example 1 solved by OC using 𝑘 = 4

3.5. Pareto (in)efficiency
Given these 5 new algorithms, it is natural to ask whether each satisfies Pareto efficiency with respect
to submitted preferences. It is easy to see that optimization of over the entire market as in (1)-(5) results in
Pareto efficiency with respect to the objective function used, cardinal, ordinal, or binary. (This follows
because the existence of a feasible Pareto improvement would contradict optimality.) Thus, OC
guarantees ordinal Pareto efficiency due to its first optimization. Though an OC solution may not be
cardinal Pareto efficient, any Pareto improving solution in cardinal utility must necessarily degrade the
total ordinal utility of the market (harming at least one student in ordinal preferences) by virtue of its
ordinal then cardinal optimization. Thus solutions that improve the situation on both metrics are not
available. Sadly, the same guarantees cannot be made for the other mechanisms, as can be shown via
counter Example 2 described in Table 13.
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Example 2. Consider a market with two students S1 and S2 each of whom can take at most 2 courses
(k = 2) and a set of five courses 𝐶 = {𝐶1, 𝐶2, … , 𝐶5}, each with one seat. Let C1 and C3 be overlapping
courses, and let the preferences of S1 and S2 be as displayed in Table 13.

Bid lists
Courses Student 1
Student 2
C1
385
380
C2
320
350
C3
180
100
C4
105
120
C5
10
50
Table 13 – Bids showing Pareto inefficiency under course overlap
Under each of the mechanisms discussed here, with the exception of OC, a Pareto inefficient solution
is selected, considering either ordinal or cardinal utility. Under the draft mechanism, BPM, TTC, or SP,
student 1 gets {C1, C5} while student 2 gets {C2, C4}. Alternatively, under TTC-O and SP-O, students 1
and 2 {C1, C4} and {C2, C3}, respectively. But OC, on the other hand awards them {C2, C3} and {C1,
C4}, respectively, which is a (cardinal or ordinal) Pareto improvement over either outcome. Note also that
straightforward cardinal-utility maximization results in an alternate cardinal Pareto efficient solution,
{C3, C4} and {C1, C2}, but OC tends to reject this more lopsided solution, which seems to place too
much weight on small cardinal differences as compared to the relative equity implied in ordinal
comparisons. Note also that this latter cardinal Pareto efficient solution fails to be ordinal Pareto efficient,
while the OC solution is Pareto efficient in both senses.

4. Efficiency and Fairness Results
In order to assess the proposed algorithms and compare their results with BPM and the draft
mechanism, we randomly generated 100 sample markets. Each consists of n = 900 students, each of
whom can take up to k = 6courses and 83 courses some with multiple sections for a total of m = 112
course-sections. (We assumed 2 courses having five sections, one course with four sections, two courses
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with three sections, fourteen courses with two sections, and 64 courses with one section.) These features
were selected to roughly approximate the characteristics of offered courses at Harvard Business School, a
prominent user of algorithmic course-allocation. Accordingly, the capacity of 10%, 30%, and 60% of
course-sections were drawn from discrete uniform distributions with probabilities of {15, 25, 35}, {40,
50, 60}, and {70, 80, 90, 100}, respectively. To establish overlap among course-sections, 8 weekly time
slots were generated, and course-sections were considered overlapping if they shared a time slot or were
sections of the same course. In addition, similar to HBS, we generated 10 different major fields of study
to group correlated courses, and based student preferences on these fields of study. Further details on how
these preferences were generated are given in Appendix A. All experiments in this paper involving
optimization used CPLEX version 12.1 on a 2.53GHz machine.
In this first set of experiments, we assumed that the generated cardinal and ordinal preferences are
true student preferences and they have not been manipulated to improve one’s allocation. (In §5, we will
relax this truthfulness assumption in a second set of experiments.) Here, we present and interpret values
for the efficiency and fairness metrics proposed in Table 1.

4.1. Binary Efficiency and Fairness
Recall that our notion of binary utility measured a 1 for an assigned seat a 0 otherwise. Averaging
total binary utility of the market over each of 100 simulated markets therefore shows us the average
number of assigned seats by each mechanism. With 900 students seeking 6 courses in each case, each
market has 5400 opportunities to assign students to a course. For easier interpretation, Figure 1 shows the
average number of missed opportunities (amount below 5400) for each algorithm. Clearly, the
optimization-based algorithms do a better job of getting students into seats, with OC doing a very good
job, missing only 6 opportunities out of 540,000 opportunities to place students.
Figure 1 - The average number of missed assignment opportunities per algorithm
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Turning next to the range of binary utility across students as a metric of fairness, we note that in
almost every random trial, at least one student received a full six-course schedule. Thus the range is most
indicative of how the worst student is treated in terms of the number of courses she is assigned. Figure 2
shows the average of the inter-student range across simulation instances.
Figure 2-The average range of binary utility per student per algorithm
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As Figure 2 depicts, in BPM the range is 2.05 on average, i.e., the student with lightest schedule gets
only 3.95 courses on average. While BPM assigns 3 or fewer courses to at least one student for 12 out of
100 instances, this occurred for only one instance under TTC or SP. But, again under this metric, the
optimization-based approaches do best; none ever assigned fewer than 4 courses at worst, and OC never
assigned fewer than 5 courses to students in any instance. Indeed, in 98 of 100 instances, OC assigned 6
courses to every single student, while BPM did not do so (complete 5400 assignments) in even one
instance. Results for the standard deviation of binary utility were qualitatively quite similar to those
presented in Figure 2, and are thus omitted.
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4.2. Ordinal Efficiency and Fairness
Figure 3 shows the simulation results of the different mechanisms based on the average total rank
(ordinal efficiency) of assigned courses. As BPM scored the worst on this metric, the figure shows
amounts above this worst benchmark case. Clearly again, the optimization-based methods dominate the
other algorithms, with OC in a strong lead, getting much better outcomes in terms of how students order
the courses.
Figure 3 - The average ordinal utility per student per algorithm, showing amounts above BPM
benchmark with average ordinal utility of 548.15 per student.
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Equity in the rank of assigned courses gives us our next measure of fairness across students, as shown
in Figure 4. Since in almost all instances the maximum total rank of assigned courses to a student is equal
to the maximum possible 585 for all algorithms considered, the range of ordinal utility is indicative of the
total rank of the worst student and how her total rank compares to this maximum. Note that the total rank
equal to 585 means that a student could take her (100, 99, 98, 97, 96, 95) ranked courses. In other words,
she could take the 6 highest ranked courses on her ordered list. Moreover, the worst total rank possible for
a student with a full schedule in these simulations (given the artificial 100-point ordinal basis and bidding
on a maximum of 35 different courses) is 411, corresponding to her ordinal objective value when she
receives her 30th, 31st, … 35th best courses. Thus, ranges greater than 585 − 411 = 174 represent a worst
student necessarily getting a reduced course load. Also note that this measure does grow quickly: a worst
student getting her 2nd, 3rd, … 7th courses (her second best possible schedule, the second best possible
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market measure) indicates a range of 6, while simply removing one course from the worst-off student
increases the range by at least 66 (the ordinal objective value of a 35th best course.)
Figure 4 - The average range of ordinal utility per student per algorithm
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Figure 4 again shows the same general pattern, with BPM scoring worst, optimization-based
algorithms doing best, and OC in a clear lead compared to all others. Looking at Figure 5, which shows
average ordinal fairness performance via the standard deviation, we see a similar pattern, but with less
contrast on average across algorithms than the extreme cases measured by the range.

Figure 5 – Average standard deviation of ordinal utility per student per algorithm
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4.3. Cardinal Efficiency and Fairness
Figure 6 displays the average cardinal utility from each student’s assigned courses under each
mechanism. As Figure 6 depicts, the draft mechanism achieves the lowest average cardinal utility, with
OC and BPM achieving the first and second best on this metric, respectively. Though BPM does well on
this metric, comparing Figure 6 to previous metrics, we see that BPM gets a high cardinal utility by
grabbing at it greedily, sacrificing fairness and efficiency among the previous metrics. In this context, OC
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proves that this sacrifice is unjustified; it is possible (as OC does) to score better than BPM in all
categories.
Figure 6 – The average cardinal utility per algorithm, amounts above Draft benchmark with average
cardinal utility 295.93
OC
SP-O
TTC-O
SP
TTC
BPM
Draft

6.87
2.43
2.43
2.03
2.97
6.12
0.00
0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

Indeed, Figure 7 displays the average range of cardinal utility, where we see that BPM gets a high
overall cardinal utility by increasing the inequality between the top and the bottom of the market. Again
we see optimization-based algorithms dominating the others, but here SP-O and TTC-O edge out OC, in
contrast to the previous results we have seen. OC seems willing to increase the range of cardinal
preferences in order to keep the ordinal measures more equitable, consistent with its ordinal-then-cardinal
formulation.
Figure 7 – The average range of cardinal utility per algorithm
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Figure 8 again shows the standard deviation painting a similar picture to that of the range, again
favoring the optimization-based algorithms and relaying bad news for BPM.
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Figure 8 – Average standard deviation of cardinal utility per algorithm
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5. Incentive Compatibility Results
To measure the effect of strategic behavior on the results of the various mechanisms discussed so far,
we adapt and build on a process presented by Kominers et al. (2010) and used by Budish & Cantillon
(2011). As in those papers, we model student preferences as arising from a combination of personal
preferences (simulated randomly for each student, as in §4) and a common-value component (drawn once
for each course in the market). Each student’s true preferences are then modeled as the average of her
personal signal for the value of the course and the market’s common-value signal of the value of the
course. This leads to a natural mechanism for simulating strategic behavior: a strategic student adjusts the
relative weight between the personal signal and the common-value signal, placing greater weight on the
common-value signal than on her true preferences.
This method for measuring incentives to deviate from truth-telling is an imperfect heuristic, but it
gives a realistic basis for comparing various mechanisms in this highly complex environment, and is
consistent with the notion of bounded rationality. Indeed, in real-life applications, it would be highly
unrealistic to assume that students would have enough information about the preferences and bids of
others in order to devise an optimal strategic bid. Even if a particular student had complete and perfect
knowledge of the bids of others (which would be impossible in practice unless the bid submission system
was somehow compromised) the problem of devising an optimal strategy under each of the mechanisms
in question is typically a difficult and large NP-hard optimization problem.
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If one instead tried to model beliefs over the preferences of others, the solution concept becomes the
determination of a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, which would be even more difficult to compute, and again
out of the reach of a student in almost any realistic setting. (Though we considered these theoretical
problems in our own notes, we leave a detailed study of this problem for future research.) So instead, we
apply the benchmark paradigm explored in the literature, but here running the procedure for a broad set of
parameter values, including several values for the percentage of students bidding strategically and for
how much they manipulate their true preferences. This provides a robust investigation of the possibilities
for student gain through deviation from truth-telling.
As in our first set of experiments, we find it beneficial to explore a number of simple metrics to
interpret our results. These illustrate how variations in the percentage of strategic students and in the
intensity of their strategic behavior change the outcomes for strategic and truthful students. In this
section, we focus on ordinal utility and do not present the parallel results for binary and cardinal utility
measures. We do this for brevity, and because cardinal results are similar but mildly harder to interpret,
while binary utility does not shift drastically based on strategies (a strategic manipulation may shift which
student gets a small and which a large bundle, without changing a binary metric, for example.)
To make our heuristic model of strategic behavior precise, consider equation (20), which is nearly
identical to the approach presented in Kominers et al. (2010):
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑗 = (1 − 𝑤𝑖 ) ∗ 𝑢𝑖𝑗 + 𝑤𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑉𝑗

(20)

In this equation, 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑗 represents the declared cardinal utility of student 𝑖 for course 𝑗, which is
calculated as a simple weighted average of student 𝑖’s personal utility component for course 𝑗 (labeled 𝑢𝑖𝑗 )
and the common value component of course 𝑗 in the market (labeled 𝐶𝑉𝑗 ). The personal parameter 𝑤𝑖
controls the relative weighting of these two components. By assumption (as in the previous literature) a
bidder who bids truthfully is defined as one who sets 𝑤𝑖 = 0.5. When student 𝑖 sets 𝑤𝑖 > 0.5, she is
effectively pretending to be more influenced by the common-value term than her true preferences dictate,
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causing her to bid more aggressively on popular courses (those with higher 𝐶𝑉𝑗 ) and less aggressively on
unpopular courses. Such a student is referred to as “strategic.” Here, similar to our model in §4, students’
cardinal and ordinal preferences are forced to be consistent, so that a single list of cardinal utility for each
course j as in (20) is sufficient to generate a unique ordinal list for each student. As a robustness check, we
also explored the settings where wi of a truthful student was defined to be 0.25 and 0.75 and repeated all
analysis. Our results showed that the conclusions remain largely unchanged for all algorithms. Incentive
compatibility metrics of this analysis are discussed in Appendix B.
After an initial test of this common-value approach, we noticed systematic poor performance for
students using the most straightforward implementation of the approach as described thus far. We then
found improved payoff to strategic manipulation for students employing the non-truthful common-value
adjustment only for course-sections in her “expanded best bundle,” defined as her favorite feasible bundle
together with any course-sections with overlap constraints incident to this bundle. Without this measure,
many instances saw degraded performance when a high common-value course with low personal-value was
focused on when an overall better course was available. The results presented here use this heuristically
improved method of strategic manipulation.
Given this setup, we varied two parameters to explore the effect of strategic behavior. The first
parameter, labeled 𝑃, indicates the percentage of students in the market that play strategically. (Hence,
(1 − 𝑃) students bid truthfully, i.e., maintaining 𝑤𝑖 = 0.5.) For each value of 𝑃, we also varied the 𝑤𝑖
parameter for strategic students. With five values for 𝑃 = {20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%}, and five
values for 𝑤𝑖 = {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0} of strategic students, each mechanism was tested under 25
different scenarios.

5.1. Effect of 𝑤𝑖 when 𝑃 = 20%
To define the benefit of strategic behavior for each (𝑃, 𝑤𝑖 ) scenario, we consistently compute the
totally truthful benchmark scenario, in which 𝑃 = 0. The “change in ordinal utility of each strategic
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student” is defined as the total (true) rank of assigned courses to her in the (𝑃, 𝑤𝑖 ) scenario minus the
total (true) rank in the totally truthful benchmark. The average of this metric over strategic students is
shown in Figure 9 for varying 𝑤𝑖 values under 𝑃 = 20%. The left graph in Figure 9 includes the results
of all seven algorithms, but to scale better, the right one displays the results of all algorithms except BPM.
Figure 9 – Average change in ordinal utility of strategic students under 𝑃 = 20%

Figure 9 illustrates that as 𝑤𝑖 increases, the average benefit of a strategic student decreases in all
mechanisms except BPM. It also shows that among all algorithms, BPM is by far the most vulnerable to
strategic manipulation, with the left graph showing relatively minor differences among all other
mechanisms. Zooming in (the right graph), however, does show some subtle differences, with the draft
mechanism showing the smallest potential benefit to deviation from truth-telling. All of the mechanisms
on the right show a decreasing pattern, in which larger deviations (via larger 𝑤𝑖 values) help the strategic
students less, becoming a negative expected value (i.e., the deviation was worse than telling the truth) for
a large enough wi . However, under BPM, strategic behavior never hurts students, indicating that this
dishonest strategy is robust.
Overall though, to gauge the magnitude of these effects of strategic manipulation, it is important to
remember that ordinal rank measures change rather quickly as the bundle of assigned courses changes.
Recall from §4.2 that moving from one’s best possible schedule to one’s second best possible schedule
results in a change of 6, for example, or that getting one more course (relative to truth-telling) raises
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ordinal utility by at least 66. Thus, seeing average changes under 2 ordinal units for each of the
mechanisms on the right in Figure 9 indicate that these mechanisms are performing rather well in terms of
providing very little benefit on average to misreporting preferences.
Next, we can measure the average change in ordinal utility between each (𝑃, 𝑤𝑖 ) scenario and the
𝑃 = 0 benchmark, but this time for students who remain truthful in the former case, indicating how much
they are harmed by the other students’ decision to play strategically
Figure 10 – Average change in ordinal utility of truthful students under 𝑃 = 20%

Figure 10 shows that the strategic behavior in BPM hurts truthful students more than in other
mechanisms, and that in the manipulated market, the ordinal utility of the truthful students is between 8
units to 10 units below their results in the 𝑃 = 0 market. Moreover, in all mechanisms except BPM, the
decrease in ordinal utility among truthful students is less than 0.42. For an alternate set of comparisons,
we combine the results of Figures 9 and 10 into Figure 11, placing truthful and strategic students side-byside for each mechanism.
Figure 11 – Average changes in ordinal utility of strategic and truthful students under 𝑃 = 20%
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This figure shows the gap between changes in ordinal utility of strategic students and truthful students
in different mechanisms. As might be expected, under BPM, strategic students significantly gain by
misreporting their preferences while their strategic behavior hurts truthful students a bit more than
proportionally. By contrast, in TTC-O, SP-O, and the draft mechanisms, the difference between the
ordinal utility change of strategic and truthful students is smaller than under other mechanisms. Moreover,
among the OC mechanism and other round by round mechanisms, OC shows a larger gap between ordinal
utility of truthful students and strategic students. However, this gap is small, below 2.5 units in total rank
for OC and less than 1 for all other round-by-round algorithms.
Figure 12 – Left: Standard deviation of change in ordinal utility of strategic students
Right: Standard deviation of change in ordinal utility of truthful students
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In addition to average effects, the standard deviation of the changes in ordinal utility can be used as a
measure of volatility and therefore risk. Though the average effect of strategic deviations may be positive
in some scenarios for those who play strategically, a large standard deviation around that mean indicates
that some will benefit while others lose utility from their decision to play strategically (though those who
benefit will outweigh the losers based on the positive average.) Figure 12 represents the pattern of
changes in standard deviation of ordinal utility of strategic and truthful students. In all cases, we see
relatively large standard deviations, indicating that deviation from truth-telling is a risky proposition
regardless of the mechanism.

5.2. Effect of changing 𝑤𝑖 when 𝑃 > 20%
Here we present an analog to Figure 11 but under 𝑃 = 80%. Similar results for 𝑃 = 40%, 60%, and
100% are given in Appendix B, but the overall story is fairly clear by comparing Figures 11 and 13. As
more and more students adopt the non-truth-telling strategy, the benefits of doing so disappear, so that the
net effect of a large number of strategic students is purely detrimental.
Figure 13 – Average changes in ordinal utility of strategic and truthful students under 𝑃 = 80%
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In our further results in Appendix B, we see, for example, that when 𝑃 = 100% on average all
students would be hurt and the average change in ordinal utility is negative for all algorithms and all
values of 𝑤𝑖 , continuing the trend shown here. When everyone deviates from truth-telling, everyone loses.

5.3. Overall Comparisons of Incentive Compatibility
In §5.2, we considered the average change in ordinal utility (relative to the 𝑃 = 0 case) for strategic
students and truthful students. Let these values (averaged over all students in each group for each (P, wi )
scenario) be denoted ∆OUstr and ∆OUtr , respectively. To aggregate the results presented thus far,
consider the following metrics. In these three metrics, we did not consider the market with 100% strategic
students since there were no truthful students for comparing with strategic students.
Strategic Upside = average(P,wi)|∆OUstr > ∆OUtr (∆𝑂𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑟 − ∆𝑂𝑈𝑡𝑟 )
Strategic Downside = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑃,𝑤𝑖)|∆𝑂𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑟 < ∆𝑂𝑈𝑡𝑟 (∆𝑂𝑈𝑡𝑟 − ∆𝑂𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑟 )
Net Benefit of Strategic Play = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑃,𝑤𝑖) (∆𝑂𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑟 − ∆𝑂𝑈𝑡𝑟 )
Where the net benefit of strategic play gives a neutral aggregate measure of the average marginal ordinal
utility of changing from a truthful student to a strategic student when the scenario is unknown, the upside
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and downside of strategic play are also informative, in case the downside of a decision is weighted more
heavily than the upside (as in loss aversion, see Kahneman and Tversky, 1984).
Figure 14 – Strategic upside (ordinal utility)
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Figure 15 – Strategic downside (ordinal utility)
OC

2.14

SP-O

1.81

TTC-O

1.81

SP

1.13

TTC

1.47

BPM

0.00

Draft

0.63
0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

Figure 16 – The average net benefit of strategic play (ordinal utility)
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Comparing Figures 14, 15, and 16, we see a few overall conclusions. BPM tends to offer a robust
reward to those who play strategically on average, with no downside to doing so. The net benefit to
strategic play is negative for all other mechanisms, except for OC, where still it is quite close to zero.
Overall, stategic play does not tend to help very much in these latter (non-BPM) mechanisms. For OC,
although there is a tiny benefit on average in the net, strategic play is more volatile, introducing the
chance of a larger dowside than any other mechanism. The existence of this larger downside risk may in
itself be viewed as a deterrent to strategic play.

6. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has explored five new algorithmic variations to solve the course allocation problem,
addressing the relative balance of efficiency, fairness, and incentive compatibility. To understand the
performance of these five algorithms, we compared them to the draft and bidding point mechanisms,
benchmarks that have been used in practice. We introduced a comprehensive systemization of natural
metrics for these objectives, with a novel perspective of analyzing any set of outcomes based on the total
(or average), range, and standard deviation of binary, ordinal, and cardinal utility.
As a final comparison of the mechanisms in question, consider the following selected graphs based on
the relative rankings (higher being better) of the seven mechanisms for CAP.
Figure 17 – Ranking the algorithms based on fairness (standard deviation or range)
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The clearest ordering is in fairness, shown in Figure 17, in which OC dominates, whether one looks at
binary or ordinal efficiency. Recall that SP-O and TTC-O switch places with OC when considering
cardinal fairness, but with only a small lead, compared to OC’s large binary and ordinal lead shown in
Figures 2, 4, and 5. Turning our attention to efficiency in ordinal and binary utility, the results remain
essentially the same, but with a murkier comparison among SP, TTC, and draft, as in Figure 18.
Figure 18 – Ranking the algorithms based on binary and ordinal efficiency

However, looking at incentive compatibility the results are less clear. In Figure 19, we see that
comparisons based on upside opportunities (smaller gains representing less temptation) and downside
risks (larger downsides representing a larger deterrent) are less consistent. For example, the draft
performs well in not providing large opportunities for upside, while OC performs well in deterring
strategic play based on the downside risk of unsuccessful manipulation.
Figure 19 – Ranking the algorithms based on incentive compatibility
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Still, perhaps the main conclusion to derive from our experiments on incentives for strategic play is
that in the net, except for BPM, all mechanisms provide very little benefit to manipulation (see Figure
16), with the risks of manipulation almost always (at least nearly) outweighing the potential benefits.
Indeed, given the nearly universal bad results for BPM, we are inclined to remove it from consideration
entirely and consider a comparison among the other mechanisms. The remaining mechanisms perform
quite similarly on incentives, leading us to consider a ranking on efficiency and fairness metrics, in which
case OC is a clear “winner” among the mechanism investigated here.
If there were reason to believe that incentives were an issue, SP-O or TTC-O seems to provide
slightly better incentives than OC, with the smallest degradation on the other metrics overall. In the
numerical simulations conducted here, SP-O and TTC-O performed nearly identically, perhaps due to the
amount of competition in the large-scale market, though small examples can be devised in which SP-O’s
use of second prices removes some opportunities for manipulation. This tends to give SP-O an ever-soslight edge over TTC-O, but one that is nearly negligible. Overall, we hope to have shown that the
opportunity for a significant improvement in the performance of course-selection algorithms through the
direct application of optimization, whether on a round-by-round or market-wide level.
Finally, our additional experiments shown in Appendix D indicate that SP-O and TTC-O maintain
better fairness properties in cases of extreme correlation, as opposed to OC which will instead sacrifice
fairness for efficiency in such circumstances. However, these extreme cases seem less likely in practice,
and our results indicate very little hope for any mechanism in such cases. If everyone is in complete
agreement, trying to use a mechanism to get them to admit where their preferences are different is futile.
Still, these additional results point to the possibility of strengthening the OC algorithm through additional
fairness constraints and reinforce the necessity of considering round-by-round mechanisms like SP-O and
TTC-O in discussions of future applications.
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Appendix A. Market simulation details for the efficiency and the fairness results
We assume that the value of each course for each student is the combination of a field-specific value
for course belonging to the field (or major plan of study), plus an independent course value for the
student. This setup tends toward correlated preferences among students according to their interest in a
field/major denoted 𝑓. Therefore, a value 𝑉𝑖𝑗′ = ∑[∀𝑓:𝑗′ ∊𝑓] 𝛼𝑓𝑗′ + 𝛽𝑖𝑗′ is calculated, where the value 𝑉𝑖𝑗′
of course 𝑗′ (considering all of its sections) for student 𝑖 is defined equal to 𝛼𝑓𝑗′ which is the random order
of field 𝑓 for student 𝑖 multiplied by 5 plus 𝛽𝑖𝑗′ , a random number drawn from the normal distribution
(𝜇 = 10, 𝜎 = 10).
Then, the top 𝑀1 courses with highest 𝑉𝑖𝑗′ are selected from 83 courses for each student. 𝑀1 is
independently chosen for each student from the discrete uniform distribution on the interval [30, 35]. To
generate correlated yet distinct values for particular sections of the same course, we generated random
normal number 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑗′ for the 𝑙 𝑡ℎ section of each selected course 𝑗′ of student 𝑖, and set the section value to
𝑉𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑗′ = 𝑉𝑖𝑗′ + 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑗′ . For each student, all course-sections are sorted based on 𝑉𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑗′ and the top
𝑀1 course-sections are selected. Re-indexing course sections to a single list translates the 𝑙 𝑡ℎ section of
each selected course 𝑗′ to the index, and thus 𝑉𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑗′ . The ordinal values of course 𝑟𝑖𝑗 are the
inferred based on 𝑉𝑆𝑖𝑗 to span the integers between [100 − 𝑀1 + 1, 100]. Therefore, 𝑟𝑖𝑗 for student 𝑖‘s
top course is 100, for her second favorite course is 99, and so on.
Finally, the 𝑢𝑖𝑗 values of course-sections of each student are assigned as follows. Depending on the
number of courses evaluated by a student, approximately 10% (and then 40%, 40%, 10%, respectively) of
the courses receive a draw from a discrete uniform distribution [0,10] (and then [10,50], [50,100] and
[100,200], respectively). For each student, these values are normalized to sum up to 1000 and then
monotonically assigned as 𝑢𝑖𝑗 values in the same order as the already assigned 𝑟𝑖𝑗 values determined
above.

Appendix B. Further incentive compatibility results when 𝒘𝒊 for truthful students is
equal to 0, 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75, and when 𝑃 > 20%.
In the first part of this appendix, we assume that 𝑤𝑖 of truthful students is 0, 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 and
show measurements similar to those shown in §5.3.
Figure B.1 – Strategic upside when 𝑤𝑖 for truthful students is 0
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Figure B.2 – Strategic upside when 𝑤𝑖 for truthful students is 0.25
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Figure B.3 – Strategic upside when 𝑤𝑖 for truthful students is 0.5
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Figure B.4 – Strategic upside when 𝑤𝑖 for truthful students is 0.75
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Figure B.5 – Strategic downside when 𝑤𝑖 for truthful students is zero
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Figure B.6 – Strategic Downside when 𝑤𝑖 for truthful students is 0.25
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Figure B.7 – The Strategic Downside when 𝑤𝑖 for truthful students is 0.5
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Figure B.8 – The Strategic Downside when 𝑤𝑖 for truthful students is 0.75
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Figure B.9 – The Net Benefit when 𝑤𝑖 for truthful students is zero
OC
SP-O
TTC-O
SP
TTC
BPM
Draft

0.88
1.61
1.61
0.94
1.54
9.71
2.25

-2.00

0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

Figure B.10 – The Net Benefit when 𝑤𝑖 for truthful students is 0.25
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Figure B.11 – The Net Benefit when 𝑤𝑖 for truthful students is 0.5
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Figure B.12 – The Net Benefit when 𝑤𝑖 for truthful students is 0.75
OC
SP-O
TTC-O
SP
TTC
BPM
Draft
-2.00

-1.53
-0.84
-0.84
-0.34
-1.08
2.13
-0.47
0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

14.00

For the second part of this appendix, we provide additional results for the main setup (i.e., when 𝑤𝑖
for truthful students is 0.5) but when the proportion of strategic students, 𝑃, varies.
Figure B.13 – Average changes in ordinal utility of strategic and truthful students under 𝑃 = 40%
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Figure B.14 – Average changes in ordinal utility of strategic and truthful students under 𝑃 = 60%

Figure B.15 – Average changes in ordinal utility of strategic and truthful students under 𝑃 = 100%
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Figure B.16 – Top – Standard deviation of change in ordinal utility of strategic students with different 𝑃.
Bottom – Standard deviation of change in ordinal utility of truthful students with different 𝑃.
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Appendix C. Comparison to the A-CEEI mechanism.
To compare the A-CEEI algorithm with the algorithms described here, we first found that the
computational time burden of running that algorithm on the same size problems discussed in this paper
was prohibitive. So we instead used the smaller setup of Othman et. al. (2011), but still, based on
computation time we had to limit ourselves to just five market instances. Each of these markets includes
𝑛 = 250 students and 𝑚 = 50 courses. Each course has only one section and the possibility of course
overlap was not considered. Also, each course has 𝑞𝑗 = 27 seats and each student needs 𝑘 = 5 courses. In
each of these five cases, it was possible to run all seven algorithms described in the earlier figures of this
paper in under 6 seconds, while a Tabu search implementation of A-CEEI consistently reached our 2hour time limit without converging to a market clearing error below the defined threshold. Budish (2011)
proved that the market clearing error threshold for each market is √(𝑘 × 𝑀)/2 which is equal to 15 in
our experiments, though we could not achieve values lower than about 49.5 on average. This metric of
infeasibility translated to an average of 119.4 seats assigned beyond the capacity (in total over several
highly demanded courses) while simultaneously resulting in several courses with empty seats, totaling
131.2 unused seats on average (because their price was set too high.)
In short, we find quite poor performance for the A-CEEI method compared to the others discussed here.
All algorithms assigned the max possible number of seats (50*5=1250 seats) to students except A-CEEI
which assigned on average 12 seats fewer than other algorithms. Also, in all random trials, all algorithms
except A-CEEI assigned exactly 5 courses to each student while in A-CEEI on average the worst student
gets 2.2 courses. Accordingly, the average range of binary utility for all algorithms is zero while it is 2.8
for A-CEEI algorithm. Similarly, the average standard deviation of binary utility for all algorithms is zero
while for A-CEEI it is 0.315.
Further results are provided as follows in Figures C.1 through C.6:
Figure C.1 - The average ordinal utility per student per algorithm, showing amounts above A-CEEI
benchmark with average ordinal utility of 432.34 per student.
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Because the Othman et al. (2011) setup is more competitive market, with total supply (50 * 27 = 1350
seats) not much more than total demand (250 * 5 = 1250), in most algorithm runs no student is awarded
her best bundle. Here, the ordinal value of the best bundle is 490 points (= 100 + 99 + 98 + 97 + 96).
Figure C.2 - The average range of ordinal utility per student per algorithm
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Figure C.3 – Average standard deviation of ordinal utility per student per algorithm
OC

20.82

A-CEEI

28.76

SP-O

7.85

TTC-O

7.85

SP

8.78

TTC

9.06

BPM

32.80

Draft

8.32
5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

Figure C.4 – The average cardinal utility per algorithm, amounts above A-CEEI benchmark with
average cardinal utility 156.73
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Figure C.5 – The average range of cardinal utility per algorithm
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Figure C.6 – Average standard deviation of cardinal utility per algorithm
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Appendix D. Comparisons on Random Instances, Varying the Common-Value
Weighting for True Values.
In a final set of experiments, we followed the simpler simulation structure of Kominers et. al. (2010)
to test the performance of the investigated algorithms in extreme cases. Similar to their model, each
course only has one section and no field of study was defined. However, unlike their model, we
maintained our assumptions of overlapping courses and that a student will not ranks all possible courses.
Accordingly, to quickly view the performance of the mechanisms under varying degrees of commonvalue, equation (21) was used to define the true value of course j for student i.
uij = (1 − W) ∗ vij + W ∗ g j

(21)

In equation (21), vij and g j are independently selected from the standard normal distribution and W
was varied as a treatment parameter. When W = 1, all students exactly bid equally for each course, while
if W = 0 students utilities for each course are totally independent. When 0 < W < 1, student preferences
are partially correlated in varying degrees. In our analysis, we compared algorithms in five conditions: W
equals to 1, 0.9, 0.5, 0.1, and 0.0. As W increases, the correlation among student preferences increases
and bid values and rank values of each course among students become more similar to each other.
Incentives were not considered in this set of experiments. Where §5 and Appendix C varied a
personalized parameter wi (in equation 20) to capture manipulation of true values for a studied of
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incentives, here the single value W is varied to change true preferences across the entire market. So here,
rather than asking how manipulation affects outcome when some pretend to have a larger than truthful
amount of common value, we ask how does the market as a whole perform when more or less common
value is present in true valuations. For a further element of robustness, we drop some of the constructs of
realism described in Appendix A, in which students have major fields of study. Here the focus is instead
on more random instances, trying to see how well our algorithms perform under more extreme
circumstances.
D.1 Binary Utility
Looking at Figure D.1, our results show that when W is small (0 or 0.1) and student preferences over
their top 30 to 35 courses are mostly random and uncorrelated to each other, each student did receive
exactly 6 courses in all algorithms and in all 100 market instances therefore all algorithms could assign
5400 seats to students. When W is equal to 0.5, the only algorithm which assigns all 5400 seats is OC
while BPM misses the most seats in comparison to other algorithms, as before. When W increases to 0.9,
the Draft mechanism assigns the lowest number of seats among different algorithms. Without ranking all
courses (students only list their favorite 30-35 courses out of 83 available) assigning all seats becomes
increasingly difficult for all algorithms as W increases. As everyone’s preferences converge to the same
favorite courses, it becomes impossible to assign courses that no one has asked for. As seen in Figure D.1,
OC still achieves the best binary utility outcome, assigning the maximum number of seats among
different algorithms. However, even OC cannot assign more than about half of offered seats as W
approaches 1.
Figure D.1 - The average total binary utility per algorithm for 0 ≤ W ≤ 1.
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D.2 Range of Binary Utility
As already noted, for small values of W such as 0 or 0.1 is exactly 0 since in these conditions all
algorithms are able to assign 5400 seats to students and all students can take 6 courses. However, as W
increases not all algorithms are able to assign the maximum number of courses. When W is equal to 0.5,
BPM achieves the highest range of binary utility and the most unfair solutions. These results reveal that in
99 instances of 100 instances BPM assigned 2 or fewer seats to the student with minimum number of
courses while for OC this number is always 6. However, when W increases to 0.9 or 1, in each of our
simulated market instances, there is at least one student who could not receive even one course based on
OC algorithm. In these examples, the rank and bid of each specific course for all students is almost the
same and the algorithm does not care to assign a specific course to a student who already has other
courses or to a student with no course. As a result, when preferences are so correlated that less than full
schedules are necessary, OC has no built-in safe guard to assign courses equitably. Thus, if OC were to be
implemented in situations of extreme correlation additional constraints would be needed. In other words,
when W is large, we need to add constraints to OC to keep the number of courses among students similar
in order to achieve similar results as in the more realistic (major-field of study based) simulations.
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However, we expect not to face this issue in SP-O and TTC-O algorithms, based on the round-byround methods’ explicit goal of equity. Our results confirm this expectation (see Figure D.2), and we see
that when all preferences are (nearly) identical SP-O can achieve the fairest results and can be considered
as the most reliable algorithm in achieving fair solutions.
Figure D.2 - The average range of binary utility per algorithm for 0 ≤ W ≤ 1.
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D.3 Ordinal and Cardinal Utility
When W is small and student preferences are mostly uncorrelated to each other, again we find all
algorithms performing similarly in average ordinal and cardinal utility per person with slightly better
results for our proposed algorithms. As expected, OC which first maximizes total market ordinal utility
always performs best on the average ordinal performance. When W increases to 0.5, OC and then TTC-O
and SP-O achieve the most efficient solutions based on ordinal and cardinal utility while BPM is the most
inefficient algorithm based on these metrics. When W becomes close to 1, all algorithms perform
similarly based on average ordinal and cardinal utility, as seen in Figures D.3 and D.4.
Figure D.3 - The average ordinal utility per student per algorithm for 0 ≤ W ≤ 1.
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Figure D.4 - The average cardinal utility per student per algorithm for 0 ≤ W ≤ 1.
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D.4 Range and Standard Deviation of Ordinal and Cardinal Utility
Our final set of results are shown in Figure D.5 through D.8, concerning the range and standard deviation
as fairness metrics on utility. Where OC again dominates at the intermediate point in which W = 0.5,
consistent with the main results of the paper, these fairness results tend to vanish as the correlation grows.
In its focus on achieving good ordinal and cardinal market performance, OC will randomly favor some
students; with (nearly) identical students some must win and some must receive very poor (even empty)
schedules in the best overall outcome. Still TTC-O and SP-O show that with only mildly worse overall
performance, these ranges and standard deviations can be kept lower. These latter mechanisms are
therefore seen to be more robust to extreme correlation with respect to fairness, converging toward a pure
rationing outcome as students get closer to identical preferences.

Figure D.5 – The average range of ordinal utility per algorithm for 0 ≤ W ≤ 1.
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Figure D.6 – The average range of cardinal utility per algorithm for 0 ≤ W ≤ 1.
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Figure D.7- The standard deviation of ordinal utility per algorithm for 0 ≤ W ≤ 1.
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Figure D.8- The standard deviation of cardinal utility per algorithm for 0 ≤ W ≤ 1.
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Chapter 3. On Finding Stable and Efficient Solutions for the Team Formation
Problem
Abstract:
The assignment of personnel to teams is a fundamental and ubiquitous managerial function, typically
involving several objectives and a variety of idiosyncratic practical constraints. Despite the prevalence of
this task in practice, the process is seldom approached as a precise optimization problem over the reported
preferences of all agents. This is due in part to the underlying computational complexity that occurs when
quadratic (i.e., intra-team interpersonal) interactions are taken into consideration, and also due to gametheoretic considerations, when those taking part in the process are self-interested agents. Variants of this
fundamental decision problem arise in a number of settings, including, for example, human resources and
project management, military platooning, sports-league management, ride sharing, data clustering, and in
assigning students to group projects. In this paper, we study a mathematical-programming approach to
\team formation" focused on the interplay between two of the most common objectives considered in the
related literature: economic efficiency (i.e., the maximization of social welfare) and game-theoretic
stability (e.g., finding a core solution when one exists). With a weighted objective across these two goals,
the problem is modeled as a bi-level binary optimization problem, and transformed into a single-level,
exponentially sized binary integer program. We then devise a branch-cut-and-price algorithm and
demonstrate its efficacy through an extensive set of simulations, with favorable comparisons to other
algorithms from the literature.

1. Introduction
Consider the task of assigning n workers to m teams of equal size (assume that m evenly divides n).
Each worker scores each co-worker, being asked to express an integer from 1 to (say) 10, with 10 being a
most preferred teammate.
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Through the application of constraints, it is easy to imagine many practical variations of this basic
setting. For example, perhaps there are m project managers among the n workers, and each team must
have exactly one project manager. Each project manager is tied to a specific project plan, and workers
consider the two together in their scoring. Variations with more constraints (e.g., at least one marketing
person, at least two from IT, etc.) abound.
This process of putting people into teams and observing their satisfaction (or lack thereof) happens
incredibly frequently in practice, yet obtaining maximum-score solutions for even modestly sized
instances can be computationally prohibitive. Indeed, the maximization of the sum of the interpersonal
scores among teammates is NP-Hard, and is too difficult to solve for even a few dozen workers,
depending on how sophisticated of a formulation is used.
Beyond utility maximization, the economic concept of stability has played a major role in similar types of
preference-reporting mechanisms. In many games, we ask if a subset of players could all improve their
situation by breaking away from the game and getting together by themselves. Such a situation is called
unstable, and is considered bad for morale or for the survivability of the game as an institution. Further, it
encourages the subset to collusively misstate their preferences to achieve the better outcome. (By
reporting maximum scores for those in the subset, and zero for all others, group manipulation may often
prove beneficial, undermining the goals of the mechanism.) Some job markets (modeled as marriage
markets, such as medical-residency matching) have been shown in the classical literature to always admit
stable solutions, sometimes many. Other simple markets may have no stable solution, such as in the stable
𝑛

roommate problem (which can be modeled as our current problem with team-size 𝑠 = 𝑚 = 2 and no
constraints besides s = 2).
This leads us to consider the problem of finding a solution that minimizes the amount that any subset
(or coalition) of players could mutually improve their situation by breaking away and forming a new valid
team. We call this the maximum uplift coalition, and consider the minimization of the maximum uplift.
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When the minimum is zero, the solution is stable, but even when no stable solution exists, the minimum
provides a measure of instability.
A restriction to equal-sized teams is used throughout this paper; other constraints based on worker
characteristics may or may not be included. Since the case when m does not evenly divide n but team
sizes as close as possible to uniform are required can be modeled by adding dummy workers and a
constraint enforcing that at most one dummy worker is assigned per team, we assume m evenly divides n
throughout for simplicity. This (nearly) equal-size team assumption is crucial, driving the interesting
behavior of this type of system (in contrast to hedonic games). With equal-size teams, individual actions
have less influence, making group uplift a more interesting consideration than unilateral deviation.
After a broad review of the literature (§2), we provide a descriptive model (§3) and then refine to a
more usable single-level reformulation (§4). We provide and then compare three algorithmic
implementations (§5 and §6) before comparing to benchmark heuristics from the literature (§7) across
four distinct preference models.

2. Related Literature
2.1. Team Dynamics
The study of interpersonal dynamics in teams has a huge stream of literature within the management
and organizational psychology community. Though too deep to expound upon broadly here, Gardner et
al. (2017), for example, have considered formal models with quadratic objective terms based on pairwise
utility realized among those individuals placed in the same group. See Mathieu et al. (2015) for a survey
of the dynamics of people working in teams and their influence on team formation. One perspective is
that a team planner will often have several practical constraints on acceptable teams, for example that
each team must include a minimum number of people from a certain gender, ethnic group, or having a
specific skill set (Campion et al. 1993). Moreover, several models and algorithms have been developed to
solve team partitioning problems that consider different forms of skill constraints (Farhadi et al. 2011,
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Gutierrez et al. 2016, Chen et al. 2012, Agrawal et al. 2014). These provide support for our constraintbased architecture, with each team needing to satisfy quotas or caps on workers of particular skill-sets or
other generic binary characteristics.

2.2. Graph Theory

Maximizing only the intra-group efficiency for teams of equal size is equivalent to the NP-hard balanced
k-clique partitioning problem (BCPP) (Bhasker and Samad 1991), which has been used, for example, for
sports tournament scheduling and league realignment (Recalde et al. 2016). This stream of literature
focuses only the efficiency of the solution, with no consideration of stability.

2.3. Matching
With preferences submitted by self-interested agents, the current work is related to an extensive literature
on \matching markets" which has become an active area of research with wide-spread applications. This
work builds on the classical stable marriage problem of Gale and Shapley (1962) (see also Gusfield and
Irving 1989, Irving 1985, Iwama and Miyazaki 2008) in which disjoint sets of men and women each rank
members of the opposite gender (possibly ranking \being alone" above some potential mates). A stable
matching is often desired, in which no unmatched couple prefers each other over their current matching.
Applications of bipartite marriage-type matching have flourished in recent years, with prominent
successes in the National Residency Matching Program (Roth 1996), school-choice programs
(Pais and Pint´er 2008), and kidney exchange (Roth et al. 2004), and even recognition of the discipline
with the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. The tension between efficiency and stability (studied
here) has been present in this stream of research, particularly in discussions of school-choice program
implementations (Erdil and Ergin 2008).
2.3.1 Roommate Problem Variations
As mentioned in Section 1, when the market does not consist of two disjoint classes of agents (e.g., men
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and women, workers and jobs, students and schools, etc.) but is instead drawn from a single pool of
agents, a stable solution may not exist, even with “teams" of size two and no further constraints, i.e., the
roommate problem (Irving 1985). Indeed, team formation has already been discussed as a natural
generalization of the roommate problem (Bir´o et al. 2016), but few have attempted to tackle all
computational difficulties directly.
While a particular instance of the (s = 2) roommate problem may not admit a stable solution, a
polynomial-time algorithm (Irving 1994) can check for the existence of a stable solution and find one, if it
exists. Prosser (2014) present an alternative constraint-programming algorithm for this problem
with partially-defined preference lists. Partially-stable outcomes in unsolvable roommate problems
(problems without stable matchings) have been defined; for example, an almost stable matching consists
of a Pareto-optimal matching with a minimum number of blocking pairs; a maximum-internally
stable matching is a solution with a maximal set of stable pairs; and a maximum irreversible matching
maximizes the number of stable pairs (Abraham et al. 2006, Tan 1990, Bir´o et al. 2016). Also, Van der
Linden et al. (2016) recently explored an algorithm for the roommate problem in which people who are
mutual favorites, i.e., soulmates, are matched first, with the process then iterated. To the best of
knowledge of the authors, no formal study of determining whether or not a stable assignment exists (and
producing one if it does exist) for s > 2 has previously been studied. Other generalizations of stable
roommate problems include those by Cechl´arov´a and Fleiner (2005), where an agent may participate in
more than one 2-person relationship. Recently, Wolfson and Lin (2017) study ride-sharing as an
application of the roommate problem, proposing a heuristic algorithm for both efficiency and stability, but
again studying only the special case of our current setting under s = 2.
It is worth noting here that much of the roommate and matching literature focuses on ordinalpreference elicitation (i.e., submission of ranked lists) while we use cardinal-preference elicitation (i.e.,
submission of numerical scores) for practical reasons. Because every cardinal submission can be
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transformed uniquely to a weak ordinal preference, we ignore this distinction for the remainder of the
paper.
2.3.2 Hedonic Games
This paper focuses on team formation with a restriction to equal-sized teams, unlike hedonic games (Aziz
et al. 2011). Negative preferences in hedonic games can result in agents not matched to teams, where here
an equal-size constraint prohibits this. We thus normalize preferences to be nonnegative.
Also of note is that a variety of stability concepts have been studied for hedonic games, including Nash
stability, individual stability, and contractual individual stability, respectively considering the benefit of
leaving a current team and joining another team for each person of the market, for each person and the
team receiving a defector, and for each person, the receiving team, and the team that was left (Aziz et al.
2011).
Research has been done on the complexity of verification, existence, and calculation of solutions
satisfying these notions of stability in hedonic games (Sung and Dimitrov 2010), but the emphasis on
individual deviations does not shed much light on the difficult computational problems explored here.
The equal-size constraint forces us to consider group deviation directly. Because one individual cannot
defect and join another team without implications for other teams, it is important to consider
improvements resulting from several trades taking place at once. Our notion of team uplift considers
the whole group of agents’ preferences in forming a hypothetical alternative team. We consider individual
deviation only in the appendix, showing that it seems to be less interesting with equal-size teams.

2.4 Team Formation: Benchmarks from the Literature
The most closely related work to our own is that of Wright and Vorobeychik (2015) who also explore
mechanisms for team formation computationally. In the Harvard Business School Draft (DRAFT), agents
are randomly ordered with the first m agents selected as captains. Over m - 1 rounds, each captain in turn
selects her most preferred unassigned member to join her team, with the order reversing in even and odd
numbered rounds. In the One-Player-One-Pick (OPOP) mechanism, all agents are randomly ordered
63

with the first m captains starting a team with only one pick from among the remaining non-captains.
Then, each remaining non-captain in the ordering chooses her favorite team based on expected utility. If
her team has another available spot, she also chooses the next person to join her team. Wright and
Vorobeychik (2015) provide evidence in favor of these two mechanisms, making them the best
benchmarks available for direct comparison in our computational experiments.

3. The Team Formation Problem
Let 𝑁 = {1, … , 𝑛} be a set of n agents with n = m · s and 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑍 + . For each 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, let 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 ∈
𝑍 + represent the pairwise utility of i for being teamed with j, normalized to be non-negative and integer
by affine transformation, with all 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 = 0. A feasible team formation is a partition of 𝑁 into m teams
𝑀 = {1, … , 𝑚} denoted by 𝑡: 𝑁 → 𝑀. Hence 𝑡(𝑖) is the team agent 𝑖 is assigned to, and the equal-size
teams restriction requires |{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁|𝑡(𝑖) = 𝑘}| = 𝑠 for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝑀. We will use 𝑇 to denote the set of legal
team formations, with the equal-size teams restriction assumed throughout. Furthermore, let 𝑐(𝑡, 𝑖): = {𝑗 ∶
𝑡(𝑗) = 𝑡(𝑖)} be the set of agents assigned to the same team as i in t.
It will be convenient to search over size-s subsets of N without specifying an entire team formation.
𝑁
Thus, let 𝐶 ∶= ( ) be the family of all subsets of N (called coalitions) of size s. For any i, let 𝐶(𝑖) ⊆ 𝐶
𝑠
be those coalitions c with 𝑖 ∈ 𝑐. For any 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶(𝑖), let 𝑢(𝑐; 𝑖): = ∑𝑗∈𝑐 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 signify i’s total individual
utility as part of c. As additional shorthand, we have 𝑢(𝑡; 𝑖) ∶= 𝑢(𝑐(𝑡, 𝑖), 𝑖) as i’s utility in a team
formation and 𝑢(𝑐): = ∑𝑖∈𝑐 ∑𝑗∈𝑐 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 as the utility of an entire coalition c. We define each agent i’s
maximum realizable utility 𝑈 (𝑖): = max 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑖) , which can be found by simply taking the top 𝑠 − 1
𝑐∈𝐶(𝑖)

values of 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 (until later when other constraints beyond equal-size are added).
As motivated above, we are interested in team formation with both total utility (efficiency) and
stability as objectives. Thus, our formal optimization problem, the team formation problem (TFP) is
formulated with both objectives, weighted by a scalar 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] . The first component (weighted by α)
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seeks to maximize the sum of the individual utilities. The second component (weighted by 1 - α) seeks to
minimize the maximum uplift r, defined for any fixed 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 by a maximum of

𝑟(𝑐, 𝑡): = ∑(𝑢(𝑐, 𝑖) − 𝑢(𝑡, 𝑖)),
𝑖∈𝑐

over all coalitions 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 with 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑖) ≥ 𝑢(𝑡, 𝑖) for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑐. The TFP is thus modeled as:
max 𝛼. ∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝑢(𝑡, 𝑖) − (1 − 𝛼) · 𝑟

(𝑇𝐹𝑃)

𝑡∈𝑇

𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑟 = max{𝑟(𝑐, 𝑡) ∶ (𝑖 ∈ 𝑐) → (𝑢(𝑐, 𝑖) ≥ 𝑢(𝑡, 𝑖))}
𝑐∈𝐶

The upper-level (leader) optimization model selects the partition and the lower-level (follower)
optimization model calculates the maximum uplift coalition for the partition identified in the leader
model. The condition in the follower problem enforces that each individual in a maximum uplift
coalition is not worse off.
Note that if α = 1 we arrive at the BCPP, and if α = 0 then stability (as measured by maximum uplift) is
the only measure of interest. In the latter case, if the optimal solution is 0, then we have a fully stable
solution; if positive, we have a solution that minimizes the maximum uplift.
Optimization model (TFP) can be cast as a bi-level binary optimization problem by introducing a
binary variable 𝑥𝑖,𝑘 indicating if each agent i is placed in team k. We also associate, in the follower,
variables yi, to indicate if person i is selected in the maximum uplift coalition:
max 𝛼 · ∑𝑖∈𝑁 ∑𝑗∈𝑁 ∑𝑘∈𝑀 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑥𝑖,𝑗 . 𝑥𝑗,𝑘 − (1 − 𝛼) · 𝑟
𝑠. 𝑡. ∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝑥𝑖,𝑘 = 𝑠,

(𝐵𝐿)
∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑀

∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝑥𝑖,𝑘 = 1

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁

𝑥𝑖,𝑗 ∈ {0,1}

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑀

𝑟 = max{∑𝑖∈𝑁 ∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑦𝑖 𝑦𝑗 − ∑𝑖∈𝑁 ∑𝑗∈𝑁 ∑𝑘∈𝑀 𝑦𝑖 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑥𝑖,𝑘 𝑥𝑗,𝑘
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𝑠. 𝑡.

0 ≤ (1 − 𝑦𝑖 ) · 𝑼 (𝑖) + ∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑦𝑖 𝑦𝑗 − ∑𝑗∈𝑁 ∑𝑘∈𝑀 𝑦𝑖 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑥𝑖,𝑘

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁

∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑠
𝑦𝑖 ∈ {0,1}

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁}

Proposition 1. Model (BL) is a valid formulation for the TFP.
Proof. Leader problem constraints ensure a team formation, with total utility weighted by α in the
objective. We need only show that the follower problem identifies the maximum uplift group.
Fix a solution to the leader problem 𝑥′. Let 𝑦′ be a feasible solution to the follower. By the constraint
∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑠 , a properly sized coalition is identified. The first term in the follower objective function,
∑𝑖∈𝑁 ∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑦𝑖 𝑦𝑗 is the total coalitional utility over every 𝑖 with 𝑦′𝑖 = 1. The second term evaluates to
′
′
′
′
∑𝑖∈𝑁 ∑𝑗∈𝑁 ∑𝑘∈𝑀 𝑦𝑖′ 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑥𝑖,𝑘
𝑥𝑗,𝑘
Therefore, for a fixed 𝑖, 𝑦𝑖′ 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑥𝑖,𝑘
𝑥𝑗,𝑘
will evaluate to 0 if 𝑦𝑖′ = 0, and to
′
′
∑𝑗∈𝑁 ∑𝑘∈𝑀 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑥𝑖,𝑘
𝑥𝑗,𝑘
if 𝑦𝑖′ = 1. In the latter case, this term is the utility of i according to 𝑥′ in the leader

problem. Therefore, the (1 - α) objective term evaluates to the total uplift of the coalition defined 𝑦𝑖′ above
the x’ value.
Finally, the constraint 0 ≤ (1 − 𝑦𝑖 ) · 𝑈 (𝑖) + ∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑦𝑖 𝑦𝑗 − ∑𝑗∈𝑁 ∑𝑘∈𝑀 𝑦𝑖 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑥𝑖,𝑘 becomes trivially
satisfied if 𝑦𝑖′ = 0 (by the maximality of 𝑈 (𝑖)). If 𝑦𝑖′ = 1, the constraint enforces that each individual
chosen must have an increase in utility to want to join an uplift coalition, completing the proof. 

4. Single-level Reformulations
In order to design an efficient algorithm for solving (BL) (which is bi-level, quadratically constrained
and has a quadratic objective function), we transform it into a single-level linear binary optimization
model with the addition of two new sets of binary variables. For every pair 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, let 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 indicate if i
and j are assigned to the same team (if 𝑖 = 𝑗 let 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 = 0, or simply ignore it). Next, for every i and value
𝑣 ∈ {0,1, … , 𝑈(𝑖)}, introduce variables 𝑧𝑖,𝑣 indicating if i has individual utility v in the team assigned to i:
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max
𝑠. 𝑡.

𝛼 · ∑𝑖∈𝑁 ∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 − (1 − 𝛼) · 𝑟

(𝑆𝐿)

∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝑥𝑖,𝑘 = 𝑠,

∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑀

∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝑥𝑖,𝑘 = 1

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁

𝑤𝑖,𝑗 ≥ 𝑥𝑖,𝑘 + 𝑥𝑗,𝑘 − 1

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑀

𝑤𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑥𝑖,𝑘 ≤ 𝑥𝑗,𝑘 + 1

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑀

∑𝑈(𝑖)
𝑣=0 𝑧𝑖,𝑣 = 1

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁

∑𝑈(𝑖)
𝑣=0 𝑣. 𝑧𝑖,𝑣 = ∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑤𝑖,𝑗

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
𝑈(𝑖)

𝑟 ≥ 𝑢(𝑐) − ∑𝑖∈𝑐 ∑𝑈(𝑖)
𝑣=0 𝑣. 𝑧𝑖,𝑣 − ∑𝑖∈𝑐 ∑𝑣=𝑢(𝑐,𝑖)+1 𝑢(𝑐). 𝑧𝑖,𝑣

∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶

𝑥𝑖,𝑗 ∈ {0,1}

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑀

𝑤𝑖,𝑗 ∈ {0,1}

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗

𝑧𝑖,𝑣 ∈ {0,1}

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ∀𝑣 ∈ {0,1, . . , 𝑈(𝑖)}

Theorem 1. Model (SL) is a valid formulation for the TFP.
Proof. The first four sets of constraints generate a partition and link the x variables with the w variables.
Note that the second constraint set is necessary to link the x and w variables, forcing there to be at least
one k for which 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 is constrained to zero when i and j’s teams differ.
𝑈(𝑖)

𝑈(𝑖)

The constraints ∑𝑣=0 𝑧𝑖,𝑣 = 1 and ∑𝑣=0 𝑣. 𝑧𝑖,𝑣 = ∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 define the z variables, which select
exactly one value from the domain of the agent’s utility function and match it to the w variable’s
generation of utility as the sum of pairwise actualizations.
The final constraint set (aside from binary constraints) links the uplift variable r to the uplift of each
coalition. In particular, for every coalition c, the first term on the right-hand side is the total utility for c.
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The second term calculates, for each i in the coalition, the individual utility realized in the team formation
obtained endogenously (by x and hence w and z variables). The third term ensures that the constraint does
not restrict the value of r unless it is an individually rational uplift group for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑐. That is, if 𝑧𝑖,𝑣 = 1
for a value 𝑣 > 𝑢 (𝑐, 𝑖), then i would get more utility from the endogenous team formation than from the
potential coalition c, and so would not join c. An active 𝑧𝑖,𝑣 variable in the third term causes the entire
right-hand side to be non-positive, hence trivially satisfied; if even one agent would not join c it is not
considered as a stability threat. Note that these constraints enforce 𝑟 ≥ 0; for any group c in the solution
defined by x, the right-hand side evaluates to 0. With the coefficient of r in the objective function nonpositive, r will take the maximum value of the right-hand sides over this constraint set. Any tight
constraint from this set corresponds to a maximum uplift coalition in the solution defined by x. 
An alternative, exponentially sized model can be formulated, which provides a tighter linear
relaxation, at the expense of model size. This is done by creating a binary variable 𝑡𝑐 for every 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶,
indicating whether or not this coalition is part of the team formation.
max
𝑠. 𝑡.

𝛼 · ∑𝑐∈𝐶 𝑢(𝑐)𝑡𝑐 − (1 − 𝛼) · 𝑟

(𝐸𝑋𝑃)

∑𝑐∈𝐶 𝑡𝑐 = 𝑚,

∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑀

∑𝑐∈𝐶(𝑖) 𝑡𝑐 = 1

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁

𝑤𝑖,𝑗 = ∑𝑐∈𝐶(𝑖)∩𝐶(𝑗) 𝑡𝑐

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗

∑𝑈(𝑖)
𝑣=0 𝑧𝑖,𝑣 = 1

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁

∑𝑈(𝑖)
𝑣=0 𝑣. 𝑧𝑖,𝑣 = ∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝑤𝑖,𝑗

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁

𝑈(𝑖)
𝑟 ≥ 𝑢(𝑐) − ∑𝑖∈𝑐 ∑𝑈(𝑖)
𝑣=0 𝑣. 𝑧𝑖,𝑣 − ∑𝑖∈𝑐 ∑𝑣=𝑢(𝑐,𝑖)+1 𝑢(𝑐). 𝑧𝑖,𝑣

𝑡𝑐 ∈ {0,1}

∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶

68

∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶

𝑤𝑖,𝑗 ∈ {0,1}

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗

𝑧𝑖,𝑣 ∈ {0,1}

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ∀𝑣 ∈ {0,1, . . , 𝑈(𝑖)}

This model replaces the x variables with t variables to define the team formation, and the x and w
linking constraints with 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 = ∑𝑐∈𝐶(𝑖)∩𝐶(𝑗) 𝑡𝑐 linking t variables with w variables.

4.1 Characteristic Constraints
As noted in section 2 diversity of skill-sets or types is a primary concern when establishing teams. For
example, a company may want teams with individuals from diverse functional areas, with varying MyersBriggs Type Indicator scores (The Myers & Briggs Foundation 2018), or with different expertise. With
student teams, diversity with respect to gender, skills, or roles might be desired.
In general we consider constraints of the form, \each team must have a specified minimum (or
maximum) number of agents with characteristic q." Formally, suppose that there are a set of
characteristics Q that each individual will either possess of not. This is indicated by the binary parameter
𝛿𝑖, 𝑞 equal to 1 if and only if agent i has characteristic q. For each characteristic 𝑞 ∈ 𝑄, there is a specified
𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑞 and 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑞, with 0 ≤ 𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑞 ≤ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑞 ≤ 𝑠, establishing bounds on the number of individuals
possessing each characteristic that must be represented in each group.
These bounds are easily appended to the models above. For model with x variables, namely models
(BL) and (SL), add:
𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑞 ≤ ∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝛿𝑖,𝑞 , 𝑥𝑖,𝑘 ≤ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑞

∀𝑞 ∈ 𝑄, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑀

to enforce this condition. For (SL) and (EXP), with variables 𝑡𝑐, we simply refine C to contain only
those groups c for which these conditions hold. Call this set 𝐶 𝑄 .

69

5. Optimization Algorithms
The models (SL) and (EXP) are computationally challenging in practice. Both contain, at a minimum,
a pseudo-polynomial number of variables and an exponential number of constraints. This requires the
design of algorithms capable of scaling to instances of practical size. We make use of branch-and bound
search, as is typically employed for binary optimization problems, with added routines for handling the
exponentially sized portions of the model.
This section provides a description of two optimization algorithms for TFP, one designed to solve
model (SL) and one for model (EXP). To begin, we describe a class of optimization problems that will
appear as subproblems throughout these two primary algorithms. The cardinality-constrained binary
quadratic programming problem (CCBQP) is specified by an asymmetric, not necessarily positive semidefinite, 𝜈 × 𝜈 matrix Q, and a value K:
max 𝜒 𝑇 𝑄𝜒
𝑠. 𝑡.

(𝐶𝐶𝐵𝑄𝑃)
∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝜒𝑖 = 𝐾
𝐴𝜒 ≥ 𝑏
𝜒𝑖 ∈ {0,1}

∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑣}

where the additional linear constraint set 𝐴𝜒 ≥ 𝑏 may be vacuous. Recent literature has investigated
effective computational models for solving various instance types of CCBQP problems. In particular,
model 2 of Lima and Grossmann (2017) proved most efficient in our experimental results (using
commercial IP solvers) over a wide-range of instances, and so our presented results employ the following
reformulation throughout. Introduce binary variables 𝜓𝑖,𝑗 for every pair of indices 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝜈} with
𝑖 < 𝑗, and reformulate (CCBQP) as follows:
𝑣
max ∑𝑣𝑖=1 𝑄𝑖,𝑖 𝜒𝑖 + ∑𝑣−1
𝑖=1 ∑𝑗=𝑖+1(𝑄𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑄𝑗,𝑖 ) 𝜓𝑖,𝑗
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(CCBQP*)

𝑠. 𝑡. ∑𝑣𝑖=1 𝜒𝑖 = 𝐾
𝜓𝑖,𝑗 ≥ 𝜒𝑖 + 𝜒𝑗 − 1
𝜓𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 𝜒𝑖
𝜓𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 𝜒𝑗
𝑣
∑𝑗−1
𝑖=1 𝜓𝑖,𝑗 + ∑𝑖=𝑗+1 𝜓𝑖,𝑗 = (𝐾 − 1) 𝜒𝑖

∀𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑣}

𝐴𝜒 ≥ 𝑏
𝜒𝑖 ∈ {0,1}

∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑣}

We now describe three proposed algorithms for the TFP, each a branch- and-bound algorithm
utilizing a model formulated in Section 4.

5.1. Branch and cut (BC)
BC is a branch-and-cut algorithm for solving model (SL). All computational models for the TFP
presented in this paper contain the family of uplift- defining constraints:
𝑈(𝑖)
𝑟 ≥ 𝑢(𝑐) − ∑𝑖∈𝑐 ∑𝑈(𝑖)
𝑣=0 𝑣. 𝑧𝑖,𝑣 − ∑𝑖∈𝑐 ∑𝑣=𝑢(𝑐,𝑖)+1 𝑢(𝑐). 𝑧𝑖,𝑣

∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶

(𝑈𝑃(𝐶))

As opposed to adding all 𝑈𝑃(𝑐) constraints at once, we propose a branch- and-cut approach for
finding constraints that might impact the optimal solution. Namely, at each integer-search-tree node, an
optimization problem is solved to identify if there exists any 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 for which the c-indexed constraint
𝑈𝑃(𝑐) is violated. If such a violated constraint exists, it is added to the model and the branch-and-bound
search continues.
Proposition 2. At any integer search-tree node, for either (SL) or (EXP), let 𝑟𝑗 be the value of 𝑟 and,
∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 , let 𝑣𝑖𝑗 be the unique second index for which variable 𝑧𝑖,𝑣 is1. Let 𝑣𝑖′ be the optimal solution to
the following problem, with optimal objective value 𝑟 ∗ :
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max ∑𝑖∈𝑁 ∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝜒𝑖 − ∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝑣𝑖′ 𝜒𝑖

(𝑉𝐶)

𝑠. 𝑡. ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝜒𝑖 = 𝑠
∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 𝜒𝑖 ≥ 𝑣𝑖′ 𝜒𝑖

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁

𝜒𝑖 ∈ {0,1}

∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁

There exists a violated 𝑈𝑃(𝑐) constraint if and only if 𝑟 ∗ > 𝑟ˊ. Furthermore, if r∗ > rˊ, and 𝑐 ∗ : = {𝑖 ∶
𝜒𝑖∗ = 1}, then 𝑈𝑃(𝑐 ∗ ) is violate constraint.
The proof of this proposition is immediate the mathematical program (𝑉𝐶) finds the group 𝑐 ∗ for
which each individual has a non-decreasing uplift (enforced by the constraints ∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑢𝑖𝑗 𝜒𝑖 ≥ 𝑣𝑖′ . 𝜒𝑖
corresponding to the most-violated constraint. Model (𝑉𝐶) is a special case of the 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝑄𝑃 and so can be
solved via model (𝐶𝐶𝐵𝑄𝑃 ∗ ). We note that if characteristic constraints are considered they can be directly
added to the mathematical program in the statement of Proposition 2 by adding constraints:
𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑞 ≤ ∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝛿𝑖,𝑞 𝜒𝑖 ≤ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑞

∀𝑞 ∈ 𝑄

Equipped with Proposition 2 we can formally describe our first proposed algorithm BC, which solves
model (𝑆𝐿) by branch-and-cut. Starting with none of the constraints 𝑈𝑃(𝑐), a branch-and-bound search
solves model (𝑆𝐿). At any integer-search-tree node, the optimization model in Proposition 2 is solved to
find if there exists a violated constraint. If one exists, the constraint 𝑈𝑃(𝑐 ∗ ) is added to the model and the
search continues. Otherwise, the solution identified at the node is feasible, and a potentially improving
solution.

5.2. Branch-cut-and-price (BCP)
BCP is a branch-cut-and-price algorithm for solving (EXP). One simple method, which we denote by
EXP, is enumerating all of C (or CQ if caps or quotas are in use) and directly solving (EXP) using a state-
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of-the-art integer programming solver. EXP has the obvious shortcoming of scalability—|C| grows
exponentially with the number of people, hence limiting the use in practical application.
To address this shortcoming, we describe a branch-cut-and-price algorithm, BCP, that generates
variables and constraints dynamically, as needed. Note that not only does model (EXP) contain an
exponential number of variables and an exponential number of constraints, but there is a family of
constraints that contain exponentially many variables, requiring particular care in implementation. We
will interchangeably refer to the variables tc as variables or columns.
BCP is initialized by finding any set of coalitions C0 ⊆ C representing a team formation. For any
current active Cˊ⊆ C, starting with C0, define the restricted master problem, RMP(Cˊ), as exactly
formulation (EXP) with C replaced by Cˊ, implying a restricted set of both tc columns and 𝑈𝑃(𝑐)
∗
constraints. Let 𝑜 ∗ ( 𝐶ˊ) denote the optimal value of 𝑅𝑀𝑃(𝐶ˊ), with 𝑟 ∗ ( 𝐶ˊ), 𝑡𝑐∗ (𝐶ˊ), and 𝑤𝑖,𝑗
(𝐶ˊ) as the

associated variables values at the particular optimal solution. To isolate the efficiency component of the
objective, let 𝑢∗ (𝐶 ′ ) ≔

𝑜∗ (𝐶 ′ )+(1−𝛼)𝑟 ∗ (𝐶 ′ )
𝛼

. Note that with 𝐶ˊ = 𝐶, all these values correspond to the true

optimal solution (of the unrestricted problem), in which case we may drop the argument. For the linear
relaxation of 𝑅𝑀𝑃(𝐶ˊ) (replacing each ∈ {0, 1} with ∈ [0, 1]), we denote the optimal value and solution
by adding carets (or hats)—for example, 𝑜̂ ∗ (𝐶ˊ) refers to the optimal value of the linear relaxation of
𝑅𝑀𝑃(𝐶ˊ).
With 𝐶 0 defined as a feasible team formation, 𝑅𝑀𝑃(𝐶 0 ) is feasible. Yet 𝑜 ∗ (𝑐 0 ) may not be a lower
bound on 𝑜 ∗ , nor will 𝑜̂ ∗ (𝐶 0 ) necessarily be an upper bound on 𝑜. For the former, there may be
additional constraints, related to 𝑐 ∉ 𝐶 0 , that restrict r to take a value higher than it does at the solution.
For the latter, there may be variables that needed to be added that are members of an improving solution.
Fix 𝐶ˊ and consider the linear relaxation of 𝑅𝑀𝑃(𝐶ˊ). Let µ, 𝜎𝑖 , and 𝜅𝑖,𝑗 be the dual multipliers of the
first three listed constraints at the optimal value, defined on the appropriate indices. Theorem 2
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establishes a condition for which one can assert that ois an upper bound on 𝑜 ∗ , enabling an exact branchcut and-price algorithm to be designed.
Theorem 2. Let 𝑟𝑐 ∗be the optimal value to the following problem:
max ∑𝑖∈𝑁 ∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑗≠𝑖(𝑢𝑖,𝑗 − 𝜅𝑖,𝑗 )𝜒𝑖 𝜒𝑗 − ∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝜎𝑖 𝜒𝑖 − 𝜇

(𝑅𝐶)

𝑠. 𝑡. ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝜒𝑖 = 𝑠
𝜒𝑖 ∈ {0,1}

∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}

If 𝑟𝑐 ∗ ≤ 0 and the optimal value to (𝑉𝐶) is less than or equal to 𝑟 ∗ (𝐶ˊ), then 𝑜̂ ∗ (𝐶 ′ ) is an upper
bound of 𝑜 ∗ .
Proof. We need only show that under the conditions of the theorem there is no set of groups 𝐶̃ ⊃ 𝐶′
for which 𝑜̂(𝐶̃ ) > 𝑜̂(𝐶′). Let 𝑃 ∗ be the problem formed by adding to 𝑅𝑀𝑃(𝐶ˊ) any missing 𝑈𝑃(𝑐)
constraints ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 but keeping the index set 𝐶 ˊ for 𝑡𝑐 columns. Given this set of columns defined by 𝐶 ˊ,
since the optimal value to 𝑅𝑀𝑃(𝐶ˊ) is less than or equal to 𝑟 ∗ (𝐶ˊ), we know that the optimal value of the
LP relaxation of 𝑅𝑀𝑃(𝐶ˊ) is equivalent to the optimal value of the LP relaxation of 𝑃∗ . We now show
that, under the conditions of the theorem, for any coalition 𝑐̃ ∉ 𝐶′, the reduced cost of variable 𝑡𝑐̃ , if it
were to be added to the variables in 𝑃, is less than or equal to 0. This implies that the LP relaxation of
𝑃∗ is equal to 𝑜̂ ∗ (𝐶ˊ) , which in turn implies 𝑜̂ ∗ (𝐶ˊ) = 𝑜̂(𝐶).
Fix 𝑐̃ ∉ 𝐶′. The reduced cost of 𝑡𝑐̃ is
𝑢(𝑐̃ ) − 𝜇 − ∑𝑖∈𝑐̃ 𝜎𝑖 − ∑𝑖∈𝑐̃ ∑𝑗∈𝑐̃:𝑗≠𝑖 𝜅𝑖,𝑗 = ∑𝑖∈𝑐̃ ∑𝑗∈𝑐̃:𝑗≠𝑖(𝑢𝑖,𝑗 − 𝜅𝑖,𝑗 ) − ∑𝑖∈𝑐̃ 𝜎𝑖 − 𝜇
By the conditions of the theorem, ∑𝑖∈𝑐̃ ∑𝑗∈𝑐̃:𝑗≠𝑖(𝑢𝑖,𝑗 − 𝜅𝑖,𝑗 ) − ∑𝑖∈𝑐̃ 𝜎𝑖 − 𝜇 ≤ 0 . Since 𝑐̃ was
arbitrarily chosen, this concludes the proof.
Note that 𝑅𝐶 is another instance of the 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝑄.
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Equipped with Theorem 2, BCP proceeds as follows. Starting from an appropriate 𝐶 0 , we begin by
iterating between finding improving columns, and finding violating constraints. In particular, starting with
𝐶ˊ = 𝐶 0 (RC) (the pricing problem) is iteratively solved, and whenever an improving column is found
(i.e., the optimal value is greater than 0), it is added to 𝐶ˊ. When the optimal value drops to 0, model (𝑉𝐶)
is solved. If a violating constraint is found, the coalition corresponding to that constraint is added to 𝐶ˊ,
and, again, improving columns are identified. If, however, there are no violating constraints, a global
bound on the optimal value is found. One can then solve 𝑅𝑀𝑃(𝐶ˊ) with integrality constraints to arrive at
a feasible, potentially improving primal solution. This is done at every search-tree node, as 𝑅𝑀𝑃(𝐶ˊ) can
typically be solved effectively.
A branch-and-bound search is used to find the globally optimal solution. In particular, after solving
the root node of the search, by the procedure described above, a variable is chosen to branch on. Two
other nodes are created, one in which the chosen variable is forced to 0 and the other forced to 1. The
procedure continues until all nodes are pruned, whereupon the best found primal solution is the globally
optimal solution to the original TFP instance. In the case where characteristic considerations are
incorporated, one need only add constraints to the pricing problem limiting the choice of additional
columns.
More formally, a branch-and-bound search is implemented as follows. Each search-tree node is
specified by two coalitional sets: 𝐶 𝑖𝑛 and 𝐶 𝑒𝑥 . Coalitions 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 𝑖𝑛 are required to be a part of the solution
and 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 𝑒𝑥 are forced to be excluded from the solution, and not be generated in subsequent pricing
problems. The search-tree nodes are stored in a queue L. Initially, a root node 𝜌 contains 𝐶 𝑖𝑛 = 𝐶 𝑒𝑥 = ∅,
a relaxation value 𝑜 is assigned to 𝜌, and 𝐿: = {𝜌}.
Once processing at a search-tree node concludes, a new search node 𝜌 is selected from 𝐿. The LP
relaxation of (EXP) is found by solving 𝑅𝑀𝑃(𝐶′) with added constraints enforcing each 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 𝑖𝑛 to be in
the solution (i.e., 𝑡𝑐 = 1) and that each 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 𝑒𝑥 is excluded (i.e., 𝑡𝑐 = 0). This is solved by iteratively
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finding new columns to add to 𝐶 ˊ via (𝑅𝐶) (adding constraints to exclude any 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 𝑖𝑛 ∪ 𝐶 𝑒𝑥 by adding
the constraint ∑𝑖∈𝑐 𝜒𝑖 − ∑𝑖∉𝑐 𝜒𝑖 ≤ 𝑠 − 1, and then finding the most violated constraint by (𝑉𝐶). By
Theorem 2, if no improving column and no violated constraint is found, the LP relaxation is solved and a
valid upper bound for the search node 𝑜 ′ ˊ is found.
If 𝑜ˊ is less than or equal to the value of the best known feasible solution, the node is pruned and
search continues. Otherwise, the master problem 𝑅𝑀𝑃(𝐶ˊ) is solved with the integrality constraints
included (along with constraint enforcing group include/exclusion in 𝐶 𝑖𝑛 and 𝐶 𝑒𝑥 ). If this solution is the
best known, it is recorded.
If 𝑜′ is still strictly larger than the value of the objective value of the best known solution, two
descendant nodes are created by selecting a coalition 𝑐ˊ ∈ 𝐶′ for which 0 < 𝑡𝑐′ < 1. In one node 𝑐ˊ is
added to 𝐶 𝑖𝑛 and in the other it is added to 𝐶 𝑒𝑥 .
If |𝐿| = 0, the best known solution must be optimal.

5.3. Implementation details
We implemented techniques BC, EXP, and BCP on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4770 CPU @ 3.40GHz
and 8 GB RAM, written in C++ and compiled with GCC 4.8.4. IP models were solved with Gurobi 7.5.1.
Unless otherwise noted, the experiments below all use an 1800 second time limit. All instances used in
the experimental evaluation and MATLAB instance generators are available upon request. Further details
are as follows.
BC: solved by GUROBI with cuts (𝑉𝐶) identified via a callback. Through preliminary
experimentation, the following settings for GUROBI were found most effective: PreCrush = 1;
DualReductions = 0; LazyConstraints = 1. Cuts 𝑈𝑃(𝑐) are found by solving (𝑉𝐶) with the reformulation
into model (CCBQP*).
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EXP: solved by GUROBI with default setting via enumerating all of C. BCP: solved by starting with
an arbitrary solution (found by taking the first s and putting them in one group, then the next s, etc.), and
adding these groups to 𝐶 0 . We then select 100 other random groups to add to 𝐶 0 as follows. For each of
these teams, we first select a random person. Then, Then, having selected a group gˊ of size 𝑠ˊ < 𝑠, each
unselected person 𝑗ˊ ∉ 𝑔′ is assigned probability 𝑃𝑔′ (𝑗 ′ ) = ∑

∑𝑖∈𝑔′ 𝑢𝑖,𝑗′

𝑖∈𝑔′ ∑𝑗∉𝑔′ 𝑢𝑖,𝑗

and is chosen to be the next

person added to 𝑔ˊ with probability 𝑝(𝑗ˊ). This process continues until a group of size s is found and then
that group is added to 𝐶 0 . This process is repeated 100 times.
In the branch-and-bound search, the following algorithmic specifications are set. Each pricing
problem is solved by GUROBI with Cuts = 0 (this was found most effective in preliminary computational
results) using reformulation CCBQP*. The nodes L are stored in a priority queue and the node with the
largest LP relaxation of the parent that created the node is selected. The group with the most fractional
𝑡𝑔′ is chosen to branch on.

6. Experimental Evaluation of EXP, BC, and BCP
Our results can be summarized as follows, with details provided in each corresponding subsection:
• BCP tends to dominate EXP and BC on the number of instances solved and optimality gap, though BC
can at times provide an optimality bound when the others cannot. (§6.2)
• Under BCP, larger umax values tend to result in more easily solved instances, despite a larger pseudopolynomial formulation. (§6.3)
• The boundary values 𝛼 ∈ {0, 1} result in inferior solutions and should be avoided in favor of, for
example, 𝛼 ∈ {0.01, 0.99}. A small con- sideration of efficiency finds more/better stable solutions in the
same amount of time, or conversely, a small consideration of stability finds more stable solutions of equal
efficiency with only a small amount of additional computation. (§6.4)
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•The type of characteristic constraints generated here have a significant impact on stability but an
insignificant effect on total utility. If such constraints are desired, Pareto improvements may often be
available. (§6.5)
Based on these results, the comparison of our own techniques to the benchmarks from the literature
(in §7) restricts attention to BCP with 𝛼 ∈ {0.01, 0.5, 0.99}.

6.1Instance Generation
To explore the multidimensional parameter space, we focused on markets of size (m, s) ∈ {(2, 4), (2,
12), (3, 8), (4, 2), (4, 4), (4, 6), (4, 8), (6, 4), (8, 4)}, including therefore instances with n ∈ {8, 16, 24,
32}. For each (m, s)-pair we generate 20 instances (five for each of the four preference generation models
described below) using umax = 25. Further, for (m, s) = (6, 4) we also generated twenty instances each for
umax ∈ {5, 100}, for use in §6.3, a study of the effect of the 𝑢 parameter. Finally, for each these eleven
market parameter settings (nine with umax = 25 and one each with umax = 5, 100) we also generate a
parallel set of instances with three personal characteristics (i.e., with |Q| = 3). This doubles the number of
instances, resulting in 440 simulated markets, 220 each for |Q| ∈ {0, 3}.
To ensure feasibility when supplementing an instance with characteristic constraints, 𝛿𝑖 , 𝑞 values are
determined by solving the following optimization problem:
max ∑𝑖∈𝑁 ∑𝑞∈𝑄 𝑤𝑖,𝑞 . 𝛿𝑖,𝑞

(𝐹𝐵)

𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑞 ≤ ∑𝑖∈𝑁|𝑡(𝑖)=𝑘 𝛿𝑖,𝑞 ≤ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑞

∀𝑞 ∈ 𝑄, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑀

𝛿𝑖,𝑞 ∈ {0,1}
For any values of 𝑤𝑖,𝑞 , this model produces δi,q values so that at least one valid team exists. For each
instance, values wi,q ∼ U [−1, 1] are drawn independently ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and ∀𝑞 ∈ 𝑄. This provides a random
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assignment of all three personal binary characteristics such that quotas and caps as defined in §4.1 are
always feasible.
Proceeding, each market is defined by ui,j values, which can be generated randomly according to a
preference generation model. Here we employ two models from the literature (G1 and G3) and offer two
new variants of our own (G2 and G4).
𝑛

Monotone Common-Value (G1): 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 , where 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 ∼ 𝑁 (0, 5 ) . (Note that 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 is re-sampled
until 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 is a positive number.) This recreates the generation procedure of Othman et al. (2010), with a
common-value component j (equal to the agent index) and a normally distributed private deviation from
the common baseline opinion of an agent’s value. (This may simulate, for example, a sports draft where
the relative order of players does not vary much from one selecting team to the next, resulting in highly
correlated preferences.)
Clustered Common-Value (G2): 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑙𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 , where the common value lj has four levels, 𝑙𝑗 ∈
𝑛 𝑛 3𝑛
}
4 2 4

{0, , ,

for four equal segments of the market. The resulting preferences are similar to G1, but with a

heavier reliance on the private values to distinguish individuals. This models a market with less extreme
public agreement on the value of agents than G1.
Uniform independent preferences (G3): 𝑢𝑖𝑗 ∼ 𝑈{0, 100}, drawn independently from a discrete
uniform distribution. For each agent, 𝑛 − 1 numbers are chosen and sorted. Then, the differences between
consecutive draws, in sorted order, are used to describe the utility of person i for other agents in the
market (Wright and Vorobeychik 2015).
Affinity Preferences (G4): We designed this set of instances to model settings in which the
characteristics of agents affect their utilities. First, characteristic sets are randomly generated based on
model (FB). We assume that the first two characteristics represent traits for which like agents tend to have
a natural affinity (e.g., age or gender) while the third characteristic is viewed favorably by all (e.g., higher
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skill level). We therefore generate 𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽1,𝑖 . 𝛾𝑖,𝑗,1 + 𝛽2,𝑖 . 𝛾𝑖,𝑗,2 + 𝛽3,𝑖 . 𝛿𝑗3 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 where binary 𝛾𝑖,𝑗,𝑞 = 1
and if and only if 𝛿𝑖,𝑞 = 𝛿𝑗𝑞 for 𝑞 ∈ {1, 2}. Further, independently drawn personal parameters 𝛽1,𝑖 , 𝛽2,𝑖 ∼
𝑈[−1, 2], 𝛽3,𝑖 ∼ 𝑈[0, 2], and 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(0, 1) reflecting that affinity effects are twice as likely to attract
likes values as repel them (and to varying degrees), and that characteristic 3 is always viewed favorably
but to varying degrees.

Figure 1: Cumulative distribution plot of performance, comparing the three
algorithms developed in this paper.
In all four data-generation schemes, an 𝑛 × 𝑛 utility matrix 𝑈 is generated as above and then ipsative
scores are generated by normalizing with respect to the mean and standard deviation of the utility vector
of agent i, then rescaled and rounded to make utilities positive, integer, and no more than 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥 (Baron
1996).

6.2. Optimality, Gap, and Computation Time Analysis
We compare the relative efficiency of EXP, BC, and BCP, running each of the 220 unconstrained
(i.e., |Q| = 0) market instances under 𝛼 ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.5, 0.99, 1}, resulting in 1100 runs of each algorithm.
Detailed solution statistics appear in the Appendix, while Figure 1 depicts a cumulative distribution plot
of performance. For each algorithm, the left half provides a plot with height equal to the cumulative
number of instances solved at the time given on the horizontal axis. In the right half, the height of the plot
corresponds to the number of remaining instances (unsolved at 1800s) with at most the log absolute gap
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(i.e., log(UB − LB)) shown on the horizontal axis. As a convention, we show an absolute gap of 100,000
(log of which is 5) for those

instances without a definite absolute gap (i.e., for EXP if memory limit is hit and for BCP if no upper
bound is proven, meaning the root node is unresolved).
Figure 1 provides clear evidence of the superiority of BCP over EXP. BC is the most robust, in that it
can provide a gap for all instances tested, being an entirely memory-controlled procedure. However, both
BCP and EXP solve many more instances and leave a much smaller relative gap.
In summary, aggregated over these 1100 runs, BCP identifies a strictly better solution (lower bound)
than the other two algorithms in 420 instances, and proves a strictly tighter relaxation bound (upper
bound) in 344 in- stances. In comparison, BC / EXP provide strictly best lower bound and upper bound,
respectively, in 36 / 57 and 71 / 43 instances. For those in- stances solved to optimality by both BC and
EXP, the solution times for EXP are far superior and so we use EXP for the remaining comparisons to
BCP.
Figures 2 through 5 provide more detailed comparison of BCP and EXP through scatter plots, one for
each of the four generation schemes. In particular, for each generation scheme, a scatter plot consisting of
a point per run (275 runs) with coordinates given by solution time of BCP and EXP is depicted. The size
of each point corresponds to the number of agents in the instance. The color (gradient, from red to blue)
corresponds to the team size, s. The point style corresponds to the value of α, with axes depicted in
logscale.
These figures show that for the instances mutually solved, the solutions times are in general
comparable, but that there are many instances unsolved by EXP that are solved by BCP, for all
81

generations schemes. This is more apparent for G3 and G4 than for G1 and G2, where BCP is able to
solve even more instances. Table 1 reports the number of instances solved by BCP and EXP,
respectively. This table suggests that EXP is only slightly affected by the generation scheme, but that
BCP is able to solve significantly more instances for G3 and G4, which suggests that varying degrees of
common-value dependency makes instances more challenging.
The scatter plots also clearly exhibit that EXP is only superior to BCP when the number of agents
and the size of the groups are relatively small.

Figure 2: Runtime for G1

Figure 3: Runtime for G2

Figure 4: Runtime for G3

Figure 5: Runtime for G4

This coincides with expectations, since EXP is a precise model of the problem -however, as the
problem size grows on any dimension, the application of EXP becomes prohibitive due to either memory
restrictions or, even when memory limits are sufficient, resolution difficulty.
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Based on the analysis in this subsection, we use the solutions obtained by BCP for the subsequent
analysis. Note that even if an upper bound is not proven by BCP, a lower bound (i.e., high-quality
feasible solution) can still be obtained by solving for the best solution using the columns generated. This
contrasts with EXP, where, if the memory limit hits, no feasible solution will be available.

Figure 6: Cumulative distribution plot of performance, comparing BCP
for varying umax with m = 6 and s=4.

6.3. The effect of 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥
We next investigate the sensitivity of BCP to umax. Figure 6 provides a cumulative distribution plot of
performance for umax ∈ {5, 25, 100} on all instances generated with m = 6 and s = 4. (Four preference
models, each with five instances and five values of α, result in 100 runs for each of three umax values.) The
figure exhibits an interesting relationship. Parameter umax sets the number of possible values that an agent
can specify for the other individuals in the market. Given more preference resolution/detail, it is slightly
easier to find the optimal solutions. Additionally, the absolute gap increases for those instances that are
unsolved. This can be attributed to either the model becoming larger (as the size is directly related to umax)
or that the relative differences from solution to solution is smaller when umax is small. The relative
performance differences, however, are marginal, showing that even though model (EXP) is pseudopolynomial in umax, BCP is able to scale for large preference ranges.
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6.4. Boundary effects on α
When considering the single-objective variants of the TFP, when only total intra-group utility or
stability, respectively, are of interest, a slight emphasis on the other objective leads to significant
improvements. For α = 1, maximizing utility only, a perturbation to α = 0.99 results in slightly longer
solution times but provides solutions with the same total utility but slightly better stability. When α = 0,
and one is concerned only with stability, perturbing to α = 0.01 results in some solutions with even better
stability within time limits, due to computational efficiency gains.
Focusing first on the α = 1 case, we restrict attention to the 197 instances (out of 220) solved to
optimality by BCP with α = 1 and α = 0.99. For every such instance, the total utility at the optimal
solution is the same, but the maximum uplift can be significantly different. In 26 of the instances (13.2%)
a better solution with respect to maximum uplift is identified, with reduction in maximum uplift ranging
from 3.84% to 100%, and an average of 35.2%. For three instances in particular, the reported optimal
solution left a maximum uplift of 8, 11, and 13, respectively under α = 1, but with α = 0.99, the reported
optimal solution has the same total utility, but found an entirely stable solution (i.e., maximum uplift = 0,
a reduction of 100%). This does come at a slight computational cost; the average solution time on these
instances is 118 (α = 1) and 147 (α = 0.99) seconds, respectively. This added computational effort,
however, is rewarded with solutions of strictly better quality. This suggests, for example, that recent
research using BCPP (i.e., α = 1) in sports management (e.g., Recalde et al. 2016) may find Pareto
improved solutions using α = 0.99.
The difference in algorithmic performance is even more apparent when comparing the solution
quality and solution time under α = 0 versus α =0.01. First, only 73 instances are solved to optimality with
α = 0 versus 91 with α = 0.01. More critically, despite having a theoretically worse optimal solution with
respect to maximum uplift, in 131 of the 220 instances, BCP identifies a solution with smaller uplift when
α = 0.01 versus setting α = 0, where the opposite occurs in only 3 instances. Furthermore, this reduction is
often substantial. The average percent reduction in maximum uplift in the 131 instances where BCP
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found a solution with smaller maximum uplift is 74.5%. In 59 of the 131 instances, the reduction is 100%,
meaning that a completely stable solution is found, whereas there are groups with positive uplift in the
solution found with α = 0 at 1800 seconds.
The reason for this surprising relative gain in solution quality can be attributed to the fact that
solutions with high total intra-group utility will have relatively low instability, compared with randomly
chosen groups. Without any consideration of total team utility in the objective function, it is challenging
for the solver to distinguish between partitions of agents.

Figure 7: Average maximum uplift and average total market utility, with
and without characteristic constraints.

Having a slight emphasis on total intra-group utility focuses the search for solutions, which turns out
to be particularly effective under a column generation approach. BCP’s performance is only slightly
hindered by the inclusion of characteristic constraints; BCP is able to solve 668 and 637 instances with
and without characteristic constraints, respectively. Of the 617 instances that mutually solved with and
without the constraints, the average solution time is 141.3 and 142.2 seconds, respectively, an
insignificant difference.
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6.5. The effect of characteristic constraints
Figure 7 provides a visual summary depicting the average of the maximum uplift and total utility,
respectively, in the best solutions obtained by BCP with and without characteristic constraints. Clearly
uplift is much more sensitive to adding characteristic constraints than utility. Indeed, the change in
average utility is barely noticeable when constraints are added in any case, compared with the maximum
uplift, which rises drastically in several market sizes, even more than doubling for some configurations.
(Table 6 in the Appendix provides further detail.) Market designers should take heed; the addition of
characteristic constraints may seem innocuous if only total utility is considered, but actually it has the
potential to introduce a great deal of instability.

7. Comparison of BCP to DRAFT and OPOP
Here we compare BCP (with different α) to DRAFT and OPOP on three performance metrics:
efficiency (measured by average individual utility), inequity (measured by the range of individual and
team utility), and instability (measured by individual and coalitional uplift). DRAFT and OPOP (see
§2.4) were not designed to handle characteristic constraints and may result in infeasibility if applied
naively. (A team may for example over-consume a constrained characteristic, resulting in infeasibility for
another team, even if they conscientiously pick to maintain their own feasibility throughout. Stated
differently, given the NP-hardness of the problem, locally greedy algorithms will fail to maintain global
feasibility.) The results of this section are therefore limited to an investigation of the |Q| = 0 subset of
instances.

7.1. Efficiency
A clustered bar chart provides efficiency comparisons of BCP, DRAFT, and OPOP in Figure 8. For
each agent in each outcome, we divide agent i’s resulting utility by i’s maximum realizable utility U(i).
For each algorithm, Figure 8 reports the average of this percentage utility over all solutions for each
generation scheme.
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Our results show that BCP solutions have superior average utility across all sets of instances. This
superiority is more obvious for data generation schemes with independent (G3) and affinity preferences
(G4) and larger α. (The latter is to be expected as the weight of efficiency in the objective increases.) The
significant common-value components of G1 and G2 result in a larger degree of “necessary
disappointment” in which it is impossible for every agent to achieve her first best possible team. BCP
tends to get closer to maximum satisfaction with the outcome of the mechanism. Perhaps surprisingly,
even when the focus on efficiency is low (i.e., when α = 0.01) BCP still provides more efficient solutions
than the heuristic formats DRAFT and OPOP.

7.2. Inequity
Intuitively, having some agents with very high utility while other agents have very low utility can be
problematic and viewed as inequitable or unfair. This can be measured and compared on the individual
level and on the team level. For percentage-based comparisons, we define the individual inequity as the
best individual utility minus the worst individual utility in a solution, divided by the average of U(i).
Similarly, we define the team inequity as the best team utility minus the worst team utility in a solution
divided by the average ideal-team utility, defined for each i as the maximum utility of any coalition
including i. In Figure 9 we report the average individual inequity and team inequity over all instances in
each generation scheme for each of the five algorithms. A taller bar indicates a worse solution on the
measure of inequity.
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Figure 8: Average solution utility as a fraction of maximum realizable utility.

Clearly, the preference generation format can greatly impact the ranking of mechanisms on this
measure of allocative inequity. The left chart in Figure 9 indicates that for data generation schemes G3
and G4, the individual inequity is typically smaller for BCP (regardless of α), and thus its results may be
perceived as fairer. However, for data generation schemes with stronger common-value effects (G1 and
G2), only BCP with α = 0.99 results in more equitable solutions than those found by OPOP and DRAFT.
Indeed, this relationship is among our more interesting findings; the focus on stability (inherent as α
decreases) results in less equitable solutions when there is wide agreement on the “top of the market” as
in G1 and G2. Stated differently, in order to reduce the tendency of groups to want to break away and
form their own teams (when the focus is stability), one will have to generate some teams with more “top”
agents together, resulting in a wider satisfaction gap (inequity) in the market. This can only occur when
the underlying preferences reflect a certain degree of agreement on which agents comprise the top of the
market (e.g., in G1 and G2). When agents tend to prefer to gather together based on their own affinity for
those of similar characteristics (G4), this effect is reduced, and it nearly disappears when preferences are
independent (G3).

Figure 9: Average inequity (percentage utility range), averaged over individuals (left) and teams (right).
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This effect is even more pronounced in the right half of Figure 9. Our results show that for data
generation schemes with independent and affinity preferences (G3 and G4), BCP with α = 0.99 achieves
more equitable teams than other algorithms. However, for data generation schemes G1 and G2, DRAFT
achieves the most equitable solutions across teams. Note that BCP is not directly minimizing inequity,
and in particular when we focus only on minimizing the maximum uplift (α = 0.01), the team inequity is
more obvious. DRAFT tends toward teams of equal satisfaction, spreading out “top picks” as would be
expected; BCP with α = 0.01 tends to allow “top picks” to clump together in order to reduce their desire
to leave the market.

7.3. Instability
To compare team formation outcomes across instances we again need a metric scaled to 1. Let
individual instability be defined as the maximum uplift an agent can gain by defecting to a hypothetical
uplift team, divided by her utility within her current team. Team instability is the maximum uplift of a
team containing each i divided by the utility of her current team. These provide a relative measure of how
much an individual or a team is incentivized to defect given the current team assignment. Figure 10
provides two plots depicting the average individual (left) and average coalition uplift (right), averaged
over all i.

Figure 10: Average individual instability (left) and average team instability (right)
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These charts show that regardless of α, the solutions obtained by BCP are more stable, having lower
average and maximum individual uplifts. Moreover, the average individual benefit of forming a coalition
in the solutions obtained by BCP with α = 0.01 is less than 4% of their current benefit, while in OPOP
and DRAFT, it can be on average as high as 30% of their current benefit. Also, note that the maximum
uplift is significantly lower in data generation schemes G3 and G4 in comparison to data G1 and G2.
(Though not shown, the relative rankings do not change if we focus on maximum uplift as opposed to
average.)

8. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we investigate computational models for the team formation problem. In order to
balance intra-team utility with solution stability, we formulated a bi-level binary optimization model and
developed a branch- cut-and-price solution algorithm. The pseudo-polynomial approach to the bi-level
problem is itself an interesting contribution, and we detailed how to implement the resulting algorithm,
which still has to manage an exponential number of variables and constraints, demanding advanced
computational methods, which we outline. Experimental results indicated that the proposed algorithm
BCP is particularly effective at finding high-quality solutions quickly. Stability as an objective to be
optimized over remains a particularly challenging computational problem, but we have shown a
promising new approach.
Our results also indicate that ignoring stability can result in inferior solutions when Pareto
improvements are available. Because a defection-based measure of instability in this context points to
opportunities for profitable group deviation (i.e., strategic manipulation), these results will have practical
implications. We showed that heuristic algorithms from the literature may be leaving efficiency and
stability gains on the table, as might have been expected. Yet heuristics based on draft principles may be
common in practice; we would argue that this has much to do with the inherent computational difficulty
of optimization approaches, which we have shown can be mitigated by algorithms like BCP. We have

90

shown that our new methods can improve total satisfaction, and improve incentives via reduced instability
measures.
While BCP with α = 0.99 performed very well on equity as a measure of fairness, we found an
interesting trade-off, in which the market maker must in some cases accept inter-agent inequity in pursuit
of stability (as α goes to zero), in particular it would seem, where common value is the primary driver of
preferences. This discrepancy of inequity performance across preference models proved interesting, and
we expect future studies to shed more light on how different models or descriptions of preferences affect
the performance of various algorithms for team formation.
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Appendix
Table 2 through Table 5 provide detailed solution statistics on G1, G2, G3, and G4, respectively. The
first four columns report the number of agents, the number of groups, the maximum pairwise utility, and
α. The next three sets of four columns report solution statistics for EXP, BC, and BCP, respectively. In
particular, for each algorithm and each configuration, we report the number of instances solved in 1800
seconds (𝑛 𝑠 ), the average solution time over those 𝑛2 instances (time), the number of instances that have a
provable optimality gap 𝑛 𝑔 (i.e., for EXP the number of instances
that don’t hit memory limits and for BCP the number of instances for which the root node was solved and
an initial upper bound is proven), and finally the average gap over those 𝑛 𝑔 instances. The last two
columns report the average total utility (𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 ) and maximum uplift (𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 ) for the best solution identified
by BCP for that configuration.
Table 6 provides details on the effect of including characteristic constraints (considering only those
instances with 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 25). For each instance configuration and for 𝛼 ∈ {0.01, 0.5, .99}, the table reports,
for the best solution identified by BCP, the average uplift (𝑟̅ ) and average total utility
(𝑢̅) with and without characteristic constraints, for the instances from each generation scheme, in
sequence.
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Chapter 4. Mixed Signals: An Empirical Study of the Alignment (and
Misalignment) of Risk Signals with Actions and Outcomes in P2P Lending
Markets

Introduction
Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending markets are internet-enabled platforms that create a venue for matching
lenders and borrowers with lower overhead, and hence the potential for greater profit margins, than
traditional financial institutions. These markets generally have three types of participants or players.
Borrowers each request a loan amount and return period (e.g., 36-month or 60-month loans), and provide
the details of their financial history and their personal information like their occupation and the purpose of
the loan. The market owner or platform serves as a mediator between borrowers and investors, receiving
the borrowers’ requests and details and making potentially profitable loan requests available to lenders for
selection. Though auction-based platforms (with pricing determined through a competitive process) have
existed, we focus on markets in which the platform also prescribes an interest rate based on their analysis
of credit information and the borrower’s info. The platform in this case serves as an expert on risk
assessment to prescribe the interest rate, rather than distributing this task among investors (as in the
auction case). In many cases, the platform will also provide additional signals (beyond defining the
interest-rate terms of the loan) such as a risk score, a grade label, and an estimated loss rate to facilitate
differentiation of the loan applications for investors. The third set of players are investors who receive all
of this information from the platform and decide how much to invest in each loan.
All players may behave strategically in this market. For example, although borrowers cannot change
their financial history, they may be able to select the “purpose of the loan” strategically, given that the
non-institutionalized and unsecured (i.e., with no collateral) market platform usually cannot verify this
information. The platform, on the other hand, wants to select a format of information transmission (the
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loan terms, types of signals, and level of detail) that most efficiently clears loans and results in the largest
profit over time. (Platforms are paid a small percentage of every payment from borrowers to the investors,
aligning their incentives partially, but also receive a one-time fee.) Investors evaluate the ex post outcome
of the loans precisely and predict the risk and benefit of each potential funding decision accurately.
Having collected a large dataset of publicly available loan information for over four years of loan
origination requests (with all follow-up data through the completion of 36-month loan terms) from an
anonymous lending platform, this study seeks to shed light on the interplay between the players in these
markets, showing how signals from one class of participant effects the behavior of others using data
analytics. In particular, we first explore the borrowers’ disclosed personal information and analyze the
response of the platform as well as the investors to these signals. Then, we analyze the response of
investors to the platform signals and examine how closely investors follow the signals provided by the
platform. Finally, we study the efficiency of both the borrower self-reported information as well as the
P2P lending platform signals in predicting the success of each loan.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of selected literature on P2P
lending markets related to our empirical study. Section 3 discusses the structure of P2P lending markets,
as well as our dataset and empirical methodology. In the next section, statistical results are presented,
with a discussion of our results, some conclusions, and directions for future research in the final section.

Background and literature review
In a P2P market, institutional or individual investors make unsecure loans to individual borrowers,
meaning that borrowers do not provide any collateral to secure the loan. In these markets, information
asymmetry between market players can affect the outcomes of the market (Lin, Prabhala & Viswanathan,
2013, Freedman & Jin, 2011, Miller, 2015, Serrano-Cinca & Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2016, Balyuk, 2016). Over
the years, the P2P lending markets have implemented different mechanisms to address the information
asymmetry issue and mitigate adverse selection among investors. In their early days, more P2P lending
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platforms used auction-like mechanisms in which borrowers posted their loan request, their maximum
accepted interest rate, and a description of themselves. Investors would respond with offers at various
interest rates resulting in the lowest offered interest rates winning the auction and funding the loan. Under
this type of mechanism, the borrower self-descriptive information, the optional support of the loan
application through the borrower’s social network, as well the limited credit history information have
each been considered in the literature in the context of adverse selection among investors (Lin et.al., 2013,
Lin, Prabhala & Viswanathan, 2009, Collier & Hampshire, 2010, Emekter, Tu, Jirasakuldech & Lu, 2015,
Dietrich & Wernli, 2016).
Indeed, the self-reporting information structure of borrowers and its effect on the P2P lending market
has generated a great deal of research, mostly considering the effect of self-reported information on P2P
lending market outcomes for markets in which borrowers could provide a short description about
themselves and even post their pictures to attract investors and build trust. Herzenstein, Andrews,
Dholakia, & Lyandres (2008) studied the effect of borrower personal characteristics like gender, race, and
financial history on funding success in a traditional form of P2P lending market in which final loan
interest rates were determined through an auction-based mechanism. Gonzales & Loureiro (2014) studied
the effect of lender and borrower personal characteristics (perceived attractiveness, age, and gender) on
outcomes of P2P lending markets and showed that loan success is sensitive to the relative age and
attractiveness of lenders and borrowers. In 2015, they also reported, “certain borrower personal
characteristics fuel interpersonal competition enough to impact lending decisions in suboptimal ways”.
Additionally, some have focused on the effect of a self-reported loan purpose, considering the
simultaneous effect of the “title” and “description of results” on loan applications. Mach, Carter &
Slattery, (2014) showed that loans applications for small business purposes were twice as likely to have
been funded than loans for other purposes. They also showed that controlling for application quality,
loans for small businesses were charged almost one percentage point interest rate premium over nonbusiness loans. In addition, Nowak, Ross & Yencha, (2018) analyzed the intriguing keywords in the
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borrower descriptions for small business loans and determined which keywords may result in a funded
application for business purposes.
In the more recent generation of prominent P2P lending markets (which have gone away from
auctions in favor of a posted rate, described next), borrower are now asked to self-report fewer pieces of
information, likely an attempt to avoid the perception of race, gender, etc., having an effect on loan
application outcomes. Currently, only a few pieces of information including occupation, length of
occupation, income, and loan purpose are directly reported by borrowers and self-descriptive paragraphs
about the loan applicant or loan purpose are no longer allowed. In addition, much of this information is
randomly verified by the P2P lending platform.
Recent policies of prominent platforms provide more detailed information about borrower financial
history to investors. They use a risk-based pricing structure to pre-define the interest rates for loan
applications, sending signals about expected the risk and benefit of loan applications. Considering the
financial history of each loan applicant as the basis to estimate the risk of each loan, the risk-based pricing
can potentially decrease adverse-selection issues and increase efficiency in consumer loan markets. (See
Walke, Fullerton, & Tokle, 2018; Cox, 2017; Adams, Einav & Levin, 2009; Edelberg, 2006; Xin, 2018).
However, the accuracy of these platform signals in predicting loan outcomes has not yet been assessed in
the depth of the current study. We find Serrano-Cinca, Gutiérrez-Nieto, López-Palacioz (2015) reported
that on their studied data set (including 24,449 loans before 2011 from the LendingClub market), the
“grade” signal was analyzed and found to be a significant indicator of delinquency in the market, but no
further analysis of the veracity of platform signals was considered.
This evaluation of the existing body of literature illustrates that there is a need to provide a more
holistic assessment of the role of all players in a P2P market and how their information revelation can
alter other players’ decisions, and thus change the market results. We have distinguished three main areas
that need to be explored in this regard:
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•

How do borrowers use the “loan purpose” signal (i.e., the last remaining piece of the difficult-to-

verify self-reported information) in current platforms?
•

How do different investor decisions respond to these signals?

•

To what extent do the borrower-reported loan purpose and the signals provided by the platform

predict the risk and profitability of loan applications?
We investigate these questions in this research, while also taking the opportunity given by our dataset
to compare the behavior of actual peer investors with the investment of institutional or high-net-worth
investors on the same platform. We compare loans based on their risk and profitability as measured by
delinquency ratio, internal rate of return, and return on investment.

The P2P Lending Market Place
In this paper, we study a P2P lending market data set that contains extensive information on both loan
applications and loan outcomes. We specifically focus on the “loan applications”, and the respective
funded applications (“loans”) initiated from 2011-01-01 until 2015-05-29, including those which were
fully paid, charged off, or defaulted by 2018-05-29. (We only considered 36-month loans for this study as
a matter of expediency.) This data set includes 284,983 loan applications of which 159,233 were funded
(55.86%). The minimum loan amount in this period is $2000 and the maximum loan amount is $35000.
The P2P lending market of this study
In the market studied here, each borrower submits the requested loan amount and provides some
information about her reason for borrowing the loan, annual income, occupation and employment status.
Then, the platform pulls the borrower credit report from Experian, including information on her credit
score, length of credit history, debt, number of accounts in the borrower’s name, number of inquiries in
the borrower’s name, credit utilization ratios, balances utilization, and mortgage accounts. Based on the
information provided by the borrower and her credit history, the platform decides about the posted
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interest rate that will be available to investors if they choose to fund this application. The platform also
generates the “estimated loss rate”, and assigns a “risk score” and a “grade score” to each loan application
and provides these calculated and assigned scores as well as all information provided by borrowers
available to investors.
Most current P2P lending markets have at least two funding channels, a “fractional” channel and a
“whole” channel. In the fractional channel, any type of investor (institutional, high-net worth, or ordinary
investors) can invest in any portion of a loan (usually above a predefined minimum like $25), and a loan
will be originated only if at least a specific portion of a loan (for example, one platforms sets 70%) is
funded1. In the “whole” channel, only institutional and validated high-net worth individuals can invest
and they have to fund any selected loan in full amount. If an application is not funded in the whole
channel, it can be moved to the fractional channel by the platform. In our data set, the whole channel itself
initiated in April 2013. During our study, 213,759 loan applications were announced in the whole channel
(75.01%) and 71,224 loan applications were announced in the fractional channel (24.99%). From 213,759
loan applications in the whole channel, 9,073 of them were not funded and then moved to the fractional
channel (3.18%). Among these 9,073 moved loan applications, 5,633 applications are funded (62.08%),
and 245 applications expired (2.7%).
When the minimum percent of a loan is funded, the P2P lending platform continues the verification
process of borrower’s information, which may result in cancellation of the loan application. In fact, if the
data are not verifiable or are not accurate, or the risk of the loan is deemed higher than acceptable, the
loan application will be cancelled (Balyuk, 2015). In addition, within the time window that the application
is available in the market, the loan applicant can also withdraw her request. In our data set, 112,178 loan

1

Borrowers have the option to be flexible and accept the loan if it is at least 70% funded, or to only accept the loan
if it is fully funded.
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applications were cancelled (39.35%), 9,445 loan applications were withdrawn (3.31%), and 4,127 loan
applications were not funded within the available time window2 and are expired (1.15%)3.
There are two primary revenue sources for the P2P lending platform, a transaction fee ranging from
1-5% of loan amount (received from borrowers at the moment of loan origination) and service fees of 1%
of each loan payment to investors (including any collection fees or recovery fees for late payments). In
our data set, the average service fees for each loan is 2.17% of loan amount.
Dependent Variables:
Considering the loan application process at the P2P lending market, we categorize the dependent
variables into three groups: P2P lending market (platform) signals, loan application outcomes, and expost loan outcomes. Table (1) lists these variables, with further detail provided below by category.

Table (1) - Dependent Variables
P2P Lending Platform Signals:
The platform assigns four values to each new loan application: interest rate, grade, risk score, and
estimated loss rate. The (posted) interest rate is the borrower’s interest rate for the loan as decided by the
platform (as opposed to a prevailing market rate). The “grade” in most P2P lending markets is a label

2

In the fractional channel, the available time window is 14 days.
From 112,178 cancelled applications, 24,990 loan applications are completed but and later did not received any
loan ID. We considered this group as cancelled loan applications.
3
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used to partition the loan applications based on their total risk and benefit. However, it is possible that a
loan with a better grade receives a higher interest rate. The “risk score” is an ordinal number between one
and eleven, with higher values representing less risky loan applications. Finally, the “loss rate” that is
being estimated is defined as the percentage of unpaid principal (in a reporting time period) deemed
“uncollectible”, i.e., taken as a loss.
Loan Application Outcomes (investor response)
We consider two metrics to measure the response of lenders to loan applications: percentage of loan
funded and funding duration. The percentage of loan funded is the fraction of the loan application amount
that is funded within the available time window for loans in the fractional channel. (This is 100% for the
whole channel by definition, so will only be discussed in the context of the fractional channel.) The
funding duration is another metric to measure the attractiveness of a loan application to investors, the time
between announcement of the loan application by the platform and the time the loan is funded. This time
varies for different loan applications based on their risk and benefits, and varies dramatically across the
two channels. All analysis on these variable considers only completed and expired loan applications4 in
order to focus on investor decisions as opposed platform decisions.
Measurement of Ex-post Loan Outcomes:
In general, there are two approaches to compare the ex post outcomes of loans in consumer loan
markets. In the first approach, the risk refers to the possibility of delinquency for each loan (Wiginton
1980, West, 2000, Baesens, Gestel, Viaene, Stepanova, Suykens, Vanthienen, 2003), while in the second
approach, the risk is defined based on the profitability of each loan (Thomas, 2000, and Serrano-Cinca &
Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2016). The possibility of delinquency is the core concept in defining a credit score and
differentiating customers in the credit market. In fact, due to the lack of precise data on customer

4

Those funded loan applications that are completed but their loan ID were not registered are also considered since
cancellation happened after selection by investors as opposed to preemptive cancellation by the platform.
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products, calculation of the loan profitability can be challenging for banking systems 5 (Baesens et. al,
2003). Therefore, credit scores and interest rates in the loan markets are mainly defined based on
possibility of delinquency. However, there is an opportunity in P2P lending markets to help investors to
attain a more precise understanding of the risks of each loan in the market. In large P2P markets, loan
payments and the charge-off sale of loans are available to investors in order to help them to mitigate
adverse selection and estimate benefit of each loan application.
Profitability Measurement
There are two well-known financial formulas to evaluate the efficiency of each investment in the
consumer market, Internal Interest Rate (IRR) and Return on Investment (ROI). IRR is the actual interest
rate at which the investment and net present value (NPV) of a loan become equal (Gallo 2016). IRR has
been used in recent research as a measure of profitability in the P2P lending markets, for example by
Serrano-Cinca and Gutiérrez-Nieto (2016) who provide a decision support system for P2P lending
markets that relies on an estimation of IRR for each loan. They illustrate IRR’s superiority over default
probability calculate the effective loan interest rates of each investment. While IRR can indeed be helpful
for ranking loans with good ex post outcomes (when the total return exceeds the initial investment,
whether full paid or not) we find that IRR is less informative when charged-off and defaulted loans are
considered.
Indeed, using the standard IRR method, one assumes that the funds released from a loan are
reinvested in another loan yielding IRR equal to the previous loan (Galo, 2016). However, this
assumption is not always possible in loan markets. In particular, for delinquent and charged off loans, this
assumption is completely misguiding in measuring the loan profits and ranking loan outcomes. For
example, consider loans as in Table (2). In this example, there are four $1000 loans with different

5

“Customers may own different products ranging from mortgages to credit cards, and may use different channels,
ranging from bank branches to online banking. All of these combined factors make it difficult to obtain precise
data on customer profitability, and researchers complain about the lack of enough data to investigate profit
scoring” (Serrano-Cinca & Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2016)
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payments. The return of the first two loans are smaller than the loan principle; however, the first one
retuned $800 in one month, while the second loan returned the same amount in four months. We prefer
the first loan outcomes to the second loan since the returned money from the first loan can be invested
sooner on another (hopefully profitable) investment; however, IRR shows a less negative interest rate for
the second loan, prioritizing it over the first one. The reason is IRR assumes that the investment of the
returned money will be repeated on a loan with the same interest rate, and losing money will continue
with the same pattern.

Table (2) - Comparison of loan profitability based on IRR for four examples
The third and four loans of this example, shown in table (2), discuss two other loans that their
returned money is above the initial investment. This time the shorter repayment has higher IRR, which
seems appropriate. However, the annual IRR for the fourth loan is 240%, which means that the
investment is more than doubled in one year. Again, the assumption of IRR for reinvesting the received
payments in loans with the same interest rate provides misleading results.
As an alternative, ROI calculates the profit to cost ratio of an investment, with the NPV of future cash
flows (based on a particular discount rate) compared to the original investment. In a P2P lending market,
ROI calculates the ratio of summation of present value (from the perspective at the moment of
origination) of all loan payments minus the (undiscounted) loan amount, to the loan amount. To calculate
the present value of each payment, we define the discount rate to be the average monthly inflation rate
within the loan origination date and each payment date. Table (3) represents the NPV and ROI of four
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discussed examples in table (2) and shows that ROI can clearly rank the ex post outcomes of these loans
(in particular the negative outcomes) better than IRR.

Initial Investment
Payment month 1
Payment month 2
Payment month 3
Payment month 4

Average
inflation
Inflation rate until
rate
month t PV Loan 1 PV Loan 2 PV Loan 3 PV Loan 4
2.50%
2.50%
-1000
-1000
-1000
-1000
2.70%
2.60% 779.7271 194.9318 292.3977 1169.591
2.40%
2.53%
0 190.2391 285.3587
0
2.20%
2.45%
0 185.9919 278.9879
0
1.90%
2.34%
0 182.3259 273.4888
0
NPV
-220.273 -246.511 130.2331 169.5906
ROI
-22.03% -24.65% 13.02% 16.96%

Table (3) - NPV and ROI for examples introduced in table (2)
Figure (1) shows the average of ex post outcomes of loan applications within years in both the fractional
and whole channels. In this figure, we observe that for loans funded in the whole channel, as the posted
interest rate increases the average ROI of loans also increases. However, the slope of this increase has
decreased from 2013 to 2015. In particular, in 2015, for the low and medium values of the posted interest
rate, ROI is almost constant. However, for the higher values of the posted interest rate, the average ROI
increases as the posted interest rate increase.
In addition, while results of the whole channel show a consistent pattern of increasing ROI as the posted
interest rate increases, investors in the fractional channel could not consistently improve their profit by
selecting higher interest rate loans, and in particular in 2015 their outcomes do not follow the increasing
trend of all other sub-figures.
Figure (1) – Average loan outputs in the fractional and whole channels within years
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A more detailed descriptive analysis of outcomes for the fractional and whole channels using different
explanatory variables is shown in the Appendix.

Data Description
Table (4) lists the remaining independent variables considered in this paper categorized in three
groups: loan specifications, borrower specifications, and economic conditions. Loan specification
variables include the loan amount, the loan purpose, and the loan origination year. Borrower
specifications are variables about financial and credit history of borrowers. Economic conditions include
the inflation rate and Federal Reserve rate at each loan origination date.
Descriptive Statistics of P2P Lending Market
In this research, we use a data set of P2P lending market that contains extensive information about
individual loan applications. We categorize these variables to three groups. The first group discusses the
borrower’s personal characteristics including income range and homeownership. The second group
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describes the borrower’s credit history and contains variables such as credit score range, number of
delinquencies over 30 days, delinquencies within the last 7 years, inquiries within the last six months, and
revolving balance. The third group refers to loan application conditions and contains the loan application
purpose, the loan application amount, the loan application date, as well as the inflation rate and Federal
Reserve rate in the month of loan application submission. Table (4) lists definitions of these variables.

Table (4) - List of Variables

Empirical Modeling
In this section, we address three questions about the three player types in a P2P lending market. First, we
explore how borrowers can adjust their self-reported information to receive lower interest rates. We also
examine if their self-reported information can influence investors and attract more investment in a shorter
amount of time. Secondly, we study how platform signals influence investors’ decisions. Thirdly, we
compare loans based on their ex post outcomes measured by delinquency and profitability, and analyze
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how the borrowers’ self-reported information, personal characteristics, and credit history as well as the
platform signals can significantly predict the outcome of loans in the market. In addition, we examine the
effect of time on accuracy of the platform signals in predicting loans’ ex post outcomes.
1- Evaluation of Effect of the Borrowers’ Self-Reported Information
In today’s prominent P2P lending markets, most borrower information consists of verified details about
their credit history. Only a small portion of borrower information is self-reported, and the platform
randomly checks pieces of this information such as income range, occupation, employment status, and
length of employment. The only fully unverified piece of information borrowers can provide to mislead
the platform and/or investors is the loan purpose. Therefore, we first explore the sensitivity of platform
and investor decisions to the stated loan purpose, i.e., we assess the impact of loan purpose on the loan
interest rate, funding duration, and percentage of loan funded.
Effect on P2P Lending Platform: Defining Posted Interest Rate
In the first model, we assess the effect of loan purpose on the platform’s posted interest rate for a loan by
estimating a regression model as given by model (1).
𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑠𝑖 + 𝜇 × 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾 × 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿 × 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (1)
The dependent variable is the posted interest rate for the loan application (𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒), and the independent
variable of primary interest is the loan purpose (𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑠𝑖 ), while we control for other loan specifications
(vector 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑐𝑖 ), the borrower personal characteristics (vector 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖 ), and the borrower credit history
factors (vector 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑖 ), as described in table (4). After checking our model for heteroscedasticity, we
found that the variances of the residuals are correlated with our explanatory variables, requiring the
models to be rerun with a relaxation of the homoscedasticity assumption. Model (1) therefore uses a
robust GLS (Generalized Least Square) model which adjust the observation with the variance to estimate
the coefficients under these conditions.
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Table (5) illustrates part of the results of this model that explains the relationship between the loan
purpose and the posted interest rate. This result shows that the adjusted 𝑅 2 is 0.61, and seven out of the
eleven loan purpose categories have a statistically significant relationship with the posted interest rate.
The model assumes a value of zero for “Taxes” and the sign and value of coefficient of other categories
are explained comparing to this category. Accordingly, sign of “Auto/Motorcycle/ RV/Boat” and “Debt
Consolidation” are negative compared to “Taxes”, implying that loan applications in these categories
would expect to receive a lower interest rate compare to their peers in the “Taxes” category. In contrast,
the coefficients of “Baby & Adoption”, “Green Loans”, “Business”, “Medical/Dental” and “Wedding
Loan” categories have positive signs compared to “Taxes” and they would expect to receive a higher
interest rate. Comparing values reveals that, among all groups, “Debt Consolidation” and
“Auto/Motorcycle/RV/Boat” seem the best categories to receive the lowest posted interest rates, and
“Baby & Adoption”, “Green Loans” and “Business” receive the highest interest rates, while “Other” and
“Not Available” categories have no statistically significant influence on the posted interest rate. The full
results of this model can be found in Appendix, table A.4.
Effect on investors: Percentage of loan-funded
In the second and third models, we study whether or not stating specific loan purposes can influence
investors. In model (2), which is defined only for the loan applications in the fractional channel, we
examine how the loan purpose can affect the amount of investment.
𝐹𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑐𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑠𝑖 + 𝜇 × 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾 × 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿 × 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝜑 × 𝑀𝑟𝑘𝑆𝑔𝑛𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (2)
The dependent variable is the percentage of loan funded (𝐹𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑐), and the independent variable of
primary interest is the loan purpose (𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑠𝑖 ). We control for loan specifications (vector 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑐𝑖 ), the
borrower personal characteristics (vector 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖 ), the borrower credit history factors (vector 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑖 ), as
well as the platform signals (vector 𝑀𝑟𝑘_𝑆𝑔𝑛𝑖 ) including the posted interest rate, risk score, grade score,
and estimated loss rate.
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In this analysis, we have focused on respond of investors to stated loan purpose. Accordingly, we only
considered the completed or expired loan applications in the market, and excluded “Withdrawn” or
“Cancelled” loan applications. Similar to model (1), we have found that the model has the
heteroscedasticity so we have used a weighted regression model to address this issue. Furthermore,
because of the high correlation between two important explanatory factors of the platform signals, the
posted interest rate and the estimated loss rate, we used the log transformation of the estimated loss in all
our next models.
Table (5) represents part of the results of this model that explains the relationship between the loan
purpose and the percentage of loan funded. Though 𝑅 2 is relatively low for this model (0.19), our findings
show that four categories out of eleven categories of loan purposes have a statistically significant
relationship with percentage of loan funded. In particular, the loan applications that state “Not Available”
as their purpose would expect 0.197 lower percentage of loan funded compared to “Taxes”. Moreover,
“Business”, “Household Expenses”, and “Other” categories attract statistically significantly lower amount
of investment in comparison to “Taxes”, while other stated loan purposes do not have any statistically
significant influence on percentage of loan funded. The full results of this model can be found in
Appendix, table A.4.
Effect on investors: Funding duration
The third model is very similar to model (2) and assesses the relationship between the loan purpose and the
funding duration (𝐹𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑟) both in the fractional and whole channels. However, since the funding duration
values range over several orders of magnitude, in this model we use the log transformation of the funding
duration as the dependent variable. In addition, to address the heteroscedasticity, we also have employed a
GLS model.
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐹𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖 ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑠𝑖 + 𝜇 × 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾 × 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿 × 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝜑 × 𝑀𝑟𝑘𝑆𝑔𝑛𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (3)
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Table (5) illustrates the results of this model that explain the relationship between loan purpose and the
funding duration, for fractional and whole channels, separately. Investors in both channels have a
significantly different response to the various loan purposes. In the fractional channel, which 𝑅 2 is 0.34,
eight of the eleven categories have statistically significant relationship with the funding duration.
Investors in the fractional channel are sensitive and responsive to the loan purpose and “Not Available”,
“Business”, “Other”, and “Household Expenses” categories have the longest funding duration among
significant loan categories in this channel. This result is in accordance with the results of model (2) in
which loan applications in “Not Available”, “Business”, “Household Expenses”, and “Other” categories
would expect lower percentage of loan funded in the fractional channel.

Table (5) – Part of the Results of Model (1), (2), and (3)
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In the whole channel, 𝑅 2 is 0.36 and ten out of the eleven categories have statistically significant
relationship with the loan purpose. Similar to the fractional channel, loan applications that stated
“Others”, “Household Expenses” and “Business” as their loan purpose would expect a longer funding
duration. However, loan applications in “Not Available” and “Green Loans” categories would expect on
average a shorter funding duration in the whole channel. It is noteworthy that despite the relatively lower
posted interest rates for “Auto/Motorcycle/RV/Boat” and “Debt Consolidation”, investors in the whole
channel are significantly less interested in these categories, and loans in these categories have the third
and fourth longest funding durations. However, despite the high posted interest rates for the “Green
Loans” which is expected to represent the high risk of these loans, in the whole channel, loan applications
in this category are the most popular loans based on the funding duration. The full results of this model
can be found in the Appendix, table A.4.
Taking all of these models together, we found that when an investor states “Business” as the loan
purpose, she would expect a higher posted interest rate, lower investment, and longer funding duration.
Moreover, if she states “Others”, she would expect no statistically significant change in the posted interest
rate, a little lower investment, and a little longer funding duration. In addition, if she states “Debt
Consolidation” as the loan purpose, she would expect a lower interest rate and a mildly longer funding
duration.
2- Evaluation of Effect of the Platform Signals on Investors
In this section, we answer to the second question of this paper and analyze how investors respond to the
platform signals. In fact, the main role of the P2P lending platform is to provide appropriate signals about
the loan applications to mitigate the adverse selection among investors. In the original model of P2P
lending mechanisms, the platform’s only role was to assign signals like grade and risk score to the loan
applications, and investor responses to borrower maximum acceptable interest rate were the main factor
to define the final interest rates. However, in today’s prominent P2P lending mechanisms, the platform is
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the key player who defines and posts the interest rates, and investors have no direct influence in defining
interest rates.
In recent P2P lending markets, investors have no direct role in defining the posted interest rate; however,
the platform rigorously needs to consider the response of investors to its signals and adjust them based on
their expected response. Although non-expired loan applications can show the investors’ satisfaction with
the posted interest rate and the platform signals, more sensitivity analyses can be helpful for the platform
to adjust its signals based on the investors’ expectations. In fact, an expired loan application is a lost
opportunity for the platform, and the platform will clearly seek to minimize these lost opportunities and
increase the investors’ eagerness to participate in the market. Clearly, a long “funding duration” or a low
“percentage of loan funded” are a matter of revealed investor preferences verifying the influence of the
platform signals on the behavior of investors. Therefore, in this section, we analyze the relationship
between the P2P platform signals and the funding percentage (of the total requested loan amount in the
fractional channel) and the funding duration in both the fractional and whole channels.
Effect on investors: Percentage of loan funded
The model for this analysis is the same as model (2) that specifically explores the loan applications
offered in the fractional channel. For this analysis, the main focused independent variables are the
platform signals and we control for the loan purpose, loan specifications, borrower personal
characteristics, and borrower credit history to analyze the relationship between the P2P platform signals
and the percentage of loan funded. We again refer to table (5) that illustrates the results of model (2) and
this time focus on the platform signals: posted interest rate, estimated loss rate, grade, and risk score.
The results in table (5) show that all platform signals have statistically significant influence on the
percentage of loan funded and investors in the fractional channel respond to the platform signals about the
loan applications. The sign of the “Posted Interest Rate” (positive) and the “Estimated Loss Rate”

118

(negative) show that increasing the posted interest rate and decreasing the estimated loss rate would result
in higher percentage of loan funded.
In model (2), in which we use the grade “AA” as the reference with effect equals to zero, the sign of the
level coefficients compared to the level “AA” are all positive. Indeed, worsening the grade of a loan
application would consistently increase the percentage of loan funded. However, if the loan labeled as
grade “HR” (i.e., high-risk), the borrower would expect a lower percentage of loan funded that grades
“B”, “C”, “D”, and “E”.
In addition, all levels of the risk score have a statistically significant relationship with the funded percent
of the loan amount. However, the trend of the risk score coefficients in the model is not consistent and has
very limited variations, except for the highest and lowest risk scores. Indeed, a loan application with a risk
score of one or eleven would expect a smaller percentage of loan funded comparing to other risk scores.
Effect on investors: Funding Duration
In this section, we explore the investor response to the platform signals and analyze the relationship
between the platform signals and the funding duration both in the fractional and whole channels. The
model for this analysis is the same as model (3) and its results are presented in table (5). In this analysis,
the platform signal is the independent variable of primary interest and we control for the loan purpose,
loan specifications, borrower personal characteristics, and borrower credit history.
The analysis for the fractional channel reveals that the posted interest rate is inversely related to the
funding duration and increasing the posted interest rate would shorten the funding duration. This result is
in accordance with our previous findings about the influence of increasing the posted interest rate on
investors’ willingness higher investment in the fractional channel. Moreover, as expected, increasing the
estimated loss rate increases the funding duration in the fractional channel. It is also observable that all
grade levels have a statistically significant relationship with the funding duration. Among all grades, loan
application labeled as grade “C”, “D”, and “E” would expect the shortest funding duration while “AA”,
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“HR”, and “A” would expect the longest funding duration in the fractional channel. This U pattern is also
similar with our previous funding about the percentage of loan funded. Finally, eight levels out of ten
grade levels have statistically significant relationship with the funding duration. In general, increasing the
risk score (toward better loan applications), with slight variation, would increase the funding duration in
the fractional channel.
The results of the whole channel however show a dissimilar relationship between platform signals
and funding duration. First, the posted interest rate and the funding duration in the whole channel are
directly related and increasing the posted interest rate would increase the funding duration. Secondly and
more surprisingly, the estimated loss rate has the inverse relationship with funding duration and
increasing the estimated loss rate would result in a decrease in funding duration in the whole channel.
Thirdly, five out of the six grade levels have statistically significant relationship with the funding
duration. Loan applications with grade “AA” would expect the shortest funding duration in the whole
channel. However, the funding duration increases for the grade “A” and then is cyclic pattern is repeated
as the grade is decreasing. Finally, the last platform signal, the risk score, has no statistically significant
relationship with funding duration and investors in the whole channel seem to be completely ignoring this
signal.
Taking all of these modes together, in the fractional channel, investors are eager to invest in riskier
loan applications. More loan applications with a higher posted interest rate and lower risk score (toward
riskier application) would surprisingly increase investor activity in this channel in general, indicating riskseeking behavior, with the caveat that their interest in “HR” applications is similar to “A” grade. Investors
in the whole channel, on the other hand, are in general risk averse and more interested in choosing
applications with a lower posted interest rate, which is reasonable since they have to invest in the whole
loan amount. However, their response to other platform signals, which describe the applications risks,
show that they do not follow signals and their decisions are not aligned with the natural interpretation of
the platform messages.
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3- Evaluation of loan ex post outcomes
In this section, we address the third question of this paper and analyze the ex post outcomes of loans. We
calculate three metrics to measure the loan outcomes, the possibility of delinquency, the internal rate of
return (IRR), and the return of investment (ROI). First, we explore the relationship between the borrower
signals and each loan’s ex post outcomes to measure the reliability of the self-reported loan purpose. Then,
we investigate the relationship between the platform signals and the loan ex post outcomes, and study
whether each of these signals are significant predictors of the loan application risk and profitability.
Evaluation of Outcomes of Loan Applications Considering the Borrower Signals
In this section, we analyze whether or not the ex post outcomes of loans show significant differences
between similar loans with different stated purposes. The dependent variables in model (4), (5), and (6)
are delinquency (𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑞𝑖 ), internal rate of return (𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖 ), and return on investment of loans (𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖 ),
respectively. In this section, the independent variable of primary interest is the loan purpose while we
control for loan terms, borrower personal characteristics, borrower credit history, and the platform
signals, as defined in tables (1) and (4).
Delinquency
In model (4), our dependent variable is a binary outcome: delinquent loan and not delinquent loan.
Accordingly, in the model, we set the delinquency variable (𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑞𝑖 ) equal to one if the loan was
defaulted or charged off. To assess the relationship between the loan purpose and the possibility of
delinquency, we compared the results of the probit, logit and extreme value models for the default binary
variable, and found that the logit model provides a more robust result considering the maximum
likelihood and log likelihood. Therefore, we used a binary logit model to explore the relationship between
the loan purpose and the possibility of delinquency.
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑞𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑠𝑖 + 𝜇 × 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾 × 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿 × 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝜑 × 𝑀𝑟𝑘𝑆𝑔𝑛𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (4)
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Our independent variable of primary interest in this analysis is the loan purpose, while we control for other
loan specifications, the borrower personal characteristics, the borrower credit history factors, and the
platform signals as described in tables (1) and (3). Table (6) represents the results of this model.
The results reveal that seven out of eleven categories, “Business”, “Baby & Adoption”, “Vacation/Special
Location”, “Other”, “Medical/ Dental”, “Household Expenses”, and “Not Available” all with positive
coefficients compared to “Taxes”, have statistically significant relationship with “default” outcome. Among
these seven significant loan purposes, “Business” has the largest positive coefficient in the model which
indicates that if the borrower states “Business” as her loan purpose, the odds of getting default would
increase compared to other groups of loan purpose.
Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
In model (5), our dependent variable is the internal rate of return (𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖 ) and we consider the same sets of
independent variable as model (4). For this model, we also have released the homoscedasticity assumption
by developing a weighted regression model in order to achieve more robust findings.
𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑠𝑖 + 𝜇 × 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾 × 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿 × 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝜑 × 𝑀𝑟𝑘𝑆𝑔𝑛𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (5)
Table (6) represents the results of this model. Our findings show that the adjusted 𝑅 2 for this model is 0.61
and only three categories out of the eleven loan purpose categories have statistically significant relationship
with IRR of the loans. Among these three categories, “Auto/Motorcycle/RV/Boat” has the highest IRR, and
the “Business” category has the lowest IRR.
Return on Investment (ROI)
Now we turn our attention to a more reliable metric for measuring the outcomes of loans in the P2P lending
market, the return on investment that is the dependent variable in model (6). For this model, we found that
the variances of the residuals are correlated with our explanatory variables so we have released the
homoscedasticity assumption and developed a GLS (Generalized Least Square) model with inverse
variance as weights to estimate the coefficients under these conditions
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𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑝𝑠𝑖 + 𝜇 × 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾 × 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿 × 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝜑 × 𝑀𝑟𝑘𝑆𝑔𝑛𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (6)
Our results in table (6) reveal that ROI of loan applications is almost not related to the loan purpose and ten
out of eleven loan purpose categories do not have statistically significant relation with the ROI of loans.
However, the only statistically significant loan purpose is the “Other” category that has the positive
relationship with profitability of loans. Therefore, it means that considering the posted interest rates, loan
purposes by themselves cannot predict any difference on loan outcomes and any extra attention to
interpretation of loan purpose can be misguiding.
Evaluation of Outcomes of Loan Applications Based on the P2P Platform Signals
In this section, we evaluate how the platform signals are statistically significant indicators to predict the
ex post outcomes of loan applications. We study the relationship between ex post outcomes of loan
applications based on delinquency, IRR, and ROI, and the market signals including the posted interest
rate, the estimated loss rate, the grade, and the risk score.
The models for these analyses are the same as models (4), (5), and (6). The dependent variables in model
(4), (5), and (6) are delinquency (𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑞𝑖 ), internal rate of return (𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖 ), and return on investment of
loans (𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖 ), respectively. In these models, the independent variables of primary interest are the market
signals, while we control for the loan purpose, the loan specifications, the borrower personal
characteristics, and the borrower credit history as defined in tables (1) and (4).
Delinquency
The model for this analysis is the same as model (4) and again we refer to table (6) for its results. As this
table illustartes the posted interest rate, the estimated loss rate and the risk score have statistically
significant relationship with the possibility of delinquency. The sign of coefficients of these variables in
the model follow expectation. In particular, the possibility of default would increase as the posted interest
rate and the estimated loss rate increase. In addition, the possibility of delinquency smoothly and
consistently decreases as the risk score changes from 1 to 11 (toward less risky applications).
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However, the analysis shows no statistically significant relationship between the loan grade and the
delinquency rate, and grades are completely unsuccessful in predicting the delinquency rate of loan
applications.

Table (6)- Part of the Results of Model (4), (5), and (6)
Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
The model for this analysis is the same as model (4) and again we refer to table (6) to present its results. As
this table illustrates, the adjusted 𝑅 2 is 0.61, and the posted interest rate, the estimated loss rate, and most
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of levels of loan grade and risk scores have significant relationship with IRR. Our findings show that IRR
has an indirect relationship with IRR and increasing the posted interest rate would decrease IRR. However,
more surprisingly, the estimated loss rate has a direct relationship with IRR, i.e., an increased the estimated
loss rate (towards more losses) would increase the internal rate of return.
In addition, loan applications with grade “A”, “B”, “C”, and “D” would expect lower IRR, while loan
applications with grade “E” and “HR” would expect higher IRR compared to the loan applications with
grade “AA” (U-shaped pattern). Moreover, in accordance with our findings on the estimated loss score, but
in contrast to natural expectation, and increased risk score (toward less riskier loans) almost everywhere
correlates to a lower IRR. Finally, the findings show that there is no statistically significant relationship
between high values of risk score (least risky) and IRR.
Return on Investment (ROI)
The model for this analysis is the same as model (6) and again we refer to table (6) to illustrate its results.
The findings reveal that the adjusted 𝑅 2of the model is 0.63 and the posted interest rate, the estimated loss
rate, few levels of loan grades, and all levels of risk score have statistically significant relationship with
ROI. Following expectation, as the posted interest rate increases and the estimated loss rate decreases,
ROI increases.
In addition, few grade levels have a significant relationship with ROI and in particular, the grade “HR”
would quite surprisingly result in higher ROI compared to “AA”. Finally, while our results show that all
levels of the risk score have statistically significant relationship with ROI, the order and values of its
coefficient in our model are not consistent with the expectation and do not represent a robust pattern.

Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a series of empirical models to study the performance of players in the P2P
lending market. We have employed different sets of models to assess the interplay between the players in
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these markets, showing how signals from one class of participant effects the behavior of others in the
market and may predict the loan outcomes.
Considering results of all our models, we find that the posted interest rate (as a platform signal), the
investor responses, and the loan ex post outcome do not always align naturally. For example, stating
“Business” as the loan purpose would result in a higher posted interest rate, lower percentage of loan
funded, and longer funding duration compared to most of the other loan purposes including “Debt
Consolidation” (table (5) and (6)). However, analyses of loan ex post outcomes reveal that the
performance of “Business” loans, based on delinquency ratio and ROI are not statistically different from
their peers in other groups. The only statistically dissimilar outcome of “Business” loans is their IRR,
which showed the smallest indirect relationship compared to other loan purposes with significant
relationship with IRR. Further, we expressed theoretical doubts about the use of IRR as an ex post
aggregate measure (in contrast with a previous study), making this relationship between the “Business”
purpose and its higher interest rate even more questionable, or perhaps explaining a possible source of
confusion if the platform itself relies on the dubious IRR metric when setting a posted rate.
A similar inconsistency between platform decisions and ex post loan outcomes is found in the “Debt
Consolidation” category. Actually if the P2P lending platform was mainly relying on either delinquency
ratio or IRR for defining the posted interest rates, the “Debt Consolidation” should have one of the
highest posted interest rates. However, loans in this category have the lowest posted interest rate among
all loan purposes. Accordingly, the results show that in general, the difference of posted interest rates for
various loan purposes cannot be explained by their expected outcomes and there is inconsistency between
ex post outcome of loan applications and the platform signal for self-reported loan purposes.
The inconsistency between platform signals, investor response, and loan ex post outcomes is not limited
to the posted interest rate as a function of loan purpose. This study expands the analysis of the
relationship among the platform signals, investor responses, and loan ex post outcomes, and assesses the

126

impact of four main platform signals, the posted interest rate, the estimated loss rate, the loan grade, and
the risk score on the market.
Firstly, our analysis illustrates that an increased posted interest rate would attract investors in the
fractional channel not only in terms of higher funded percentage of loan amount, but also in shorter
funding duration. While the decision of investors in the fractional channel is in accordance with the
expected ROI of loan applications, which increases as the posted interest rate increases, their decision is
against their benefits based on the delinquency rate and IRR, since increasing the posted interest rate
would increase the delinquency ratio and decrease the IRR. In contrast, investors in the whole channel
show less desire to invest in loan applications with a higher posted interest rate, which provide more
benefit for them based on delinquency and IRR.
Secondly, our analysis indicates that the estimated loss rate, the next platform signal, is an effective
predictor of delinquency and ROI, and investors in the fractional channel acknowledge this result. Indeed,
a higher estimated loss rate would increase the possibility of delinquency and reduce ROI. At the same
time, and a higher estimated loss rate decreases the interest of investors in the fractional channel, based on
both the funded percentage of loan amount and the funding duration. However, unexpectedly, a higher
estimated loss rate increases IRR; an effect that is acknowledged by investors in the whole channel who
show more interest in loan applications with a higher estimated loss rate.
The third platform signal that we have assessed is the loan grade. The results of our models indicate that
this signal has no statistically significant relationship with possibility of delinquency. However, for a few
grade levels like “B” and “HR”, there is a significant relationship between the grade level, and both IRR
and ROI. Based on IRR and ROI, investing in loan applications with “HR” grade is beneficial for
investors while investing in loan applications with “B” grade is not beneficial. Nevertheless, investors in
the fractional and whole channels significantly ignore this result and prefer loan applications with “B”
grade to “HR” grade. Moreover, there is a consistent and robust inverse U-shaped response toward loan
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grade among investors in the fractional channel that shows more desire for middle grade loans among
fractional investors. However, their desire is not statistically supported by their benefits, measured by
delinquency, IRR, or ROI. There is also a statistically significant relationship between loan grade and
investor desires in the whole channel. However, this significant, but not robust relationship cannot be
supported by the outcomes of loans, measured by delinquency, IRR, or ROI.
The last platform signal, the risk score, shows a direct and strictly robust relationship with the
delinquency ratio and IRR. Indeed, higher risk scores predict a lower delinquency ratio, but also lower
IRR. This result is clearly acknowledged by investors in the fractional channel, where funding duration
increases as the risk score increases toward better applications. In fact, investors in the fractional channel
have a tendency to invest in loan applications with lower risk score (the riskier applications), which
would be expected to lead to higher delinquency but more IRR. In contrast, investors in the whole
channel are indifferent about risk score; their responses show no statistically significant relationship with
the risk score.
In summary, not all platform signals are reliable predictors of loan application outcomes. In the studied
market, the risk score is the only robust and consistent signal for prediction of loan delinquency in the
market. Moreover, if IRR is the primary concern, one may find the loan grade as a significant predictor of
IRR; however, the statistically significant U-shaped relationship between loan grade and IRR does not
follow the anticipated increasing trend for benefit of different levels of loan grade, and the loan grades in
their current form seem to be misinforming investors. In addition, if ROI is the primary concern, neither
the loan grade nor the risk score are reliable predictor of ROI. Taking all these results together, we
conclude that the studied P2P lending platform needs more consistent and robust signals about expected
outcomes of loan applications to help investors, especially in the fractional market, with better metrics to
analyze and compare loan applications.
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Appendix

Table (A.1)- Descriptive analysis of the grade and risk score

Table (A.2) - Descriptive analysis of the loan purpose
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Table (A.3) – Descriptive analysis of the round of posted interest rates.
Poster Interest Rate
(Model 1)
Std.
Error

Coeff.

Std.
Error

Loan Purpose

Coeff.

Auto/Motorcycle/RV/Boat

-0.004

***

0.001

-0.002

Baby & Adoption

0.009

***

0.002

-0.040

Business

0.005

***

0.001

-0.043

Debt Consolidation

-0.008

***

0.001

0.000

Green Loans

0.008

*

0.003

0.024

Household Expenses

0.000

0.001

-0.023

Medical / Dental

0.005

0.001

-0.015

Not Available

-0.004

0.003

-0.197

Other

-0.001

0.001

-0.020

Vacation/Special Occasion

-0.001

0.001

-0.012

Wedding Loans

0.004

0.001

-0.004

***

**

Funding duration (Model 3)

Loan Funded
Percentage (Model 2)

Fractional

Whole

Coeff.

Std.
Error

0.009

1.963

4.357

5.985

0.020

10.244

9.619

-0.365

0.008

27.076

***

4.052

9.535

***

0.607

0.008

9.399

*

3.774

6.324

***

0.540

0.033

22.264

16.398

-7.702

**

2.833

0.008

16.387

***

3.891

7.532

***

0.558

0.010

12.110

**

4.585

1.144

*

0.632

***

0.035

96.922

***

16.900

-7.022

**

2.150

*

0.008

21.699

***

3.933

3.543

***

0.565

0.011

14.263

**

5.341

2.062

**

0.778

0.011

9.202

*

5.340

5.318

***

0.869

***

**

Coeff.

Std. Error
***

0.689
2.125

P2P Market Signals
Posted Interest Rate

1.798

***

0.090

164.156

***

40.601

68.630

***

7.296

Estimated Loss Rate

-0.299

***

0.010

59.128

***

3.496

-1.335

**

0.482

GRADE="A"

0.154

***

0.008

-50.555

***

2.666

3.602

***

0.269

GRADE="B"

0.254

***

0.011

***

4.019

1.433

***

0.378

GRADE="C"

0.294

***

0.014

-97.003
118.018

***

5.104

2.100

***

0.481

Grade
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GRADE="D"

0.304

***

0.016

GRADE="E"

0.300

***

0.019

116.676
115.748

GRADE="HR"

0.180

***

0.021

RISK_SCORE=2

0.105

***

RISK_SCORE=3

0.095

RISK_SCORE=4

***

6.284

0.303

0.626

***

7.685

1.820

*

0.824

-56.583

***

8.352

1.739

*

1.040

0.006

-9.291

**

3.543

14.519

20972.250

***

0.006

1.889

3.503

15.742

20972.250

0.103

***

0.006

6.415

3.430

19.729

20972.250

RISK_SCORE=5

0.120

***

0.006

1.953

3.502

26.815

20972.250

RISK_SCORE=6

0.099

***

0.006

14.182

***

3.588

22.708

20972.250

RISK_SCORE=7

0.103

***

0.007

18.523

***

3.713

23.118

20972.250

RISK_SCORE=8

0.105

***

0.007

33.462

***

3.791

23.576

20972.250

RISK_SCORE=9

0.110

***

0.008

31.225

***

4.055

25.641

20972.250

RISK_SCORE=10

0.096

***

0.010

17.189

***

4.375

25.759

20972.250

RISK_SCORE=11

0.051

***

0.011

27.562

***

4.613

35.137

20972.250
20973.270

Risk Score

Intercept

*

0.143

***

0.005

-0.309

***

0.061

97.433

***

3.765

76.038

Total Inquiries

0.001

***

0.000

0.002

***

0.000

-0.686

***

0.135

-0.038

**

0.014

Total Open Revolving
Accounts

0.000

**

0.000

0.001

***

0.000

-0.407

***

0.104

0.025

*

0.012

Revolving Balance

0.000

***

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Revolving Available Percent

0.000

***

0.000

0.000

*

0.000

0.048

*

0.026

-0.004

Loan Application Amount

0.000

***

0.000

0.000

***

0.000

0.007

***

0.000

0.000

***

0.000

Inflation Rate

0.006

***

0.000

-0.025

***

0.002

24.620

***

1.155

-22.335

***

0.162

Credit History Length

0.000

***

0.000

-0.001

***

0.000

0.510

***

0.055

-0.023

***

0.006

Bankcard Utilization

0.006

***

0.001

0.035

***

0.004

-10.332

***

2.201

2.621

***

0.332

Debt to income with the loan
Delinquencies within last7
years

0.000

***

0.000

0.000

***

0.000

0.000

***

0.000

0.000

***

0.000

0.000

***

0.000

0.000

***

0.000

0.559

***

0.048

0.194

***

0.005

Delinquencies over 30 days

0.000

***

0.000

0.000

***

0.000

-0.106

*

0.064

-0.153

***

0.009

Inquiries last 6 months

0.008

***

0.000

-0.007

***

0.001

3.236

***

0.346

***

0.041

Federal Reserve Rate

0.086

***

0.006

-0.905

***

0.048

705.043

***

22.714

0.213
775.958

***

4.175

FICO_SCO="< 600"

0.081

***

0.004

0.044

0.036

-8.426

15.933

35.351

141.681

FICO_SCO="600-619"

0.075

***

0.003

0.046

0.030

-17.160

11.944

22.889

150.432

FICO_SCO="620-639"

0.076

***

0.002

0.055

*

0.027

-16.455

*

9.101

17.072

49.522

FICO_SCO="640-659"

0.082

***

0.002

0.061

*

0.024

-21.964

**

7.068

5.501

***

0.862

FICO_SCO="660-679"

0.051

***

0.002

0.063

**

0.024

-18.153

**

6.976

5.795

***

0.848

FICO_SCO="680-699"

0.038

***

0.002

0.063

**

0.024

-17.191

*

6.948

8.242

***

0.840

FICO_SCO="700-719"

0.031

***

0.002

0.073

**

0.024

-24.659

***

6.943

8.591

***

0.837

FICO_SCO="720-739"

0.026

***

0.002

0.079

**

0.024

-26.630

***

6.947

9.760

***

0.832

FICO_SCO="740-759"

0.021

***

0.002

0.076

**

0.024

-23.667

***

7.063

8.056

***

0.837

FICO_SCO="760-779"

0.017

***

0.002

0.066

**

0.025

-23.008

**

7.190

9.528

***

0.844

FICO_SCO="780-799"

0.010

***

0.002

0.057

*

0.026

-17.281

*

7.469

3.362

***

0.882

FICO_SCO="800-819"

0.003

0.002

0.045

0.028

-12.472

7.951

11.243

***

0.898

Control Variables
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0.000
0.004

FICO_SCO="NA"

0.060

***

0.002

0.046

SCOREX="< 600"

0.061

***

0.001

-0.010

SCOREX="600-619"

0.057

***

0.001

0.029

SCOREX="620-639"

0.052

***

0.001

SCOREX="640-649"

0.049

***

SCOREX="650-664"

0.041

***

SCOREX="665-689"

0.041

SCOREX="690-701"

*

0.025

19.723

0.011

-4.698

*

***

0.007

-29.247

0.022

***

0.006

-24.642

0.001

-0.041

***

0.006

1.462

0.001

-0.036

***

0.006

9.271

***

***

0.000

-0.011

*

0.005

3.784

*

0.035

***

0.001

0.000

0.005

SCOREX="702-723"

0.030

***

0.000

0.006

SCOREX="724-747"

0.021

***

0.000

0.000

SCOREX="748-777"

0.014

***

0.000

SCOREX="NA"
Loan Origination Year
=2011

0.014

7.819
5.462

10.042

***

0.441

***

3.550

2.508

***

0.382

***

2.938

-0.415

2.898

11.187

***

0.325

2.450

4.159

***

0.292

2.143

1.389

***

0.264

1.758

2.276

-0.946

***

0.276

0.005

-0.645

2.041

-0.383

0.240

0.005

2.140

1.926

-0.059

0.230

0.005

0.005

-1.346

1.843

-1.801

***

0.220

0.008

-0.056

0.044

3.281

21.108

0.009

30.428

***

4.171

***

3.824
1.480

22.915

***

3.428

***

0.326

0.024

***

0.001

-0.060

Loan Origination Year=2012

0.020

***

0.001

0.005

0.008

-17.302

Loan Origination Year=2014

-0.038

***

0.000

0.018

***

0.003

-0.024

Loan Origination Year=2015

-0.043

***

0.000

0.026

***

0.006

34.724

***

2.427

12.665

***

3.439

Homeownership="True"

0.009

***

0.000

0.015

***

0.002

-7.781

***

0.978

1.900

***

0.114

Income_Range="$100,000+"

-0.040

***

0.005

-0.050

*

0.030

39.080

*

16.571

-21.553

206.786

Income_Range="$1-24,999"
Income_Range="$25,00049,999"
Income_Range="$50,00074,999"
Income_Range="$75,00099,999"
Income_Range="Not
employed"

-0.006

0.005

-0.086

**

0.030

62.916

***

16.604

-23.736

206.786

-0.022

***

0.005

-0.062

*

0.030

50.081

***

16.548

-23.923

206.786

-0.029

***

0.005

-0.055

*

0.030

42.320

*

16.552

-22.070

206.786

-0.037

***

0.005

-0.053

*

0.030

42.382

*

16.568

-21.383

206.786

0.005

-0.138

***

0.031

95.901

***

16.904

-13.343

-0.004

222.064

Number of Observations

284,983

50,709

50,709

137,641

R-Square Adjusted

0.6109

0.1912

0.3435

0.3585

*** indicates p-value<0.001, ** indicates p-value<0.01, * indicates p-value <0.1

Table (A.4) - Results of models (1), (2), and (3)
Default (Model 4)
Std.
Error

Coefficient
Auto/Motorcycle/RV/Boat

-0.0781

IRR (Model 5)
Std.
Coefficient
Error

0.1029

-0.0008

*

ROI (Model 6)
Std.
Coefficient
Error

0.0005

-0.0035

0.0031

0.0011

-0.0082

0.0072

0.0004

0.0029

0.0028

Baby & Adoption

0.4104

*

0.2038

-0.0006

Business

0.5306

***

0.0913

-0.0010

Debt Consolidation

0.1333

0.0848

-0.0002

0.0004

-0.0006

0.0025

Green Loans

0.2814

0.3254

-0.0009

0.0018

-0.0109

0.0117

Household Expenses

0.2050

*

0.0875

-0.0005

0.0004

0.0031

0.0026

Medical / Dental

0.2099

*

0.0971

0.0002

0.0005

0.0043

0.0030

Not Available

0.1476

*

0.2720

-0.0004

0.0014

0.0052

0.0093

Other

0.2107

*

0.0876

-0.0009

0.0004

0.0064

Vacation/Special Occasion

0.2171

*

0.1156

-0.0004

0.0006

0.0000

0.0037

0.1227

-0.0003

0.0005

-0.0032

0.0036

0.9089

-0.0351

0.0045

1.6143

Wedding Loans

-0.1939

*

*

*

0.0026

P2P Lending Market Signals
Posted Interest Rate

2.4334

**
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***

***

0.0305

Estimated Loss Rate

0.2279

**

0.0855

0.0082

***

0.0004

-0.0124

***

0.0028

Grade
GRADE="A"

0.0243

0.0534

-0.0016

***

0.0003

0.0027

GRADE="B"

0.0242

0.0736

-0.0034

***

0.0004

0.0046

0.0018

GRADE="C"

0.0486

0.0894

-0.0023

***

0.0005

0.0048

0.0031

GRADE="D"

0.0398

0.1053

-0.0009

0.0006

0.0028

0.0037

GRADE="E"

0.0628

0.1236

0.0027

***

0.0007

0.0035

0.0044

GRADE="HR"

0.0378

0.1381

0.0040

***

0.0007

0.0137

**

0.0048

*

0.0025

Risk Score
RISK_SCORE=2

-1.0870

***

0.2214

0.0055

***

0.0014

-0.1159

***

0.0082

RISK_SCORE=3

-1.1247

***

0.2212

0.0051

***

0.0014

-0.1183

***

0.0082

RISK_SCORE=4

-1.1326

***

0.2208

0.0044

**

0.0013

-0.1166

***

0.0082

RISK_SCORE=5

-1.1887

***

0.2212

0.0045

***

0.0014

-0.1184

***

0.0082

RISK_SCORE=6

-1.2278

***

0.2216

0.0037

**

0.0014

-0.1141

***

0.0082

RISK_SCORE=7

-1.2752

***

0.2221

0.0035

**

0.0014

-0.1169

***

0.0083

RISK_SCORE=8

-1.3689

***

0.2225

0.0043

**

0.0014

-0.1173

***

0.0083

RISK_SCORE=9

-1.5018

***

0.2240

0.0019

0.0014

-0.1173

***

0.0083

RISK_SCORE=10

-1.6273

***

0.2273

0.0019

0.0014

-0.1167

***

0.0084

RISK_SCORE=11

-1.8287

***

0.2318

0.0033

0.0014

-0.1162

***

0.0085

Intercept

-0.7733

0.7696

0.0446

0.0045

0.0091

0.0000

-0.0011

***

0.0001

***

0.0297

Control Variables
Total Inquiries

0.0094

***

0.0020

0.0000

Total Open Revolving Accounts

0.0131

***

0.0017

0.0001

0.0000

0.0002

***

0.0001

Revolving Balance

0.0000

***

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

*

0.0000

Revolving Available Percent

0.0004

0.0005

0.0000

0.0000

-0.0002

***

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

***

0.0000

0.0000

*

0.0000

0.0229

0.0006

***

0.0001

0.0020

**

0.0008

Loan Application Amount
Inflation Rate

0.0000

***

-0.0280

***

Credit History Length

0.0028

**

0.0009

0.0000

***

0.0000

0.0003

***

0.0000

Bankcard Utilization

-0.3028

***

0.0449

-0.0012

***

0.0002

-0.0096

***

0.0015

0.0000

***

0.0000

0.0000

***

0.0000

0.0000

***

0.0000

Delinquencies within last7 years

-0.0052

***

0.0008

0.0000

0.0000

-0.0002

***

0.0000

Delinquencies over 30 days

-0.0020

*

0.0012

0.0000

*

0.0000

0.0005

***

0.0000

Debt to income with the loan

Inquiries last 6 months

0.0215

***

0.0057

-0.0001

**

0.0000

-0.0007

**

0.0002

Federal Reserve Rate

1.8798

***

0.5459

-0.0132

***

0.0027

0.0502

**

0.0178

FICO_SCO="< 600"

1.7211

***

0.4390

0.0018

0.0025

-0.0028

0.0165

FICO_SCO="600-619"

0.7731

*

0.3723

0.0022

0.0016

0.0004

0.0109

FICO_SCO="620-639"

0.9049

***

0.2536

0.0022

*

0.0011

-0.0025

0.0075

FICO_SCO="640-659"

0.5216

**

0.1998

0.0016

*

0.0008

-0.0089

0.0057

FICO_SCO="660-679"

0.5271

**

0.1987

0.0008

0.0008

-0.0063

0.0057

FICO_SCO="680-699"

0.5531

**

0.1981

0.0004

0.0008

-0.0046

0.0057

FICO_SCO="700-719"

0.5024

*

0.1978

0.0001

0.0008

-0.0016

0.0057

FICO_SCO="720-739"

0.3826

*

0.1978

-0.0007

0.0008

-0.0033

0.0057

FICO_SCO="740-759"

0.3182

0.1990

-0.0009

0.0008

-0.0038

0.0057

FICO_SCO="760-779"

0.3097

0.2017

-0.0017

0.0008

-0.0036

0.0058

FICO_SCO="780-799"

0.1314

0.2096

-0.0012

0.0008

-0.0073

0.0060

FICO_SCO="800-819"

0.2268

0.2237

-0.0018

0.0009

-0.0094

0.0065

FICO_SCO="NA"

0.1919

0.2522

0.0015

0.0010

0.0005

0.0070
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*
*

SCOREX="< 600"

1.0328

***

0.0649

-0.0045

***

0.0004

0.0092

***

0.0024

SCOREX="600-619"

0.9367

***

0.0577

-0.0046

***

0.0003

0.0038

*

0.0021

SCOREX="620-639"

0.7823

***

0.0506

-0.0045

***

0.0003

0.0041

*

0.0017

SCOREX="640-649"

0.7133

***

0.0510

-0.0046

***

0.0003

0.0031

*

0.0018

SCOREX="650-664"

0.5998

***

0.0466

-0.0046

***

0.0002

0.0058

***

0.0016

SCOREX="665-689"

0.5433

***

0.0427

-0.0044

***

0.0002

0.0036

*

0.0014

SCOREX="690-701"

0.4924

***

0.0445

-0.0043

***

0.0002

0.0029

**

0.0015

SCOREX="702-723"

0.4115

***

0.0409

-0.0045

***

0.0002

0.0024

*

0.0013

SCOREX="724-747"

0.3067

***

0.0400

-0.0044

***

0.0002

0.0030

*

0.0013

SCOREX="748-777"

0.1545

***

0.0401

-0.0034

***

0.0002

0.0014

0.7826

-0.0073

*

0.0033

-0.0622

**

0.0240

*

0.0043

SCOREX="NA"

-0.1570

Loan Origination Year =2011

0.8347

***

0.1604

0.0054

***

0.0007

-0.0087

Loan Origination Year=2012

0.6381

***

0.1567

0.0019

**

0.0006

-0.0031

Loan Origination Year=2014

0.2068

***

0.0290

-0.0017

***

0.0001

0.0002

Loan Origination Year=2015

0.3057

***

0.0428

-0.0016

***

0.0002

0.0036

0.0013

0.0041
0.0009
*

0.0014

Homeownership="True"

-0.0409

*

0.0167

0.0000

0.0001

0.0003

0.0006

Income_Range="$100,000+"

-1.5238

**

0.5492

0.0007

0.0035

0.0342

Income_Range="$1-24,999"
Income_Range="$25,00049,999"
Income_Range="$50,00074,999"
Income_Range="$75,00099,999"

-0.7438

0.5496

0.0021

0.0035

0.0485

*

0.0237

Income_Range="Not employed"

0.0237

-1.0123

*

0.5490

0.0020

0.0035

0.0405

*

0.0237

-1.2039

*

0.5490

0.0010

0.0035

0.0347

*

0.0237

-1.3559

*

0.5492

0.0013

0.0035

0.0334

0.0237

-0.9322

*

0.5593

0.0004

0.0036

0.0319

0.0240

Number of Observations

159,231

159,231

R-Square Adjusted

0.6102

0.6286

*** indicates p-value<0.001, ** indicates p-value<0.01, * indicates p-value <0.1

Table (A.5) – Results of model (4), (5), and (6)
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Chapter 5. Conclusions
In this thesis, we addressed three main questions. First, we explored the many-to-many matching
problem, and in particular the course allocation problem and developed optimization-based mechanisms
that improve fairness and efficiency and can reduce the benefit of students who misreport their
preferences. Second, the team formation problem was presented as an extension of the roommate
problem, and an algorithm for achieving game-theoretically stable and economically efficient solutions
was developed. Third, we turned our attention to a peer-to-peer lending market and presented a series of
empirical models to assess the interplay between players and show how signals from one class of
participant predict the loan outcomes and affect the behavior of others in the market.
In detail, the first essay explored five new algorithmic variations to solve the course allocation problem,
addressing the relative balance of efficiency, fairness, and incentive compatibility. To understand the
performance of these five algorithms, we compared them to the draft and bidding point mechanisms,
benchmarks that have been used in practice. We introduced a comprehensive systemization of natural
metrics for these objectives, with a novel perspective of analyzing any set of outcomes based on the total
(or average), range, and standard deviation of binary, ordinal, and cardinal utility. Our two-part OC
algorithm (global ordinal optimization with cardinal tie-breaking) proved to be a very fair and efficient
method, with alternative new methods (based on within-round optimization) performing better on
incentive compatibility.
In the second paper, we investigated computational models for the team formation problem. In order to
balance intra-team utility with solution stability, we formulated a bi-level binary optimization model and
developed a branch-cut-and-price solution algorithm. The pseudo-polynomial approach to the bi-level
problem is itself an interesting contribution, and we detailed how to implement the resulting algorithm,
which still has to manage an exponential number of variables and constraints, which demanded the*
development of advanced computational methods. Experimental results indicated that the proposed
algorithm BCP is particularly effective at finding high-quality solutions quickly. Stability as an objective
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to be optimized over remains a particularly challenging computational problem, but we have shown a
promising new approach. Our results also indicated that ignoring stability can result in inferior solutions
when Pareto improvements are available.
In the third paper, having collected a large dataset of publicly available loan information for over four
years of loan origination requests (with all follow-up data through the completion of 36-month loan
terms) from an anonymous lending platform, we analyzed the interplay between the players in P2P
lending markets. In particular, we first explored the borrowers’ disclosed personal information and
analyzed the response of the platform as well as the investors to these signals. Then, we analyzed the
response of investors to the platform signals and examined how closely investors follow the signals
provided by the platform. Finally, we studied the effectiveness of the P2P lending platform signals in
predicting the success of loans. Our results suggest that certain platform signals might be misleading, as
well as significant trends in which the self-reported loan purpose might also be a signal that is being
misread by investors.
As a whole, these essays showed that matching markets, which might at first seem simple, are actually
incredibly complex. Though we illustrate how difficult they may sometimes be to understand, predict, or
control, we also demonstrated that advanced computational techniques create new opportunities for better
understanding of existing markets and better designs for the markets of tomorrow.
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